ODNB Life of the Day - Richard, Duke of York
ODNB Life of the Day - Richard, Duke of York
2011-07-15 12:31:14
I subscribe to the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography Life of the Day.
They usually choose people because it's their birthday - clearly not the
case this time - and I'm glad Richard Duke of York is having a turn.
Best wishes
Christine
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Subject: A most successful failure?
Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2011 07:00:00 +0100
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Richard of York, third duke of York (1411-1460), magnate and claimant
to the English throne, was the only son of Richard of Conisbrough,
fourth earl of Cambridge (1385-1415), and Anne Mortimer (b. after 1388,
d. before 1414), daughter of Roger (VII) Mortimer, fourth earl of March.
He was descended from Edward III through both parents, his father being
the son of that king's fourth son, Edmund of Langley, first duke of
York, and his mother the great-granddaughter of Edward's second son,
Lionel of Antwerp, duke of Clarence. It was this distinguished ancestry
that provided the basis for his explosive participation in the troubled
politics of the 1450s. In October 1460, after a decade of agitation and
intervention, he attempted to seize the throne on the grounds that his
descent from Clarence made him rightful king in place of Henry VI, who,
like the other Lancastrian kings, was descended from Edward III's third
son, John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster. The attempt failed, and York died
a few months later at the battle of Wakefield, but the claim, of course,
lived on to provide the basis for Edward IV's succession in March 1461.
Youth and inheritance
Richard of York was born on 22 September 1411, to parents who had
married in secret and were soon to be dead. His mother was gone within a
year or two; his father, who married again in 1414, was executed the
following year when details of his plot to depose Henry V came to light.
Cambridge's plan to raise the north and (apparently) to put Edmund (V)
Mortimer, earl of March, on the throne must have thrown his son's
dynastic position into sharp relief: the young Richard's mother had been
the elder of March's sisters, which made the boy himself a possible heir
to the Mortimer-Clarence claim to the throne. On Cambridge's death he
became a royal ward, and it is not altogether surprising that in March
1416 he was placed in the custody of the Lancastrians' leading gaoler,
Sir Robert Waterton. Three years into his reign, however, Henry V was
busy laying to rest the divisions of his father's time and Richard of
York was destined for rehabilitation. He was protected from the effects
of his father's attainder and, on the death of his uncle Edward, duke of
York, at Agincourt, the boy was recognized to be his heir. Not long
after Henry VI's accession York's wardship and marriage were sold to
Ralph Neville, earl of Westmorland. At 3000 marks the price was a high
one, but Neville's investment was amply repaid when, in January 1425,
Edmund, earl of March, died childless, and York, as his nephew, became
heir to the extensive Mortimer inheritance. At some stage in the 1420s,
possibly as early as 1424, the young duke was married off to Cecily
Neville (1415-1495), one of Westmorland's daughters with Joan Beaufort.
From the point of view of the Nevilles, who had married into most of the
leading magnate families of the day, it was a prestigious match that
helped to confirm the family's growing pre-eminence; from the point of
view of Henry VI's government, it was an ideal way to absorb a
potentially dangerous figure by attaching him to some of the dynasty's
staunchest supporters.
Over the next few years York was drawn more closely into the circle
around the young king. In 1426 he was knighted, and two years later he
was appointed to take up residence in the royal household. In 1430 York
took part in the king's coronation expedition to France. His retinue was
small, but he was handsomely rewarded for his involvement: over 1000
marks by the summer of 1431. Soon after his return, and still a minor
(though there appears to have been some uncertainty over this at the
time), he was granted livery of his estates on 12 May 1432. At the time
both inheritances were encumbered with debts, dowers, and obligations,
while the duchy of York was mainly in the hands of feoffees. By the
summer of 1434, however, a series of financial settlements and the
deaths of the two remaining dowagers had lifted the worst of these
burdens, and the duke was free to enjoy his extensive patrimony
undisturbed. The acquisition of his inheritance had cost him quite a
lot, but he had received fair-even generous-treatment from the
government. York's proximity to the king, both in blood and in person,
and his links with the families of Neville and Beaufort had stood him in
good stead.
Service in France
In 1433 York was admitted to the Order of the Garter-a mark of favour, a
certificate of loyalty, and perhaps a token of martial expectations. His
first taste of military command was to be as successor to John, duke of
Bedford, in the lieutenancy of France, a post for which he was, in many
ways, the obvious candidate: the royal commission, dated 8 May 1436,
recited the king's desire to see France ruled by 'some great prince of
our blood' (Johnson, York, 226), and there was no one else who fitted
the bill, apart from Humphrey, duke of Gloucester. York had agreed to
serve in France as early as February 1436, but his army did not reach
Harfleur until 7 June. Had it left England more promptly, it might have
been able to prevent the French reconquest of Paris and the
Ile-de-France, which took place during the spring, though it is
difficult to know where the blame for the expedition's dilatoriness
should lie: York was also to be late leaving for his second tour of duty
in 1441, and the government was sceptical of his excuses on both
occasions, but recruiting an army was no easy feat in the later stages
of the Hundred Years' War, and delays were probably unavoidable. In the
event the French advance was halted by York's forces. The brilliant
campaign of autumn 1436, which ensured the safety of Rouen, was actually
commanded by John, Lord Talbot, but Duke Richard too seems to have
carried out some useful work, regaining most of the Pays de Caux after
the rebellion of 1435, attending to the grievances of the Normans, and
surveying the English garrisons. During both of York's lieutenancies it
seems to have been a policy of his to delegate the basic management of
the war to leading captains: his retainer Talbot, as marshal, in 1436;
his brother-in-law Richard Neville, earl of Salisbury, as
lieutenant-general in 1437; and Talbot again as 'lieutenant-general for
the conduct of the war' (Pollard, 39) during York's second tour of duty
from 1441. Although the duke and his council retained overall control of
military policy throughout, it may be that York saw himself more as a
viceroy, responsible for government as a whole, than as a warrior. This
is certainly implicit in the attention that he gave to matters of
domestic governance in Normandy and the pays de conquete: it was for his
good rule of the duchy and for his genuine attempts to deal with the
problems created by a declining military occupation that York would be
remembered in France. His role in the fighting of the war was
undistinguished, and a number of English chroniclers noted the fact.
Faced with the imminent expiry of his indentures-though not of his
lieutenancy, the term of which was indefinite-York sought permission to
return home in the spring of 1437. His successor was to be the earl of
Warwick, and York was instructed to remain in Normandy until his
arrival, which was delayed until the following November. It is difficult
to know whether the decision to replace York reflects disappointment
with his performance or not: the duke may even have wished to stand
down, possibly because of difficulties in extracting money from the
Norman exchequer for the payment of his troops. In any event Warwick's
service was soon cut short by his death in April 1439, and Henry VI's
government found itself once again faced with the task of providing for
the rule of Lancastrian France. It was apparently as a compromise
candidate that York emerged as the new lieutenant on 2 July 1440:
Gloucester appears to have sought his own appointment, while Cardinal
Beaufort, the regime's paymaster, probably pressed the claims of his
nephew John Beaufort, earl of Somerset. York, however, was the most
suitable choice for a post which now, more than ever, demanded a
flexible, diplomatic, and authoritative holder: as the government
pursued both peace and war with greater vigour than before, the duke was
sufficiently neutral, consultative, and grand to act effectively on its
behalf; he was also well connected with all parties, including the
military establishment in France.
On this occasion York demanded adequate funding and increased powers
before he would accept the job: he went to France as a second Bedford,
with all the powers that Duke John had enjoyed after 1432 and a promise
of £20,000 a year from the English exchequer to fund his troops. Apart
from these improved terms of service, however, the patterns of the first
lieutenancy were repeated. York left England late, not arriving in
Normandy until the end of June 1441. He then moved speedily down the
Seine to Pontoise where Talbot was struggling to lift Charles VII's
siege, but this was to be his only military action in the three years
before the truce of Tours. It was not a particularly impressive one: if
York had helped to secure Pontoise for a further few months, he may also
have frustrated a daring scheme of Talbot's that could have resulted in
the capture of the French king. Caution, it seems, got the better of
York, and not for the last time in his career.
Over the next few years the duke busied himself with matters of
governance and diplomacy while the war effort in Normandy ground slowly
to a halt. In part this was because Charles VII had turned his attention
to the south-west, but it is clear that York's reluctance to engage the
French directly caused dissatisfaction in the English government and it
may help to explain why Cardinal Beaufort was able to engineer a major
military command for his nephew John. The earl of Somerset's expedition,
planned from late 1442 and launched in the summer of 1443, involved a
major diversion of men, funds, and authority away from York and the
Norman theatre. Duke Richard dispatched an embassy to remonstrate with
the English government in June 1443, but it had no effect, and the
campaign itself added injury to insult: Somerset's attack on Brittany
and the duke of Alencon's stronghold of La Guerche disrupted York's
attempts, conducted during 1442-3, to involve the English in an alliance
of French princes. In the light of all this it is hardly surprising
that, following the expedition's failure, the government seems to have
felt the need to appease York: tallies for the payments due at
Michaelmas 1443 arrived in February 1444 and, later in that year, the
duke was given a major apanage in southern Normandy, while earldoms
(and, in Edmund's case, lands) were granted to his eldest sons. After
this no more of York's wages were paid until 1446, but at least the
truce contracted in May 1444 reduced his expenses and removed the need
for further military activity. In September 1445 York returned to
England: his indentures were about to expire, parliament was in session,
and-rather ironically, given the government's own failures in this
regard-his management of Norman finances was under investigation.
York and English politics before 1450
It now seems clear that Cardinal Beaufort, William de la Pole, earl of
Suffolk, and the other leading councillors and courtiers who, in the
first instance, managed Henry VI's authority in the 1430s and 1440s
intended Richard of York to be a pillar of the Lancastrian regime. This
did not mean that the already wealthy duke was to be showered with
gifts, nor did it mean that he was to be given a formal role in the
government of England. York was not, for example, appointed to the
re-established council in November 1437, but nothing should be inferred
from this: at twenty-six the duke would have been considered rather
youthful for what was in any case a rather anomalous role; exclusion
from the council would scarcely have excluded him from influence; and it
is likely that already the expectation was that his service to the crown
would be overseas, at least while he was of military age. It is not
known what part, if any, York played in the politics of 1437-41, during
which time he was in England and Henry VI, somewhat uncertainly, came of
age. There is no reason to suppose that he supported the moves of
Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, against Cardinal Beaufort in 1439-40,
despite Gloucester's suggestion that York and other lords had been
wrongfully kept out of power; nor should it be assumed that he was
opposed to the release of the duke of Orleans. He seems to have kept a
low profile at this time, participating in a scheme to restore order in
Wales in 1437-8, sharing in the custody of the Beauchamp wardship in
1439, and touring his estates. When, in early 1441, the 'longe
bareynesse' of his marriage was suddenly ended and a son born, York
named him Henry (Bokenham's Legenden, 273). This demonstration of
dynastic loyalty earned a gift of £100 worth of jewels from the grateful
king: the restoration of the heir of Cambridge and Mortimer must have
seemed to be complete.
As lieutenant of France for the second time York became embroiled in the
government's various diplomatic initiatives, including the moves
associated with the truce of Tours. It has often been assumed that Duke
Richard was hostile to the peace negotiations of the 1440s, but there is
absolutely no evidence for this. While the confusions of policy in the
early years of the decade must have been exasperating for anyone charged
with responsibility for the defence of Lancastrian France, there is
nothing to suggest that York preferred war to diplomacy as a means of
preserving English interests. As the plan to seek a truce with Charles
VII and a marriage alliance with the house of Anjou emerged as the
central plank of royal policy in 1444, York seems to have given it his
full support. In the new spirit of Anglo-French amity, for example, he
sent forces to assist the dauphin's campaign in Alsace in the summer of
1444. The following year, and possibly in response to promptings from
the government, he opened negotiations for a marriage between his eldest
son (now Edward of Rouen-the future Edward IV-born on 28 April 1442) and
one of the French king's daughters. The duke may even have been
sympathetic to the government's plans to surrender Maine, which
proceeded alongside the truce negotiations and formed an integral part
of the alliance policy. Because of the postures that York struck after
1450 historians have tended to assume that he was opposed to this
notorious scheme, but that is by no means clear. It is very likely that
he knew what was planned by the end of 1445 (if not earlier, since he
met Suffolk's embassy as it travelled through Normandy in 1444) and he
was certainly involved in the arrangements for compensating Maine's
English landholders in 1447. Interestingly York was never explicitly to
condemn the handover of the territory, although its loss was certainly a
prominent feature of popular and parliamentary criticism of William de
la Pole, by then duke of Suffolk, Edmund Beaufort, duke of Somerset, and
the other so-called 'traitors' of 1450.
It is from the period following his return to England in 1445 that
York's alienation from Henry VI's ministers is often supposed to have
dated. The duke found himself accused of mishandling the funds he had
been paid for the defence of Normandy, and his chief accuser, it
appeared, was a central figure in the government, Adam Moleyns, bishop
of Chichester. York had returned to England confident of reappointment
to the French lieutenancy, but he was obliged to wait for more than a
year and then to see the office go to Edmund Beaufort instead. It used
to be thought that because of his alleged hostility to the peace policy,
and his putatively close links to the duke of Gloucester (who died
mysteriously in 1447), Duke Richard was persona non grata with Suffolk's
regime: his appointment to the lieutenancy of Ireland on 30 July 1447
has sometimes been seen as a form of exile, the government's hope being
that, like the earls of March, his predecessors, he would go there and die.
However, events thus far do not support this interpretation. York was
certainly dismayed by the rumours concerning his performance in
Normandy, but he was explicitly vindicated by king and lords both in and
outside the parliament of 1445-6; it is not even known that Moleyns had
made the accusations York claimed, only that the duke saw in a public
attack on the bishop the opportunity to clear his own name. Similarly,
while York was probably disappointed not to regain the lieutenancy of
France, too much should not be made of this: the lieutenancy of Ireland,
which he was granted in return, was a post that his most distinguished
ancestors (notably Clarence himself) had held; it bestowed upon him
almost sovereign powers in the island; and it gave him the opportunity
to combine military service with the exploitation of his interests as an
Irish landlord. Finally, since the terms of his commission permitted him
to appoint a deputy and return to England, it cannot be seen as a form
of banishment. In some ways, indeed, 1446 and 1447 saw York more closely
involved in the governing regime than he had ever been: in October 1446
he was granted the abbey and town of Waltham because he 'will come often
to London for the king's business and his own' (CPR, 1446-52, 43); over
the next year he attended a number of council meetings and was named as
a witness to more than three-quarters of the charters issued from 1446
to 1448; during 1447-9 he was added to the peace commissions of eleven
counties beyond those to which he had been named at his inheritance (and
in some cases beyond the scope of his landholdings); and finally, almost
for the first time, he began to enjoy the kind of rewards more commonly
bestowed on courtiers-most notably, perhaps, the wardship and marriage
of the Holland heir (Henry) and a series of lands and offices once held
by Gloucester. This last detail is a reminder that there was almost
nothing to link York with Duke Humphrey in the latter's lifetime: in no
sense can York be considered his supporter, and it is not improbable
that, like other members of the nobility, he witnessed Gloucester's
destruction at the Bury parliament and, tacitly at least, assented to it.
When he finally left for Ireland, in June 1449, Duke Richard did so as a
loyal and well-regarded member of the Lancastrian establishment. If he
had been less involved in affairs during the preceding year or so, this
may well have been at his own choice. Many of the nobility seem to have
withdrawn from the court during 1448 as the government's troubles began
to mount. York cannot have wished to be associated with the humiliating
surrender of Le Mans in March 1448 and he may well have feared the
consequences of the extraordinary coup at Fougeres. A tour of duty in
Ireland must have appeared an attractive alternative. During his
fourteen months in the province York scored a series of easy (if
short-lived) victories, receiving the submission of most of the island's
leaders and campaigning effectively in Wicklow. At the Drogheda
parliament of April 1450 he followed the lead of the Commons at
Westminster by introducing an Act of Resumption. Like the lieutenant of
France he was short of money, and this limited his achievements, but the
contrast between this vigorous performance and the demoralizing stasis
of Somerset's rule in France must have impressed itself upon contemporaries.
Estates and connections
By the mid-1430s, when he had gained full control over his estates, York
was the richest and most extensive landowner among the king's subjects.
Estimates of his wealth have varied between £2874 and £5800 net, but the
most recent and reliable estimate suggests that his estates in England
and Wales were worth about £4000 a year (net) when he came into them,
and that his exchequer annuities yielded an average of £600 a year.
York's lands were scattered through England and the march of Wales, with
notable concentrations in the West Riding of Yorkshire; in Lincolnshire
and Northamptonshire; in Dorset and Somerset; in Herefordshire,
Shropshire, and the middle march of Wales; and in the centre of East
Anglia along the border of Norfolk and Suffolk. Beyond this he held the
earldom of Ulster and the lordships of Connacht and Trim, although only
the last of these Irish estates is likely to have yielded York any real
influence or income.
The possession of such vast holdings shaped York's activities as a lord:
like John of Gaunt before him he was a truly national figure, with
interests so widespread and diverse that it was difficult for him to
exert the kind of local authority typical of later medieval magnates. He
had no real 'country'-no county-sized area of concentrated influence
where local gentlemen might turn first of all to him for lordship-and
this helped to determine both the nature of his affinity and the role
that he and it were to play in the politics of the realm. York's
following, like Gaunt's or indeed the king's, was a disparate group of
often important men, many of whom had their own local allegiances and
whose links with York were forged mainly through military service and
the tenure of estate or household office. In part, of course, this
pattern was a consequence of the duke's long minority and his prolonged
service in France: many of the servants of the duchy of York had melted
away in the 1420s into Gloucester's service, for example; while Duke
Richard's appointment as Bedford's successor in Normandy presented him
with a ready-made following looking for a lord. A spry comment from an
anti-Yorkist chronicler has promoted the suggestion that York was unduly
influenced by the men who gathered round him in Normandy-in particular,
by Sir William Oldhall, who was one of York's most reliable agents
during the 1450s-but there is little to support this notion,
particularly when the duke's involvement in the peace policy of the
mid-1440s is taken into account. On the contrary, it seems likely that
York's high status, his extensive interests, and his relative
disengagement from the affairs of any particular locality beyond his
estates meant that he was exposed to a wide array of different voices.
If anyone besides the king and his ministers was likely to hear the
counsel of the realm, it was surely York, who numbered lords such as
Talbot, Ralph Cromwell, and Thomas Scales among his councillors, but
also enjoyed links with exchequer clerks, lawyers, the widows of Norman
soldiers, and local worthies from all parts of the country. The
maintenance of this kind of connection may have cost York dear-as much
as £1300 a year, according to one recent estimate-but it seems that his
money was well spent. Despite his inability to offer really consistent
local support, he was apparently able to co-ordinate the raising of
large retinues throughout the 1450s. If some of his servants kept away
from the duke's more controversial ventures, a sizeable and prestigious
core remained loyal to the end.
The making of York's rebellion
The last and best-known period in York's political life began in
September 1450, when he suddenly returned from Ireland and took up the
common cry for the traitors surrounding the king to be brought to
justice. This was a significant change of political direction for the
duke, and one that shaped the remainder of his career, but the reasons
for it are not immediately obvious. Modern historians have mostly
rejected the traditional interpretation, which laid stress on York's
dynastic interests and saw his participation in the popular ferments of
the 1450s as a device for seizing the crown. Instead, the search has
been for the causes of personal grievance on Duke Richard's part: was he
moved to anger, or even desperation, by the government's enormous debts
to him? Was he incensed by the new pre-eminence of Edmund Beaufort, duke
of Somerset, the man who had so recently lost France? Did he fear for
his own position, as an old rival took control of Henry VI's government?
Alternatively, was York simply an opportunist, moving (typically late)
to exploit the regime's difficulties, but without any fixed idea of
where his dissidence might take him?
One difficulty in reaching any conclusions lies in trying to establish
which elements of York's programme, as this slowly unfolded, were
intentional, and intended from the start. It is certainly unlikely that
the duke was seeking to gain the throne in 1450: previous legitimists
had soon revealed their desire to improve the realm by changing the
king, but York was not to assert his Mortimer-Clarence claim until 1460,
after ten years of activism explicitly devoted to other ends. Even in
that year, moreover, his move was greeted with hostility, and it seems
reasonable to suggest that the duke would have known all along that this
was a likely reaction and would have trimmed his policy accordingly. It
is possible that, in 1450, York was concerned to secure recognition as
heir presumptive to Henry VI: the king was still without a child and
there was a (somewhat faint) possibility of dynastic competition from
the house of Beaufort. Like most noblemen York took an active interest
in the claims and titles he possessed-in 1445 he had sought information
on his interest in the throne of Castile and in 1451 an agent of his was
to argue in parliament that the duke should be named as heir
apparent-but, at best, this can provide only a partial explanation for
his actions in 1450.
As far as personal grievances are concerned, meanwhile, it is difficult
to see what grounds York had for complaint. That the duke was part of
the establishment in the 1440s has already been illustrated. Financially
he had fared no worse than any of Henry VI's other major accountants:
indeed, somewhat remarkably, given the state of royal finances, he
received £1200 from the crown at the end of 1449, and even in May 1450
efforts were being made to find him money. He may have decided to return
to England to seek funds-a letter to Salisbury, written in June 1450,
suggests that he feared serious losses in Ireland unless he received
further payments-but this is rather a different matter from acting on a
sense of grievance, and if seeking money was York's initial aim, it was
soon overwhelmed by other purposes.
What, finally, of York's famous antagonism towards Somerset: was this
the motivation for his assault on the king's ministers? The problem here
is one of disentangling the personal feud between the two men from the
relative positions in which a wider politics had placed them: did York
attack the government because it contained Somerset, or did he attack
Somerset because he was the leader of the government? It is certainly
possible to find grounds for animosity between the two men: Beaufort's
performance in the last years of the war was undistinguished to say the
least, and York may have thought that he himself could have achieved
more; it has recently been suggested, moreover, that the lieutenant's
casual surrender of Rouen would particularly have rankled with Duke
Richard, since he had continued to be its captain. At the same time,
however, it is clear that once York had made his inflammatory moves of
September 1450 (and possibly even before then), he and Somerset were
destined to be at odds: Duke Richard's political standing came quickly
to depend on the argument that the government was run by traitors, and a
large part of his justification for taking up arms in 1450, 1452, and
1455 was that the enmity of leading ministers obliged him to take action
to defend himself; Duke Edmund, on the other hand, was not unjustified
in regarding much of York's behaviour as threatening, both to himself
and to the order of the realm; if he sought, in 1450, in 1452-3, and in
1455, to deal with the problem by repression instead of indulgence, it
was an understandable approach. Politics, as much as personality and
private interest, determined the conflict between York and Somerset.
Pursuing this further, it may be suggested that it was in the
extraordinary politics of 1450 that the most likely reasons for York's
sudden attack on the government are to be found. As Normandy fell to the
French and the king's bankruptcy was exposed in parliament, the
authority of Henry VI's ministers disintegrated. MPs and more lowly
members of society appeared to be united in the belief that the king had
been betrayed by a self-serving clique who had pillaged his possessions
in England and surrendered those in France. If Suffolk's trial and
murder had removed the leader of the gang, the rest remained in
positions of power, and until the king and the 'true lords' took action
against them, there could be no justice or order in the realm. This
judgement on the recent past dominated public life in England between
1449 and 1451, and it continued to exert a certain influence over the
public imagination thereafter. York, like other members of the nobility,
must have known that in certain ways it was wide of the mark, but this
did not mean that it could be ignored. In particular, in fact, it could
not be ignored by York, who had already been identified by some of the
government's critics as the figure most likely to visit retribution upon
the 'traitors'. This appears to be the explanation for the rough
reception that York and his men received at their landing in north Wales
in September: local agents of the royal household, and possibly their
commanders at the centre, had become alarmed about the duke's
intentions. It was at this point, perhaps, and not in 1447, that 'by
treating [the duke] as an enemy the court had made him one' (McFarlane,
405): if both the king's ministers and his subjects were going to cast
York as the agent of justice, he might as well fulfil their
expectations. Certainly, the moment must have seemed ripe for someone to
take drastic action: the king's officers could not govern without public
confidence, and it may have appeared that the removal of some of the
discredited men-not least, perhaps, the duke of Somerset-was the best
way to restore it.
Beyond all this, it might be added that, even if the government had not
moved against him in 1450, everything in York's make-up would have given
him the sense that he was the man to restore the situation. He was the
greatest prince of the royal blood, head and shoulders above other
lords, the natural successor to Bedford and Gloucester in the protection
of Henry VI's interests. He had already acted as the king's viceroy in
France and Ireland; why not in England too? What, if anything, York knew
of the deeds of men like Gaunt and Woodstock (or those of Montfort and
Lancaster), whose status was much the same as his and whose actions were
to prefigure his own, is not known; but one model of proper noble
service had been made available to him when, probably in 1445, York was
presented with an elegantly decorated translation of Claudian's life of
the consul Stilicho. It was an account of how the people of Rome and
other nations implored this virtuous prince to accept the office of
consul and restore good government to a city torn apart by the evil
advisers of a child emperor. Its translator had invited York to 'marke
stilicoes life' ('Mittelenglische Claudian-Ubersetzung', 256): in 1450
the moment had arrived when he might put this teaching to good use.
York and the politics of the 1450s
It was with a volley of bills and open letters addressed to the king
that York returned to English political life in September 1450. The
first of these sought to establish the duke's loyalty; the second
advertised his intention to seek justice against his accusers; but it
was the third that was truly controversial-it drew the king's attention
to the universal complaint that justice was not being done to those who
broke the king's law with impunity (in particular, the so-called
'traitors'), and offered York's services in bringing the guilty to book.
This was an open defiance of the government's authority, since the
essence of the 'traitors' idea was that it was the men about the king
who were most of all responsible for the disasters that had befallen the
realm. As far as York was concerned, this meant that a true subject was
obliged to act against the inner circle of authority in order to fulfil
the terms of his allegiance to king and realm, and this explains the
duke's many affirmations of loyalty to King Henry: it was the essential
justification for actions that, on the face of it, appeared disloyal.
Under normal circumstances, of course, attempts to separate a king's
chosen counsellors and servants from the ruler himself were unlikely to
succeed: defiance of royal agents easily shaded into defiance of the
king, and that was treason. As York and all the rest of the nobility
knew, however, these circumstances were not normal: Henry VI had shown
no more discernment than a child in the government of his realm; his
ministers were virtually self-appointed, and the policies pursued during
the 1420s, 1430s, and 1440s were essentially theirs. If this makes
nonsense of one aspect of the 'traitors' thesis, it exposes the truth of
another aspect: the government was not in any real sense the vehicle of
the king's will, and thus defiance of it was not treason; the regime
could legitimately be reshaped, and, with large sections of the public
arguing that it should be, York's actions had a certain justice in them.
In reality he was appealing not to the king with these manifestos, but
to the Lords and to the wider public: his plea was that those who were
less compromised by the disasters of 1449-50 must abandon those who were
more immediately responsible; a new government, in which the duke was to
play a more prominent role, must be established.
Not surprisingly York's demands fell on deaf ears. The king's circle saw
little reason for a general blood-letting, and the nobility, who had
begun to lend support to the beleaguered regime as the crisis mounted,
appear to have taken a similar view. In a public reply to York's bills,
his offers of assistance were politely rebuffed, and the duke left
London to prepare for the parliament summoned to meet in November 1450.
When it gathered on the 6th, MPs demonstrated their continuing
enthusiasm for reform by electing Oldhall, York's chamberlain, as
speaker and loudly calling for the traitors to be brought to justice.
When the duke himself arrived, with sword borne upright before him and a
large army at his back, the initiative was his: Somerset was promptly
imprisoned and the Lords waited to see what would happen next. What
followed was in part a demonstration of Duke Richard's hesitancy and
conservatism, and in part a reflection of the constraints of his
position. Elements of the Commons' programme were put into effect, but
the duke made no attempt to alter the institutional framework of Henry's
government, and the result was that, during the Christmas recess,
authority drifted back to the king and his household, Somerset was
released, and the Lords, many of whom had flirted with York while he was
in the ascendant, resumed their former obedience. During the sessions of
the parliament in 1451 York's power waned, and Thomas Younge's notorious
attempt to have him recognized as heir apparent must have seemed to many
an act of desperation. Why had York not done more to secure himself
during his brief ascendancy? It is not, of course, clear what he wanted:
if only the restoration of order, then this was being achieved without
his help; if a role for himself in the government, then his actions had
made this unthinkable unless the king himself were to be altogether
displaced-the men of Henry's household, who effectively disposed of
royal power, were hardly going to welcome a man who had posed as their
nemesis. What York had done, in effect, was to go too far without going
far enough. Perhaps he should have cut his losses and risked a direct
assault on the throne; but such a move was almost certain to fail. The
duke had cast himself as the true liegeman of Henry VI: any deviation
from this role was sure to be seen as the grossest kind of betrayal;
York had many potential supporters, but-apart, perhaps, from his own
servants-their support was for his public, not his private, interests.
It has been worth looking at the events of 1450 in some detail, because
for the next two years Duke Richard's options were very largely shaped
by what had happened in that year. He could not be secure while Somerset
and the household retained both control of the king and the support of
the Lords, yet there was little he could do to improve his lot. Moves
against Oldhall were under way by the end of 1451, and when, in January
1452, York reacted publicly against them and against their implications
for himself, he was thinly supported. Apart from the duke's own men only
the malcontent Thomas Courtenay, earl of Devon, and his crony Lord
Cobham were persuaded to join the rising that attempted to repeat the
coup of 1450: the rest of the nobility gathered around the king and
Somerset, and York was forced to capitulate at Dartford in early March.
His failure left him worse off than before. He was obliged to swear a
humiliating oath of submission, his supporters and tenants were harried
by judicial commissions, and his attempts to discredit Somerset were
treated as part and parcel of a private quarrel. As the common people
were reduced to order and the government enjoyed the unfamiliar taste of
victory in Gascony, it seemed that York's political career was at an
end: never again would he be able to take his proper place in the
Lancastrian establishment.
At this point, however, fate combined with the contradictions of Henry
VI's regime to bestow new opportunities upon Duke Richard. In the summer
of 1453 Somerset's governing consensus suddenly collapsed, as the
victories in Gascony were reversed, the king lost his mind, and war
broke out in the north between the Nevilles and the Percys. In the
resulting crisis York was the only person of sufficient stature to
restore the situation, and it must be this factor, above all, that
explains the decision of a non-partisan group of councillors to summon
him to London in October 1453, and the agreement in parliament to
appoint him protector and defender of the realm on 27 March 1454. Here
was a means for York to wrest control of government from Somerset and
the king's household men without bringing his loyalty to Henry VI into
question; and here was a means for the rest of political society to
contain the powerful duke and to create an effective government without
the kind of sacrifices that had been demanded in 1450. York certainly
did his part: he went to London full of emollient promises to attend the
council and do all 'that sholde or might be to the welfare of the king
and of his subgettes' (CPR, 1452-61, 143); he made no attacks on
Somerset or other sometime 'traitors' (though his ally, Norfolk, did);
and, on taking up the post of protector, he committed himself to rule
consultatively and representatively with the Lords. During the
succeeding months York made serious and well-founded attempts to pacify
the disputes in the north and north midlands, and he enjoyed some
success. Making genuine efforts to consult widely, he demonstrated the
same statesmanlike qualities that had marked his management of France
and Ireland: 'for a whole year', wrote one chronicler, 'he governed the
whole realm of England most nobly and in the best way' ('Benet's
chronicle', 212). There were certainly limits to his achievement, and
his tenure of office was to be brought to an abrupt halt in February
1455, but the duke's performance may have prompted many of his peers to
look more sympathetically at his claims in the years to come.
Unfortunately, however, the moulds of politics were changing in these
years, and the broad unity that had so long been preserved among the
nobility was breaking down. The deterioration of order in the
localities, which had become so dramatic and extensive by 1453, was now
combined with the emergence of a more aggressive Lancastrian dynasticism
to promote significant divisions among the elite. These had begun to
emerge even before York's protectorate: one of the reasons why it had
taken so long to arrange the duke's appointment was that a substantial
group of lords had grouped themselves around the queen, Margaret of
Anjou, who-since the birth of her son Edward in October 1453-was
attempting to secure a regency for herself. In the winter of 1453-4,
indeed, civil war looked a distinct possibility. It was held off by
York's readiness to make explicit his submission to the dynastic claims
of the new prince, and by the agreement of all but the most extreme
figures to join a broadly based regime under the duke's headship. When
Henry VI recovered his sanity, however, at Christmas 1454, those in the
household and the north who had opposed the protectorate seized the
opportunity to assert their interests. York was removed from office on 9
February 1455, and by early March a more hard-faced government was
taking steps against the duke. The fact that the Neville earls of
Warwick and Salisbury also fell under attack at this time reveals the
factional and divisive aims of those in control: although the government
proceeded with the language of treason and obedience, its narrowing base
and its sponsorship of conflict began to undermine its claims to such
public goods; when York and the Nevilles confronted the king, Somerset,
and the Percys at St Albans on 22 May 1455, there was a broad
equivalence between the two sides, and the first blows of a civil war
were struck.
The Yorkist victory, however, brought this war to a rapid halt. Just as
he had done in the early 1450s, the duke submitted to the king and
attempted to rebuild unity. This was to remain his posture and that of
his allies right up to the disasters of 1459. York was certainly
prepared to strain his allegiance to its very limits-securing
appointment to a second protectorate on 15 November 1455 and depriving
the king of personal authority a week later-but he would not cross the
bounds to an outright repudiation of Henry VI's sovereignty. As a
consequence his pre-eminence remained insecure. His protectorate was
soon terminated (on 25 February 1456) when parliamentary pressure for a
resumption weakened his support among the Lords, but the aim of
preserving unity, or oonhede, among the nobility lingered on for some
years and ensured that if York was not to be admitted to any special
power, he was not to be destroyed either. It seems likely that, provided
he behaved himself, most of the peerage had some respect for the duke.
Pressure from Queen Margaret and her growing band of partisans meant
that he was obliged to repeat his submission of 1452 on a number of
occasions between 1456 and 1459, but he was confirmed in possession of
the lieutenancy of Ireland, and even seems to have been able to direct
policy for a time in the wake of the 'loveday' settlement of 1458. Only
in 1459 did the bulk of the Lords finally accept the case for war
against the duke, and then the fault-lines of 1453-4 and 1455 were
recreated and York received the support of the Nevilles. Rather as at St
Albans, York, Warwick, and Salisbury revived the case that evil
counsellors around the king were destroying the common weal of the realm
and threatening their own security. On this occasion, however, their
propaganda cut no ice: finding most of the nobility in arms against them
at Ludford Bridge (near Ludlow, Shropshire) and deserted by a part of
the army, York and his allies fled the field during the night of 12-13
October 1459.
Exile, return, and death
The duke and his second son, Edmund, earl of Rutland, spent the next
eleven months in Ireland, attempting to gain the men and money for an
armed return to England, where the duke's estates were in royal hands as
a result of his attainder at the Coventry parliament (about the end of
November 1459). His younger children, including George, were all placed
in the custody of the duchess of Buckingham. An incidental result of
York's efforts was the famous Drogheda parliament of 8 February 1460, in
which the Anglo-Irish establishment obtained recognition as a distinct
political community, separate from England, ruled by its own laws and
financed by its own currency. In return for these concessions York
gained resources, protection for his person, and an extensive army of
archers, which he must have intended to take to England. Plans for a
co-ordinated invasion of the mainland were apparently made during a
conference with Warwick at Waterford in the spring of 1460, and the
duke's Neville allies, accompanied by his eldest son, Edward of March,
duly landed in Kent in June professing loyalty to Henry VI and
protesting about the misgovernment of the realm. With startling success,
they won support in London and the south-east and proceeded to defeat
the royal army at Northampton on 10 July, submitting to the king at the
battle's end. Over the next few weeks March and the Nevilles began to
secure the realm and to await York's return, which finally occurred near
Chester on or about 9 September 1460.
Much about the next few weeks is obscure: it is not known why it took
York so long to join his allies on the mainland; it is not known when he
began so famously to assert his claim to the throne (13 September is the
first date for which a plausible case can be made); it is not known
whether or not the initiative had been agreed, or even discussed, with
the Nevilles. It seems clear that there was no option for York but to
attempt to make himself king: all other avenues, as has been shown, led
nowhere; the duke could neither secure himself nor restore political
order without taking the drastic step from which he had so far shrunk;
and it may have seemed that by 1460 the polity of Henry VI was
sufficiently dislocated to permit a direct assault on the king.
Unfortunately for the duke, however, his own options were different from
those of his allies, even his sons. These men had gained support on the
old plea of reforming Henry VI's government. They had recently made
their loyalty to the king explicit. As the managers of a large and
diverse alliance, they could not easily abandon what they had promised,
and it seems clear that the message from the London elite, who played an
important role in the frantic politics of 1459-61, was that a deposition
could not be tolerated. York marched into London, seized the king, and
entered parliament on 10 October, announcing that he intended 'to
challenge his right' to the crown (Johnson, York, 214). The Lords'
response was unpromising: they went into conclave at Blackfriars and
sent the young earl of March to persuade his father to accept a
negotiated settlement. By 13 October York had been brought to abandon
his plans for an immediate coronation, and a few days later he submitted
his claim for discussion in parliament. An accord emerged on 31 October,
and its central feature was to leave Henry VI on the throne, while
settling the succession on York and his sons. It is possible that even
after this York attempted to get his way by inducing Henry to abdicate.
He must have realized that, like the treaty of Troyes on which it was
apparently based, the accord promised immediate war with the
disinherited heir. In any event, the king was moved to safety and the
duke was obliged to accept the terms agreed in October, at least for the
time being. Acting more or less as protector he marched north in early
December to deal with the forces of the prince of Wales and Queen
Margaret, which had regrouped in Yorkshire after the defeat at
Northampton. Venturing forth from his castle at Sandal on 30 December
1460, in what may have been an uncharacteristic attempt to surprise his
enemy, York was set upon by an unexpectedly large Lancastrian force. In
the ensuing battle of Wakefield, he and his second son, Edmund of
Rutland, were killed. As a macabre riposte to Duke Richard's recent
pretensions, his head was severed from his body and displayed on the
walls of York bearing a paper crown.
So ended the life of this curious figure, who, having played safe in the
prime of his years, abruptly changed tack at the age of thirty-nine,
pursuing ever more ambitious and dangerous policies until, with victory
almost in his grasp, he fell on an ill-chosen battlefield. Duke Richard
was the true founder of the royal house of York, but despite a career
that a recent biographer has described as 'the most successful failure
of the middle ages' (Johnson, 'Political career', abstract), he has
inspired little interest and even less sympathy among historians.
Notwithstanding his many claims to be acting for the 'common weal' of
the realm, York has usually been presented as a somewhat colourless
bungler: all along, it seems, he wanted power, but he could not decide
how far to go until the last minute, whereupon-fatally-he went too far.
In 1964 B. Wilkinson set the tone for most modern accounts of the duke's
career with his judgement that 'it would be folly to make a statesman
out of this fifteenth-century worldling' (Wilkinson, 88). This view
seems unfairly harsh: like many of his peers, his instincts were to make
the best of things in Henry VI's England, a world in which there were no
easy answers. York's opportunities were closely circumscribed and his
intentions in opposing Henry VI's government are far from clear; in fact
there may be a case for seeing him more as the victim of circumstances
than as their creator. His cautiousness, if ultimately unproductive, was
justified by the sheer impropriety of opposition to the government. On
the other hand, the recklessness that he demonstrated in 1450, 1452,
1455, 1459, and 1460 was also justified: sometimes by its results;
always by the need to do something to restore the authority that the
king, in his feebleness, had frittered away. In medieval England,
however, the restoration of authority could only be carried out from the
throne. York's final and most destructive venture was thus his
best-conceived one, but it is easy to see why it has won him few plaudits.
John Watts
Sources P. A. Johnson, Duke Richard of York, 1411-1460 (1988) + T. B.
Pugh, 'Richard Plantagenet (1411-60), duke of York, as the king's
lieutenant in France and Ireland', Aspects of medieval government and
society: essays presented to J. R. Lander, ed. J. G. Rowe (1986), 107-41
+ J. Watts, Henry VI and the politics of kingship (1996) + R. A.
Griffiths, The reign of King Henry VI: the exercise of royal authority,
1422-1461 (1981) + Chancery records + J. T. Rosenthal, 'The estates and
finances of Richard, duke of York, 1411-1460', Studies in Medieval and
Renaissance History, 2 (1965), 117-204 + G. L. Harriss, Cardinal
Beaufort: a study of Lancastrian ascendancy and decline (1988) + A. J.
Pollard, John Talbot and the war in France, 1427-1453, Royal Historical
Society Studies in History, 35 (1983) + C. T. Allmand, Lancastrian
Normandy, 1415-1450 (1983) + M. K. Jones, 'Somerset, York and the Wars
of the Roses', EngHR, 104 (1989), 285-307 + R. A. Griffiths, 'Duke
Richard of York's intentions in 1450 and the origins of the Wars of the
Roses', Journal of Medieval History, 1 (1975), 187-209 + M. L. Kekewich
and others, eds., The politics of fifteenth-century England: John Vale's
book (1995) + J. L. Watts, 'De consulatu Stiliconis: texts and politics
in the reign of Henry VI', Journal of Medieval History, 16 (1990),
251-66 + J. M. W. Bean, 'The financial position of Richard, duke of
York', War and government in the middle ages, ed. J. Gillingham and J.
C. Holt (1984), 182-98 + T. B. Pugh, Henry V and the Southampton plot of
1415, Southampton RS, 30 (1988) + A. J. Otway-Ruthven, A history of
medieval Ireland (1968) + 'John Benet's chronicle for the years 1400 to
1462', ed. G. L. Harriss and M. A. Harriss, Camden miscellany, XXIV, CS,
4th ser., 9 (1972) + E. Flugel, 'Eine mittelenglische
Claudian-Ubersetzung (1445)', Anglia, 28 (1905), 255-99 + P. A. Johnson,
'The political career of Richard, duke of York, to 1456', DPhil diss.,
U. Oxf., 1981 + B. Wilkinson, Constitutional history of England in the
fifteenth century (1399-1485) (1964) + Osbern Bokenam's Legenden, ed. C.
Horstmann (Heilbronn, 1883) + 'William Gregory's chronicle of London',
The historical collections of a citizen of London in the fifteenth
century, ed. J. Gairdner, CS, new ser., 17 (1876) + K. Dockray, 'The
battle of Wakefield and the Wars of the Roses', The Ricardian, 9
(1991-3), 238-58 + R. Knowles, 'The battle of Wakefield: the
topography', The Ricardian, 9 (1991-3), 259-65 + C. Ross, Edward IV
(1974) + Itineraries [of] William Worcestre, ed. J. H. Harvey, OMT
(1969) + K. B. McFarlane, 'The Lancastrian kings', Cambridge Medieval
History, 8, ed. C. W. Previte-Orton and Z. N. Brooke (1936), 363-417 +
CPR, 1446-61 + CEPR letters, 8.132
Archives BL, letters relating to a truce between England and Burgundy,
Add. Ch. 75479
Likenesses painted glass window, Cirencester; repro. in S. Lysons, A
collection of Gloucestershire antiquities (1804) · painted glass window,
Trinity Cam. [see illus.]
Wealth at death under £4600 p.a. net: Johnson, Duke Richard, 7, 21-4
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Subject: A most successful failure?
Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2011 07:00:00 +0100
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Richard of York, third duke of York (1411-1460), magnate and claimant
to the English throne, was the only son of Richard of Conisbrough,
fourth earl of Cambridge (1385-1415), and Anne Mortimer (b. after 1388,
d. before 1414), daughter of Roger (VII) Mortimer, fourth earl of March.
He was descended from Edward III through both parents, his father being
the son of that king's fourth son, Edmund of Langley, first duke of
York, and his mother the great-granddaughter of Edward's second son,
Lionel of Antwerp, duke of Clarence. It was this distinguished ancestry
that provided the basis for his explosive participation in the troubled
politics of the 1450s. In October 1460, after a decade of agitation and
intervention, he attempted to seize the throne on the grounds that his
descent from Clarence made him rightful king in place of Henry VI, who,
like the other Lancastrian kings, was descended from Edward III's third
son, John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster. The attempt failed, and York died
a few months later at the battle of Wakefield, but the claim, of course,
lived on to provide the basis for Edward IV's succession in March 1461.
Youth and inheritance
Richard of York was born on 22 September 1411, to parents who had
married in secret and were soon to be dead. His mother was gone within a
year or two; his father, who married again in 1414, was executed the
following year when details of his plot to depose Henry V came to light.
Cambridge's plan to raise the north and (apparently) to put Edmund (V)
Mortimer, earl of March, on the throne must have thrown his son's
dynastic position into sharp relief: the young Richard's mother had been
the elder of March's sisters, which made the boy himself a possible heir
to the Mortimer-Clarence claim to the throne. On Cambridge's death he
became a royal ward, and it is not altogether surprising that in March
1416 he was placed in the custody of the Lancastrians' leading gaoler,
Sir Robert Waterton. Three years into his reign, however, Henry V was
busy laying to rest the divisions of his father's time and Richard of
York was destined for rehabilitation. He was protected from the effects
of his father's attainder and, on the death of his uncle Edward, duke of
York, at Agincourt, the boy was recognized to be his heir. Not long
after Henry VI's accession York's wardship and marriage were sold to
Ralph Neville, earl of Westmorland. At 3000 marks the price was a high
one, but Neville's investment was amply repaid when, in January 1425,
Edmund, earl of March, died childless, and York, as his nephew, became
heir to the extensive Mortimer inheritance. At some stage in the 1420s,
possibly as early as 1424, the young duke was married off to Cecily
Neville (1415-1495), one of Westmorland's daughters with Joan Beaufort.
From the point of view of the Nevilles, who had married into most of the
leading magnate families of the day, it was a prestigious match that
helped to confirm the family's growing pre-eminence; from the point of
view of Henry VI's government, it was an ideal way to absorb a
potentially dangerous figure by attaching him to some of the dynasty's
staunchest supporters.
Over the next few years York was drawn more closely into the circle
around the young king. In 1426 he was knighted, and two years later he
was appointed to take up residence in the royal household. In 1430 York
took part in the king's coronation expedition to France. His retinue was
small, but he was handsomely rewarded for his involvement: over 1000
marks by the summer of 1431. Soon after his return, and still a minor
(though there appears to have been some uncertainty over this at the
time), he was granted livery of his estates on 12 May 1432. At the time
both inheritances were encumbered with debts, dowers, and obligations,
while the duchy of York was mainly in the hands of feoffees. By the
summer of 1434, however, a series of financial settlements and the
deaths of the two remaining dowagers had lifted the worst of these
burdens, and the duke was free to enjoy his extensive patrimony
undisturbed. The acquisition of his inheritance had cost him quite a
lot, but he had received fair-even generous-treatment from the
government. York's proximity to the king, both in blood and in person,
and his links with the families of Neville and Beaufort had stood him in
good stead.
Service in France
In 1433 York was admitted to the Order of the Garter-a mark of favour, a
certificate of loyalty, and perhaps a token of martial expectations. His
first taste of military command was to be as successor to John, duke of
Bedford, in the lieutenancy of France, a post for which he was, in many
ways, the obvious candidate: the royal commission, dated 8 May 1436,
recited the king's desire to see France ruled by 'some great prince of
our blood' (Johnson, York, 226), and there was no one else who fitted
the bill, apart from Humphrey, duke of Gloucester. York had agreed to
serve in France as early as February 1436, but his army did not reach
Harfleur until 7 June. Had it left England more promptly, it might have
been able to prevent the French reconquest of Paris and the
Ile-de-France, which took place during the spring, though it is
difficult to know where the blame for the expedition's dilatoriness
should lie: York was also to be late leaving for his second tour of duty
in 1441, and the government was sceptical of his excuses on both
occasions, but recruiting an army was no easy feat in the later stages
of the Hundred Years' War, and delays were probably unavoidable. In the
event the French advance was halted by York's forces. The brilliant
campaign of autumn 1436, which ensured the safety of Rouen, was actually
commanded by John, Lord Talbot, but Duke Richard too seems to have
carried out some useful work, regaining most of the Pays de Caux after
the rebellion of 1435, attending to the grievances of the Normans, and
surveying the English garrisons. During both of York's lieutenancies it
seems to have been a policy of his to delegate the basic management of
the war to leading captains: his retainer Talbot, as marshal, in 1436;
his brother-in-law Richard Neville, earl of Salisbury, as
lieutenant-general in 1437; and Talbot again as 'lieutenant-general for
the conduct of the war' (Pollard, 39) during York's second tour of duty
from 1441. Although the duke and his council retained overall control of
military policy throughout, it may be that York saw himself more as a
viceroy, responsible for government as a whole, than as a warrior. This
is certainly implicit in the attention that he gave to matters of
domestic governance in Normandy and the pays de conquete: it was for his
good rule of the duchy and for his genuine attempts to deal with the
problems created by a declining military occupation that York would be
remembered in France. His role in the fighting of the war was
undistinguished, and a number of English chroniclers noted the fact.
Faced with the imminent expiry of his indentures-though not of his
lieutenancy, the term of which was indefinite-York sought permission to
return home in the spring of 1437. His successor was to be the earl of
Warwick, and York was instructed to remain in Normandy until his
arrival, which was delayed until the following November. It is difficult
to know whether the decision to replace York reflects disappointment
with his performance or not: the duke may even have wished to stand
down, possibly because of difficulties in extracting money from the
Norman exchequer for the payment of his troops. In any event Warwick's
service was soon cut short by his death in April 1439, and Henry VI's
government found itself once again faced with the task of providing for
the rule of Lancastrian France. It was apparently as a compromise
candidate that York emerged as the new lieutenant on 2 July 1440:
Gloucester appears to have sought his own appointment, while Cardinal
Beaufort, the regime's paymaster, probably pressed the claims of his
nephew John Beaufort, earl of Somerset. York, however, was the most
suitable choice for a post which now, more than ever, demanded a
flexible, diplomatic, and authoritative holder: as the government
pursued both peace and war with greater vigour than before, the duke was
sufficiently neutral, consultative, and grand to act effectively on its
behalf; he was also well connected with all parties, including the
military establishment in France.
On this occasion York demanded adequate funding and increased powers
before he would accept the job: he went to France as a second Bedford,
with all the powers that Duke John had enjoyed after 1432 and a promise
of £20,000 a year from the English exchequer to fund his troops. Apart
from these improved terms of service, however, the patterns of the first
lieutenancy were repeated. York left England late, not arriving in
Normandy until the end of June 1441. He then moved speedily down the
Seine to Pontoise where Talbot was struggling to lift Charles VII's
siege, but this was to be his only military action in the three years
before the truce of Tours. It was not a particularly impressive one: if
York had helped to secure Pontoise for a further few months, he may also
have frustrated a daring scheme of Talbot's that could have resulted in
the capture of the French king. Caution, it seems, got the better of
York, and not for the last time in his career.
Over the next few years the duke busied himself with matters of
governance and diplomacy while the war effort in Normandy ground slowly
to a halt. In part this was because Charles VII had turned his attention
to the south-west, but it is clear that York's reluctance to engage the
French directly caused dissatisfaction in the English government and it
may help to explain why Cardinal Beaufort was able to engineer a major
military command for his nephew John. The earl of Somerset's expedition,
planned from late 1442 and launched in the summer of 1443, involved a
major diversion of men, funds, and authority away from York and the
Norman theatre. Duke Richard dispatched an embassy to remonstrate with
the English government in June 1443, but it had no effect, and the
campaign itself added injury to insult: Somerset's attack on Brittany
and the duke of Alencon's stronghold of La Guerche disrupted York's
attempts, conducted during 1442-3, to involve the English in an alliance
of French princes. In the light of all this it is hardly surprising
that, following the expedition's failure, the government seems to have
felt the need to appease York: tallies for the payments due at
Michaelmas 1443 arrived in February 1444 and, later in that year, the
duke was given a major apanage in southern Normandy, while earldoms
(and, in Edmund's case, lands) were granted to his eldest sons. After
this no more of York's wages were paid until 1446, but at least the
truce contracted in May 1444 reduced his expenses and removed the need
for further military activity. In September 1445 York returned to
England: his indentures were about to expire, parliament was in session,
and-rather ironically, given the government's own failures in this
regard-his management of Norman finances was under investigation.
York and English politics before 1450
It now seems clear that Cardinal Beaufort, William de la Pole, earl of
Suffolk, and the other leading councillors and courtiers who, in the
first instance, managed Henry VI's authority in the 1430s and 1440s
intended Richard of York to be a pillar of the Lancastrian regime. This
did not mean that the already wealthy duke was to be showered with
gifts, nor did it mean that he was to be given a formal role in the
government of England. York was not, for example, appointed to the
re-established council in November 1437, but nothing should be inferred
from this: at twenty-six the duke would have been considered rather
youthful for what was in any case a rather anomalous role; exclusion
from the council would scarcely have excluded him from influence; and it
is likely that already the expectation was that his service to the crown
would be overseas, at least while he was of military age. It is not
known what part, if any, York played in the politics of 1437-41, during
which time he was in England and Henry VI, somewhat uncertainly, came of
age. There is no reason to suppose that he supported the moves of
Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, against Cardinal Beaufort in 1439-40,
despite Gloucester's suggestion that York and other lords had been
wrongfully kept out of power; nor should it be assumed that he was
opposed to the release of the duke of Orleans. He seems to have kept a
low profile at this time, participating in a scheme to restore order in
Wales in 1437-8, sharing in the custody of the Beauchamp wardship in
1439, and touring his estates. When, in early 1441, the 'longe
bareynesse' of his marriage was suddenly ended and a son born, York
named him Henry (Bokenham's Legenden, 273). This demonstration of
dynastic loyalty earned a gift of £100 worth of jewels from the grateful
king: the restoration of the heir of Cambridge and Mortimer must have
seemed to be complete.
As lieutenant of France for the second time York became embroiled in the
government's various diplomatic initiatives, including the moves
associated with the truce of Tours. It has often been assumed that Duke
Richard was hostile to the peace negotiations of the 1440s, but there is
absolutely no evidence for this. While the confusions of policy in the
early years of the decade must have been exasperating for anyone charged
with responsibility for the defence of Lancastrian France, there is
nothing to suggest that York preferred war to diplomacy as a means of
preserving English interests. As the plan to seek a truce with Charles
VII and a marriage alliance with the house of Anjou emerged as the
central plank of royal policy in 1444, York seems to have given it his
full support. In the new spirit of Anglo-French amity, for example, he
sent forces to assist the dauphin's campaign in Alsace in the summer of
1444. The following year, and possibly in response to promptings from
the government, he opened negotiations for a marriage between his eldest
son (now Edward of Rouen-the future Edward IV-born on 28 April 1442) and
one of the French king's daughters. The duke may even have been
sympathetic to the government's plans to surrender Maine, which
proceeded alongside the truce negotiations and formed an integral part
of the alliance policy. Because of the postures that York struck after
1450 historians have tended to assume that he was opposed to this
notorious scheme, but that is by no means clear. It is very likely that
he knew what was planned by the end of 1445 (if not earlier, since he
met Suffolk's embassy as it travelled through Normandy in 1444) and he
was certainly involved in the arrangements for compensating Maine's
English landholders in 1447. Interestingly York was never explicitly to
condemn the handover of the territory, although its loss was certainly a
prominent feature of popular and parliamentary criticism of William de
la Pole, by then duke of Suffolk, Edmund Beaufort, duke of Somerset, and
the other so-called 'traitors' of 1450.
It is from the period following his return to England in 1445 that
York's alienation from Henry VI's ministers is often supposed to have
dated. The duke found himself accused of mishandling the funds he had
been paid for the defence of Normandy, and his chief accuser, it
appeared, was a central figure in the government, Adam Moleyns, bishop
of Chichester. York had returned to England confident of reappointment
to the French lieutenancy, but he was obliged to wait for more than a
year and then to see the office go to Edmund Beaufort instead. It used
to be thought that because of his alleged hostility to the peace policy,
and his putatively close links to the duke of Gloucester (who died
mysteriously in 1447), Duke Richard was persona non grata with Suffolk's
regime: his appointment to the lieutenancy of Ireland on 30 July 1447
has sometimes been seen as a form of exile, the government's hope being
that, like the earls of March, his predecessors, he would go there and die.
However, events thus far do not support this interpretation. York was
certainly dismayed by the rumours concerning his performance in
Normandy, but he was explicitly vindicated by king and lords both in and
outside the parliament of 1445-6; it is not even known that Moleyns had
made the accusations York claimed, only that the duke saw in a public
attack on the bishop the opportunity to clear his own name. Similarly,
while York was probably disappointed not to regain the lieutenancy of
France, too much should not be made of this: the lieutenancy of Ireland,
which he was granted in return, was a post that his most distinguished
ancestors (notably Clarence himself) had held; it bestowed upon him
almost sovereign powers in the island; and it gave him the opportunity
to combine military service with the exploitation of his interests as an
Irish landlord. Finally, since the terms of his commission permitted him
to appoint a deputy and return to England, it cannot be seen as a form
of banishment. In some ways, indeed, 1446 and 1447 saw York more closely
involved in the governing regime than he had ever been: in October 1446
he was granted the abbey and town of Waltham because he 'will come often
to London for the king's business and his own' (CPR, 1446-52, 43); over
the next year he attended a number of council meetings and was named as
a witness to more than three-quarters of the charters issued from 1446
to 1448; during 1447-9 he was added to the peace commissions of eleven
counties beyond those to which he had been named at his inheritance (and
in some cases beyond the scope of his landholdings); and finally, almost
for the first time, he began to enjoy the kind of rewards more commonly
bestowed on courtiers-most notably, perhaps, the wardship and marriage
of the Holland heir (Henry) and a series of lands and offices once held
by Gloucester. This last detail is a reminder that there was almost
nothing to link York with Duke Humphrey in the latter's lifetime: in no
sense can York be considered his supporter, and it is not improbable
that, like other members of the nobility, he witnessed Gloucester's
destruction at the Bury parliament and, tacitly at least, assented to it.
When he finally left for Ireland, in June 1449, Duke Richard did so as a
loyal and well-regarded member of the Lancastrian establishment. If he
had been less involved in affairs during the preceding year or so, this
may well have been at his own choice. Many of the nobility seem to have
withdrawn from the court during 1448 as the government's troubles began
to mount. York cannot have wished to be associated with the humiliating
surrender of Le Mans in March 1448 and he may well have feared the
consequences of the extraordinary coup at Fougeres. A tour of duty in
Ireland must have appeared an attractive alternative. During his
fourteen months in the province York scored a series of easy (if
short-lived) victories, receiving the submission of most of the island's
leaders and campaigning effectively in Wicklow. At the Drogheda
parliament of April 1450 he followed the lead of the Commons at
Westminster by introducing an Act of Resumption. Like the lieutenant of
France he was short of money, and this limited his achievements, but the
contrast between this vigorous performance and the demoralizing stasis
of Somerset's rule in France must have impressed itself upon contemporaries.
Estates and connections
By the mid-1430s, when he had gained full control over his estates, York
was the richest and most extensive landowner among the king's subjects.
Estimates of his wealth have varied between £2874 and £5800 net, but the
most recent and reliable estimate suggests that his estates in England
and Wales were worth about £4000 a year (net) when he came into them,
and that his exchequer annuities yielded an average of £600 a year.
York's lands were scattered through England and the march of Wales, with
notable concentrations in the West Riding of Yorkshire; in Lincolnshire
and Northamptonshire; in Dorset and Somerset; in Herefordshire,
Shropshire, and the middle march of Wales; and in the centre of East
Anglia along the border of Norfolk and Suffolk. Beyond this he held the
earldom of Ulster and the lordships of Connacht and Trim, although only
the last of these Irish estates is likely to have yielded York any real
influence or income.
The possession of such vast holdings shaped York's activities as a lord:
like John of Gaunt before him he was a truly national figure, with
interests so widespread and diverse that it was difficult for him to
exert the kind of local authority typical of later medieval magnates. He
had no real 'country'-no county-sized area of concentrated influence
where local gentlemen might turn first of all to him for lordship-and
this helped to determine both the nature of his affinity and the role
that he and it were to play in the politics of the realm. York's
following, like Gaunt's or indeed the king's, was a disparate group of
often important men, many of whom had their own local allegiances and
whose links with York were forged mainly through military service and
the tenure of estate or household office. In part, of course, this
pattern was a consequence of the duke's long minority and his prolonged
service in France: many of the servants of the duchy of York had melted
away in the 1420s into Gloucester's service, for example; while Duke
Richard's appointment as Bedford's successor in Normandy presented him
with a ready-made following looking for a lord. A spry comment from an
anti-Yorkist chronicler has promoted the suggestion that York was unduly
influenced by the men who gathered round him in Normandy-in particular,
by Sir William Oldhall, who was one of York's most reliable agents
during the 1450s-but there is little to support this notion,
particularly when the duke's involvement in the peace policy of the
mid-1440s is taken into account. On the contrary, it seems likely that
York's high status, his extensive interests, and his relative
disengagement from the affairs of any particular locality beyond his
estates meant that he was exposed to a wide array of different voices.
If anyone besides the king and his ministers was likely to hear the
counsel of the realm, it was surely York, who numbered lords such as
Talbot, Ralph Cromwell, and Thomas Scales among his councillors, but
also enjoyed links with exchequer clerks, lawyers, the widows of Norman
soldiers, and local worthies from all parts of the country. The
maintenance of this kind of connection may have cost York dear-as much
as £1300 a year, according to one recent estimate-but it seems that his
money was well spent. Despite his inability to offer really consistent
local support, he was apparently able to co-ordinate the raising of
large retinues throughout the 1450s. If some of his servants kept away
from the duke's more controversial ventures, a sizeable and prestigious
core remained loyal to the end.
The making of York's rebellion
The last and best-known period in York's political life began in
September 1450, when he suddenly returned from Ireland and took up the
common cry for the traitors surrounding the king to be brought to
justice. This was a significant change of political direction for the
duke, and one that shaped the remainder of his career, but the reasons
for it are not immediately obvious. Modern historians have mostly
rejected the traditional interpretation, which laid stress on York's
dynastic interests and saw his participation in the popular ferments of
the 1450s as a device for seizing the crown. Instead, the search has
been for the causes of personal grievance on Duke Richard's part: was he
moved to anger, or even desperation, by the government's enormous debts
to him? Was he incensed by the new pre-eminence of Edmund Beaufort, duke
of Somerset, the man who had so recently lost France? Did he fear for
his own position, as an old rival took control of Henry VI's government?
Alternatively, was York simply an opportunist, moving (typically late)
to exploit the regime's difficulties, but without any fixed idea of
where his dissidence might take him?
One difficulty in reaching any conclusions lies in trying to establish
which elements of York's programme, as this slowly unfolded, were
intentional, and intended from the start. It is certainly unlikely that
the duke was seeking to gain the throne in 1450: previous legitimists
had soon revealed their desire to improve the realm by changing the
king, but York was not to assert his Mortimer-Clarence claim until 1460,
after ten years of activism explicitly devoted to other ends. Even in
that year, moreover, his move was greeted with hostility, and it seems
reasonable to suggest that the duke would have known all along that this
was a likely reaction and would have trimmed his policy accordingly. It
is possible that, in 1450, York was concerned to secure recognition as
heir presumptive to Henry VI: the king was still without a child and
there was a (somewhat faint) possibility of dynastic competition from
the house of Beaufort. Like most noblemen York took an active interest
in the claims and titles he possessed-in 1445 he had sought information
on his interest in the throne of Castile and in 1451 an agent of his was
to argue in parliament that the duke should be named as heir
apparent-but, at best, this can provide only a partial explanation for
his actions in 1450.
As far as personal grievances are concerned, meanwhile, it is difficult
to see what grounds York had for complaint. That the duke was part of
the establishment in the 1440s has already been illustrated. Financially
he had fared no worse than any of Henry VI's other major accountants:
indeed, somewhat remarkably, given the state of royal finances, he
received £1200 from the crown at the end of 1449, and even in May 1450
efforts were being made to find him money. He may have decided to return
to England to seek funds-a letter to Salisbury, written in June 1450,
suggests that he feared serious losses in Ireland unless he received
further payments-but this is rather a different matter from acting on a
sense of grievance, and if seeking money was York's initial aim, it was
soon overwhelmed by other purposes.
What, finally, of York's famous antagonism towards Somerset: was this
the motivation for his assault on the king's ministers? The problem here
is one of disentangling the personal feud between the two men from the
relative positions in which a wider politics had placed them: did York
attack the government because it contained Somerset, or did he attack
Somerset because he was the leader of the government? It is certainly
possible to find grounds for animosity between the two men: Beaufort's
performance in the last years of the war was undistinguished to say the
least, and York may have thought that he himself could have achieved
more; it has recently been suggested, moreover, that the lieutenant's
casual surrender of Rouen would particularly have rankled with Duke
Richard, since he had continued to be its captain. At the same time,
however, it is clear that once York had made his inflammatory moves of
September 1450 (and possibly even before then), he and Somerset were
destined to be at odds: Duke Richard's political standing came quickly
to depend on the argument that the government was run by traitors, and a
large part of his justification for taking up arms in 1450, 1452, and
1455 was that the enmity of leading ministers obliged him to take action
to defend himself; Duke Edmund, on the other hand, was not unjustified
in regarding much of York's behaviour as threatening, both to himself
and to the order of the realm; if he sought, in 1450, in 1452-3, and in
1455, to deal with the problem by repression instead of indulgence, it
was an understandable approach. Politics, as much as personality and
private interest, determined the conflict between York and Somerset.
Pursuing this further, it may be suggested that it was in the
extraordinary politics of 1450 that the most likely reasons for York's
sudden attack on the government are to be found. As Normandy fell to the
French and the king's bankruptcy was exposed in parliament, the
authority of Henry VI's ministers disintegrated. MPs and more lowly
members of society appeared to be united in the belief that the king had
been betrayed by a self-serving clique who had pillaged his possessions
in England and surrendered those in France. If Suffolk's trial and
murder had removed the leader of the gang, the rest remained in
positions of power, and until the king and the 'true lords' took action
against them, there could be no justice or order in the realm. This
judgement on the recent past dominated public life in England between
1449 and 1451, and it continued to exert a certain influence over the
public imagination thereafter. York, like other members of the nobility,
must have known that in certain ways it was wide of the mark, but this
did not mean that it could be ignored. In particular, in fact, it could
not be ignored by York, who had already been identified by some of the
government's critics as the figure most likely to visit retribution upon
the 'traitors'. This appears to be the explanation for the rough
reception that York and his men received at their landing in north Wales
in September: local agents of the royal household, and possibly their
commanders at the centre, had become alarmed about the duke's
intentions. It was at this point, perhaps, and not in 1447, that 'by
treating [the duke] as an enemy the court had made him one' (McFarlane,
405): if both the king's ministers and his subjects were going to cast
York as the agent of justice, he might as well fulfil their
expectations. Certainly, the moment must have seemed ripe for someone to
take drastic action: the king's officers could not govern without public
confidence, and it may have appeared that the removal of some of the
discredited men-not least, perhaps, the duke of Somerset-was the best
way to restore it.
Beyond all this, it might be added that, even if the government had not
moved against him in 1450, everything in York's make-up would have given
him the sense that he was the man to restore the situation. He was the
greatest prince of the royal blood, head and shoulders above other
lords, the natural successor to Bedford and Gloucester in the protection
of Henry VI's interests. He had already acted as the king's viceroy in
France and Ireland; why not in England too? What, if anything, York knew
of the deeds of men like Gaunt and Woodstock (or those of Montfort and
Lancaster), whose status was much the same as his and whose actions were
to prefigure his own, is not known; but one model of proper noble
service had been made available to him when, probably in 1445, York was
presented with an elegantly decorated translation of Claudian's life of
the consul Stilicho. It was an account of how the people of Rome and
other nations implored this virtuous prince to accept the office of
consul and restore good government to a city torn apart by the evil
advisers of a child emperor. Its translator had invited York to 'marke
stilicoes life' ('Mittelenglische Claudian-Ubersetzung', 256): in 1450
the moment had arrived when he might put this teaching to good use.
York and the politics of the 1450s
It was with a volley of bills and open letters addressed to the king
that York returned to English political life in September 1450. The
first of these sought to establish the duke's loyalty; the second
advertised his intention to seek justice against his accusers; but it
was the third that was truly controversial-it drew the king's attention
to the universal complaint that justice was not being done to those who
broke the king's law with impunity (in particular, the so-called
'traitors'), and offered York's services in bringing the guilty to book.
This was an open defiance of the government's authority, since the
essence of the 'traitors' idea was that it was the men about the king
who were most of all responsible for the disasters that had befallen the
realm. As far as York was concerned, this meant that a true subject was
obliged to act against the inner circle of authority in order to fulfil
the terms of his allegiance to king and realm, and this explains the
duke's many affirmations of loyalty to King Henry: it was the essential
justification for actions that, on the face of it, appeared disloyal.
Under normal circumstances, of course, attempts to separate a king's
chosen counsellors and servants from the ruler himself were unlikely to
succeed: defiance of royal agents easily shaded into defiance of the
king, and that was treason. As York and all the rest of the nobility
knew, however, these circumstances were not normal: Henry VI had shown
no more discernment than a child in the government of his realm; his
ministers were virtually self-appointed, and the policies pursued during
the 1420s, 1430s, and 1440s were essentially theirs. If this makes
nonsense of one aspect of the 'traitors' thesis, it exposes the truth of
another aspect: the government was not in any real sense the vehicle of
the king's will, and thus defiance of it was not treason; the regime
could legitimately be reshaped, and, with large sections of the public
arguing that it should be, York's actions had a certain justice in them.
In reality he was appealing not to the king with these manifestos, but
to the Lords and to the wider public: his plea was that those who were
less compromised by the disasters of 1449-50 must abandon those who were
more immediately responsible; a new government, in which the duke was to
play a more prominent role, must be established.
Not surprisingly York's demands fell on deaf ears. The king's circle saw
little reason for a general blood-letting, and the nobility, who had
begun to lend support to the beleaguered regime as the crisis mounted,
appear to have taken a similar view. In a public reply to York's bills,
his offers of assistance were politely rebuffed, and the duke left
London to prepare for the parliament summoned to meet in November 1450.
When it gathered on the 6th, MPs demonstrated their continuing
enthusiasm for reform by electing Oldhall, York's chamberlain, as
speaker and loudly calling for the traitors to be brought to justice.
When the duke himself arrived, with sword borne upright before him and a
large army at his back, the initiative was his: Somerset was promptly
imprisoned and the Lords waited to see what would happen next. What
followed was in part a demonstration of Duke Richard's hesitancy and
conservatism, and in part a reflection of the constraints of his
position. Elements of the Commons' programme were put into effect, but
the duke made no attempt to alter the institutional framework of Henry's
government, and the result was that, during the Christmas recess,
authority drifted back to the king and his household, Somerset was
released, and the Lords, many of whom had flirted with York while he was
in the ascendant, resumed their former obedience. During the sessions of
the parliament in 1451 York's power waned, and Thomas Younge's notorious
attempt to have him recognized as heir apparent must have seemed to many
an act of desperation. Why had York not done more to secure himself
during his brief ascendancy? It is not, of course, clear what he wanted:
if only the restoration of order, then this was being achieved without
his help; if a role for himself in the government, then his actions had
made this unthinkable unless the king himself were to be altogether
displaced-the men of Henry's household, who effectively disposed of
royal power, were hardly going to welcome a man who had posed as their
nemesis. What York had done, in effect, was to go too far without going
far enough. Perhaps he should have cut his losses and risked a direct
assault on the throne; but such a move was almost certain to fail. The
duke had cast himself as the true liegeman of Henry VI: any deviation
from this role was sure to be seen as the grossest kind of betrayal;
York had many potential supporters, but-apart, perhaps, from his own
servants-their support was for his public, not his private, interests.
It has been worth looking at the events of 1450 in some detail, because
for the next two years Duke Richard's options were very largely shaped
by what had happened in that year. He could not be secure while Somerset
and the household retained both control of the king and the support of
the Lords, yet there was little he could do to improve his lot. Moves
against Oldhall were under way by the end of 1451, and when, in January
1452, York reacted publicly against them and against their implications
for himself, he was thinly supported. Apart from the duke's own men only
the malcontent Thomas Courtenay, earl of Devon, and his crony Lord
Cobham were persuaded to join the rising that attempted to repeat the
coup of 1450: the rest of the nobility gathered around the king and
Somerset, and York was forced to capitulate at Dartford in early March.
His failure left him worse off than before. He was obliged to swear a
humiliating oath of submission, his supporters and tenants were harried
by judicial commissions, and his attempts to discredit Somerset were
treated as part and parcel of a private quarrel. As the common people
were reduced to order and the government enjoyed the unfamiliar taste of
victory in Gascony, it seemed that York's political career was at an
end: never again would he be able to take his proper place in the
Lancastrian establishment.
At this point, however, fate combined with the contradictions of Henry
VI's regime to bestow new opportunities upon Duke Richard. In the summer
of 1453 Somerset's governing consensus suddenly collapsed, as the
victories in Gascony were reversed, the king lost his mind, and war
broke out in the north between the Nevilles and the Percys. In the
resulting crisis York was the only person of sufficient stature to
restore the situation, and it must be this factor, above all, that
explains the decision of a non-partisan group of councillors to summon
him to London in October 1453, and the agreement in parliament to
appoint him protector and defender of the realm on 27 March 1454. Here
was a means for York to wrest control of government from Somerset and
the king's household men without bringing his loyalty to Henry VI into
question; and here was a means for the rest of political society to
contain the powerful duke and to create an effective government without
the kind of sacrifices that had been demanded in 1450. York certainly
did his part: he went to London full of emollient promises to attend the
council and do all 'that sholde or might be to the welfare of the king
and of his subgettes' (CPR, 1452-61, 143); he made no attacks on
Somerset or other sometime 'traitors' (though his ally, Norfolk, did);
and, on taking up the post of protector, he committed himself to rule
consultatively and representatively with the Lords. During the
succeeding months York made serious and well-founded attempts to pacify
the disputes in the north and north midlands, and he enjoyed some
success. Making genuine efforts to consult widely, he demonstrated the
same statesmanlike qualities that had marked his management of France
and Ireland: 'for a whole year', wrote one chronicler, 'he governed the
whole realm of England most nobly and in the best way' ('Benet's
chronicle', 212). There were certainly limits to his achievement, and
his tenure of office was to be brought to an abrupt halt in February
1455, but the duke's performance may have prompted many of his peers to
look more sympathetically at his claims in the years to come.
Unfortunately, however, the moulds of politics were changing in these
years, and the broad unity that had so long been preserved among the
nobility was breaking down. The deterioration of order in the
localities, which had become so dramatic and extensive by 1453, was now
combined with the emergence of a more aggressive Lancastrian dynasticism
to promote significant divisions among the elite. These had begun to
emerge even before York's protectorate: one of the reasons why it had
taken so long to arrange the duke's appointment was that a substantial
group of lords had grouped themselves around the queen, Margaret of
Anjou, who-since the birth of her son Edward in October 1453-was
attempting to secure a regency for herself. In the winter of 1453-4,
indeed, civil war looked a distinct possibility. It was held off by
York's readiness to make explicit his submission to the dynastic claims
of the new prince, and by the agreement of all but the most extreme
figures to join a broadly based regime under the duke's headship. When
Henry VI recovered his sanity, however, at Christmas 1454, those in the
household and the north who had opposed the protectorate seized the
opportunity to assert their interests. York was removed from office on 9
February 1455, and by early March a more hard-faced government was
taking steps against the duke. The fact that the Neville earls of
Warwick and Salisbury also fell under attack at this time reveals the
factional and divisive aims of those in control: although the government
proceeded with the language of treason and obedience, its narrowing base
and its sponsorship of conflict began to undermine its claims to such
public goods; when York and the Nevilles confronted the king, Somerset,
and the Percys at St Albans on 22 May 1455, there was a broad
equivalence between the two sides, and the first blows of a civil war
were struck.
The Yorkist victory, however, brought this war to a rapid halt. Just as
he had done in the early 1450s, the duke submitted to the king and
attempted to rebuild unity. This was to remain his posture and that of
his allies right up to the disasters of 1459. York was certainly
prepared to strain his allegiance to its very limits-securing
appointment to a second protectorate on 15 November 1455 and depriving
the king of personal authority a week later-but he would not cross the
bounds to an outright repudiation of Henry VI's sovereignty. As a
consequence his pre-eminence remained insecure. His protectorate was
soon terminated (on 25 February 1456) when parliamentary pressure for a
resumption weakened his support among the Lords, but the aim of
preserving unity, or oonhede, among the nobility lingered on for some
years and ensured that if York was not to be admitted to any special
power, he was not to be destroyed either. It seems likely that, provided
he behaved himself, most of the peerage had some respect for the duke.
Pressure from Queen Margaret and her growing band of partisans meant
that he was obliged to repeat his submission of 1452 on a number of
occasions between 1456 and 1459, but he was confirmed in possession of
the lieutenancy of Ireland, and even seems to have been able to direct
policy for a time in the wake of the 'loveday' settlement of 1458. Only
in 1459 did the bulk of the Lords finally accept the case for war
against the duke, and then the fault-lines of 1453-4 and 1455 were
recreated and York received the support of the Nevilles. Rather as at St
Albans, York, Warwick, and Salisbury revived the case that evil
counsellors around the king were destroying the common weal of the realm
and threatening their own security. On this occasion, however, their
propaganda cut no ice: finding most of the nobility in arms against them
at Ludford Bridge (near Ludlow, Shropshire) and deserted by a part of
the army, York and his allies fled the field during the night of 12-13
October 1459.
Exile, return, and death
The duke and his second son, Edmund, earl of Rutland, spent the next
eleven months in Ireland, attempting to gain the men and money for an
armed return to England, where the duke's estates were in royal hands as
a result of his attainder at the Coventry parliament (about the end of
November 1459). His younger children, including George, were all placed
in the custody of the duchess of Buckingham. An incidental result of
York's efforts was the famous Drogheda parliament of 8 February 1460, in
which the Anglo-Irish establishment obtained recognition as a distinct
political community, separate from England, ruled by its own laws and
financed by its own currency. In return for these concessions York
gained resources, protection for his person, and an extensive army of
archers, which he must have intended to take to England. Plans for a
co-ordinated invasion of the mainland were apparently made during a
conference with Warwick at Waterford in the spring of 1460, and the
duke's Neville allies, accompanied by his eldest son, Edward of March,
duly landed in Kent in June professing loyalty to Henry VI and
protesting about the misgovernment of the realm. With startling success,
they won support in London and the south-east and proceeded to defeat
the royal army at Northampton on 10 July, submitting to the king at the
battle's end. Over the next few weeks March and the Nevilles began to
secure the realm and to await York's return, which finally occurred near
Chester on or about 9 September 1460.
Much about the next few weeks is obscure: it is not known why it took
York so long to join his allies on the mainland; it is not known when he
began so famously to assert his claim to the throne (13 September is the
first date for which a plausible case can be made); it is not known
whether or not the initiative had been agreed, or even discussed, with
the Nevilles. It seems clear that there was no option for York but to
attempt to make himself king: all other avenues, as has been shown, led
nowhere; the duke could neither secure himself nor restore political
order without taking the drastic step from which he had so far shrunk;
and it may have seemed that by 1460 the polity of Henry VI was
sufficiently dislocated to permit a direct assault on the king.
Unfortunately for the duke, however, his own options were different from
those of his allies, even his sons. These men had gained support on the
old plea of reforming Henry VI's government. They had recently made
their loyalty to the king explicit. As the managers of a large and
diverse alliance, they could not easily abandon what they had promised,
and it seems clear that the message from the London elite, who played an
important role in the frantic politics of 1459-61, was that a deposition
could not be tolerated. York marched into London, seized the king, and
entered parliament on 10 October, announcing that he intended 'to
challenge his right' to the crown (Johnson, York, 214). The Lords'
response was unpromising: they went into conclave at Blackfriars and
sent the young earl of March to persuade his father to accept a
negotiated settlement. By 13 October York had been brought to abandon
his plans for an immediate coronation, and a few days later he submitted
his claim for discussion in parliament. An accord emerged on 31 October,
and its central feature was to leave Henry VI on the throne, while
settling the succession on York and his sons. It is possible that even
after this York attempted to get his way by inducing Henry to abdicate.
He must have realized that, like the treaty of Troyes on which it was
apparently based, the accord promised immediate war with the
disinherited heir. In any event, the king was moved to safety and the
duke was obliged to accept the terms agreed in October, at least for the
time being. Acting more or less as protector he marched north in early
December to deal with the forces of the prince of Wales and Queen
Margaret, which had regrouped in Yorkshire after the defeat at
Northampton. Venturing forth from his castle at Sandal on 30 December
1460, in what may have been an uncharacteristic attempt to surprise his
enemy, York was set upon by an unexpectedly large Lancastrian force. In
the ensuing battle of Wakefield, he and his second son, Edmund of
Rutland, were killed. As a macabre riposte to Duke Richard's recent
pretensions, his head was severed from his body and displayed on the
walls of York bearing a paper crown.
So ended the life of this curious figure, who, having played safe in the
prime of his years, abruptly changed tack at the age of thirty-nine,
pursuing ever more ambitious and dangerous policies until, with victory
almost in his grasp, he fell on an ill-chosen battlefield. Duke Richard
was the true founder of the royal house of York, but despite a career
that a recent biographer has described as 'the most successful failure
of the middle ages' (Johnson, 'Political career', abstract), he has
inspired little interest and even less sympathy among historians.
Notwithstanding his many claims to be acting for the 'common weal' of
the realm, York has usually been presented as a somewhat colourless
bungler: all along, it seems, he wanted power, but he could not decide
how far to go until the last minute, whereupon-fatally-he went too far.
In 1964 B. Wilkinson set the tone for most modern accounts of the duke's
career with his judgement that 'it would be folly to make a statesman
out of this fifteenth-century worldling' (Wilkinson, 88). This view
seems unfairly harsh: like many of his peers, his instincts were to make
the best of things in Henry VI's England, a world in which there were no
easy answers. York's opportunities were closely circumscribed and his
intentions in opposing Henry VI's government are far from clear; in fact
there may be a case for seeing him more as the victim of circumstances
than as their creator. His cautiousness, if ultimately unproductive, was
justified by the sheer impropriety of opposition to the government. On
the other hand, the recklessness that he demonstrated in 1450, 1452,
1455, 1459, and 1460 was also justified: sometimes by its results;
always by the need to do something to restore the authority that the
king, in his feebleness, had frittered away. In medieval England,
however, the restoration of authority could only be carried out from the
throne. York's final and most destructive venture was thus his
best-conceived one, but it is easy to see why it has won him few plaudits.
John Watts
Sources P. A. Johnson, Duke Richard of York, 1411-1460 (1988) + T. B.
Pugh, 'Richard Plantagenet (1411-60), duke of York, as the king's
lieutenant in France and Ireland', Aspects of medieval government and
society: essays presented to J. R. Lander, ed. J. G. Rowe (1986), 107-41
+ J. Watts, Henry VI and the politics of kingship (1996) + R. A.
Griffiths, The reign of King Henry VI: the exercise of royal authority,
1422-1461 (1981) + Chancery records + J. T. Rosenthal, 'The estates and
finances of Richard, duke of York, 1411-1460', Studies in Medieval and
Renaissance History, 2 (1965), 117-204 + G. L. Harriss, Cardinal
Beaufort: a study of Lancastrian ascendancy and decline (1988) + A. J.
Pollard, John Talbot and the war in France, 1427-1453, Royal Historical
Society Studies in History, 35 (1983) + C. T. Allmand, Lancastrian
Normandy, 1415-1450 (1983) + M. K. Jones, 'Somerset, York and the Wars
of the Roses', EngHR, 104 (1989), 285-307 + R. A. Griffiths, 'Duke
Richard of York's intentions in 1450 and the origins of the Wars of the
Roses', Journal of Medieval History, 1 (1975), 187-209 + M. L. Kekewich
and others, eds., The politics of fifteenth-century England: John Vale's
book (1995) + J. L. Watts, 'De consulatu Stiliconis: texts and politics
in the reign of Henry VI', Journal of Medieval History, 16 (1990),
251-66 + J. M. W. Bean, 'The financial position of Richard, duke of
York', War and government in the middle ages, ed. J. Gillingham and J.
C. Holt (1984), 182-98 + T. B. Pugh, Henry V and the Southampton plot of
1415, Southampton RS, 30 (1988) + A. J. Otway-Ruthven, A history of
medieval Ireland (1968) + 'John Benet's chronicle for the years 1400 to
1462', ed. G. L. Harriss and M. A. Harriss, Camden miscellany, XXIV, CS,
4th ser., 9 (1972) + E. Flugel, 'Eine mittelenglische
Claudian-Ubersetzung (1445)', Anglia, 28 (1905), 255-99 + P. A. Johnson,
'The political career of Richard, duke of York, to 1456', DPhil diss.,
U. Oxf., 1981 + B. Wilkinson, Constitutional history of England in the
fifteenth century (1399-1485) (1964) + Osbern Bokenam's Legenden, ed. C.
Horstmann (Heilbronn, 1883) + 'William Gregory's chronicle of London',
The historical collections of a citizen of London in the fifteenth
century, ed. J. Gairdner, CS, new ser., 17 (1876) + K. Dockray, 'The
battle of Wakefield and the Wars of the Roses', The Ricardian, 9
(1991-3), 238-58 + R. Knowles, 'The battle of Wakefield: the
topography', The Ricardian, 9 (1991-3), 259-65 + C. Ross, Edward IV
(1974) + Itineraries [of] William Worcestre, ed. J. H. Harvey, OMT
(1969) + K. B. McFarlane, 'The Lancastrian kings', Cambridge Medieval
History, 8, ed. C. W. Previte-Orton and Z. N. Brooke (1936), 363-417 +
CPR, 1446-61 + CEPR letters, 8.132
Archives BL, letters relating to a truce between England and Burgundy,
Add. Ch. 75479
Likenesses painted glass window, Cirencester; repro. in S. Lysons, A
collection of Gloucestershire antiquities (1804) · painted glass window,
Trinity Cam. [see illus.]
Wealth at death under £4600 p.a. net: Johnson, Duke Richard, 7, 21-4
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Re: ODNB Life of the Day - Richard, Duke of York
2011-07-15 14:30:57
Thanks, Christine!
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From: Christine Headley <christinelheadley@...>
To: [email protected];
Sent: Friday, July 15, 2011 6:29 AM
Subject: ODNB Life of the Day - Richard, Duke of York
I subscribe to the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography Life of the Day.
They usually choose people because it's their birthday - clearly not the
case this time - and I'm glad Richard Duke of York is having a turn.
Best wishes
Christine
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Subject: A most successful failure?
Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2011 07:00:00 +0100
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Richard of York, third duke of York (1411-1460), magnate and claimant
to the English throne, was the only son of Richard of Conisbrough,
fourth earl of Cambridge (1385-1415), and Anne Mortimer (b. after 1388,
d. before 1414), daughter of Roger (VII) Mortimer, fourth earl of March.
He was descended from Edward III through both parents, his father being
the son of that king's fourth son, Edmund of Langley, first duke of
York, and his mother the great-granddaughter of Edward's second son,
Lionel of Antwerp, duke of Clarence. It was this distinguished ancestry
that provided the basis for his explosive participation in the troubled
politics of the 1450s. In October 1460, after a decade of agitation and
intervention, he attempted to seize the throne on the grounds that his
descent from Clarence made him rightful king in place of Henry VI, who,
like the other Lancastrian kings, was descended from Edward III's third
son, John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster. The attempt failed, and York died
a few months later at the battle of Wakefield, but the claim, of course,
lived on to provide the basis for Edward IV's succession in March 1461.
Youth and inheritance
Richard of York was born on 22 September 1411, to parents who had
married in secret and were soon to be dead. His mother was gone within a
year or two; his father, who married again in 1414, was executed the
following year when details of his plot to depose Henry V came to light.
Cambridge's plan to raise the north and (apparently) to put Edmund (V)
Mortimer, earl of March, on the throne must have thrown his son's
dynastic position into sharp relief: the young Richard's mother had been
the elder of March's sisters, which made the boy himself a possible heir
to the Mortimer-Clarence claim to the throne. On Cambridge's death he
became a royal ward, and it is not altogether surprising that in March
1416 he was placed in the custody of the Lancastrians' leading gaoler,
Sir Robert Waterton. Three years into his reign, however, Henry V was
busy laying to rest the divisions of his father's time and Richard of
York was destined for rehabilitation. He was protected from the effects
of his father's attainder and, on the death of his uncle Edward, duke of
York, at Agincourt, the boy was recognized to be his heir. Not long
after Henry VI's accession York's wardship and marriage were sold to
Ralph Neville, earl of Westmorland. At 3000 marks the price was a high
one, but Neville's investment was amply repaid when, in January 1425,
Edmund, earl of March, died childless, and York, as his nephew, became
heir to the extensive Mortimer inheritance. At some stage in the 1420s,
possibly as early as 1424, the young duke was married off to Cecily
Neville (1415-1495), one of Westmorland's daughters with Joan Beaufort.
From the point of view of the Nevilles, who had married into most of the
leading magnate families of the day, it was a prestigious match that
helped to confirm the family's growing pre-eminence; from the point of
view of Henry VI's government, it was an ideal way to absorb a
potentially dangerous figure by attaching him to some of the dynasty's
staunchest supporters.
Over the next few years York was drawn more closely into the circle
around the young king. In 1426 he was knighted, and two years later he
was appointed to take up residence in the royal household. In 1430 York
took part in the king's coronation expedition to France. His retinue was
small, but he was handsomely rewarded for his involvement: over 1000
marks by the summer of 1431. Soon after his return, and still a minor
(though there appears to have been some uncertainty over this at the
time), he was granted livery of his estates on 12 May 1432. At the time
both inheritances were encumbered with debts, dowers, and obligations,
while the duchy of York was mainly in the hands of feoffees. By the
summer of 1434, however, a series of financial settlements and the
deaths of the two remaining dowagers had lifted the worst of these
burdens, and the duke was free to enjoy his extensive patrimony
undisturbed. The acquisition of his inheritance had cost him quite a
lot, but he had received fair-even generous-treatment from the
government. York's proximity to the king, both in blood and in person,
and his links with the families of Neville and Beaufort had stood him in
good stead.
Service in France
In 1433 York was admitted to the Order of the Garter-a mark of favour, a
certificate of loyalty, and perhaps a token of martial expectations. His
first taste of military command was to be as successor to John, duke of
Bedford, in the lieutenancy of France, a post for which he was, in many
ways, the obvious candidate: the royal commission, dated 8 May 1436,
recited the king's desire to see France ruled by 'some great prince of
our blood' (Johnson, York, 226), and there was no one else who fitted
the bill, apart from Humphrey, duke of Gloucester. York had agreed to
serve in France as early as February 1436, but his army did not reach
Harfleur until 7 June. Had it left England more promptly, it might have
been able to prevent the French reconquest of Paris and the
Ile-de-France, which took place during the spring, though it is
difficult to know where the blame for the expedition's dilatoriness
should lie: York was also to be late leaving for his second tour of duty
in 1441, and the government was sceptical of his excuses on both
occasions, but recruiting an army was no easy feat in the later stages
of the Hundred Years' War, and delays were probably unavoidable. In the
event the French advance was halted by York's forces. The brilliant
campaign of autumn 1436, which ensured the safety of Rouen, was actually
commanded by John, Lord Talbot, but Duke Richard too seems to have
carried out some useful work, regaining most of the Pays de Caux after
the rebellion of 1435, attending to the grievances of the Normans, and
surveying the English garrisons. During both of York's lieutenancies it
seems to have been a policy of his to delegate the basic management of
the war to leading captains: his retainer Talbot, as marshal, in 1436;
his brother-in-law Richard Neville, earl of Salisbury, as
lieutenant-general in 1437; and Talbot again as 'lieutenant-general for
the conduct of the war' (Pollard, 39) during York's second tour of duty
from 1441. Although the duke and his council retained overall control of
military policy throughout, it may be that York saw himself more as a
viceroy, responsible for government as a whole, than as a warrior. This
is certainly implicit in the attention that he gave to matters of
domestic governance in Normandy and the pays de conquete: it was for his
good rule of the duchy and for his genuine attempts to deal with the
problems created by a declining military occupation that York would be
remembered in France. His role in the fighting of the war was
undistinguished, and a number of English chroniclers noted the fact.
Faced with the imminent expiry of his indentures-though not of his
lieutenancy, the term of which was indefinite-York sought permission to
return home in the spring of 1437. His successor was to be the earl of
Warwick, and York was instructed to remain in Normandy until his
arrival, which was delayed until the following November. It is difficult
to know whether the decision to replace York reflects disappointment
with his performance or not: the duke may even have wished to stand
down, possibly because of difficulties in extracting money from the
Norman exchequer for the payment of his troops. In any event Warwick's
service was soon cut short by his death in April 1439, and Henry VI's
government found itself once again faced with the task of providing for
the rule of Lancastrian France. It was apparently as a compromise
candidate that York emerged as the new lieutenant on 2 July 1440:
Gloucester appears to have sought his own appointment, while Cardinal
Beaufort, the regime's paymaster, probably pressed the claims of his
nephew John Beaufort, earl of Somerset. York, however, was the most
suitable choice for a post which now, more than ever, demanded a
flexible, diplomatic, and authoritative holder: as the government
pursued both peace and war with greater vigour than before, the duke was
sufficiently neutral, consultative, and grand to act effectively on its
behalf; he was also well connected with all parties, including the
military establishment in France.
On this occasion York demanded adequate funding and increased powers
before he would accept the job: he went to France as a second Bedford,
with all the powers that Duke John had enjoyed after 1432 and a promise
of £20,000 a year from the English exchequer to fund his troops. Apart
from these improved terms of service, however, the patterns of the first
lieutenancy were repeated. York left England late, not arriving in
Normandy until the end of June 1441. He then moved speedily down the
Seine to Pontoise where Talbot was struggling to lift Charles VII's
siege, but this was to be his only military action in the three years
before the truce of Tours. It was not a particularly impressive one: if
York had helped to secure Pontoise for a further few months, he may also
have frustrated a daring scheme of Talbot's that could have resulted in
the capture of the French king. Caution, it seems, got the better of
York, and not for the last time in his career.
Over the next few years the duke busied himself with matters of
governance and diplomacy while the war effort in Normandy ground slowly
to a halt. In part this was because Charles VII had turned his attention
to the south-west, but it is clear that York's reluctance to engage the
French directly caused dissatisfaction in the English government and it
may help to explain why Cardinal Beaufort was able to engineer a major
military command for his nephew John. The earl of Somerset's expedition,
planned from late 1442 and launched in the summer of 1443, involved a
major diversion of men, funds, and authority away from York and the
Norman theatre. Duke Richard dispatched an embassy to remonstrate with
the English government in June 1443, but it had no effect, and the
campaign itself added injury to insult: Somerset's attack on Brittany
and the duke of Alencon's stronghold of La Guerche disrupted York's
attempts, conducted during 1442-3, to involve the English in an alliance
of French princes. In the light of all this it is hardly surprising
that, following the expedition's failure, the government seems to have
felt the need to appease York: tallies for the payments due at
Michaelmas 1443 arrived in February 1444 and, later in that year, the
duke was given a major apanage in southern Normandy, while earldoms
(and, in Edmund's case, lands) were granted to his eldest sons. After
this no more of York's wages were paid until 1446, but at least the
truce contracted in May 1444 reduced his expenses and removed the need
for further military activity. In September 1445 York returned to
England: his indentures were about to expire, parliament was in session,
and-rather ironically, given the government's own failures in this
regard-his management of Norman finances was under investigation.
York and English politics before 1450
It now seems clear that Cardinal Beaufort, William de la Pole, earl of
Suffolk, and the other leading councillors and courtiers who, in the
first instance, managed Henry VI's authority in the 1430s and 1440s
intended Richard of York to be a pillar of the Lancastrian regime. This
did not mean that the already wealthy duke was to be showered with
gifts, nor did it mean that he was to be given a formal role in the
government of England. York was not, for example, appointed to the
re-established council in November 1437, but nothing should be inferred
from this: at twenty-six the duke would have been considered rather
youthful for what was in any case a rather anomalous role; exclusion
from the council would scarcely have excluded him from influence; and it
is likely that already the expectation was that his service to the crown
would be overseas, at least while he was of military age. It is not
known what part, if any, York played in the politics of 1437-41, during
which time he was in England and Henry VI, somewhat uncertainly, came of
age. There is no reason to suppose that he supported the moves of
Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, against Cardinal Beaufort in 1439-40,
despite Gloucester's suggestion that York and other lords had been
wrongfully kept out of power; nor should it be assumed that he was
opposed to the release of the duke of Orleans. He seems to have kept a
low profile at this time, participating in a scheme to restore order in
Wales in 1437-8, sharing in the custody of the Beauchamp wardship in
1439, and touring his estates. When, in early 1441, the 'longe
bareynesse' of his marriage was suddenly ended and a son born, York
named him Henry (Bokenham's Legenden, 273). This demonstration of
dynastic loyalty earned a gift of £100 worth of jewels from the grateful
king: the restoration of the heir of Cambridge and Mortimer must have
seemed to be complete.
As lieutenant of France for the second time York became embroiled in the
government's various diplomatic initiatives, including the moves
associated with the truce of Tours. It has often been assumed that Duke
Richard was hostile to the peace negotiations of the 1440s, but there is
absolutely no evidence for this. While the confusions of policy in the
early years of the decade must have been exasperating for anyone charged
with responsibility for the defence of Lancastrian France, there is
nothing to suggest that York preferred war to diplomacy as a means of
preserving English interests. As the plan to seek a truce with Charles
VII and a marriage alliance with the house of Anjou emerged as the
central plank of royal policy in 1444, York seems to have given it his
full support. In the new spirit of Anglo-French amity, for example, he
sent forces to assist the dauphin's campaign in Alsace in the summer of
1444. The following year, and possibly in response to promptings from
the government, he opened negotiations for a marriage between his eldest
son (now Edward of Rouen-the future Edward IV-born on 28 April 1442) and
one of the French king's daughters. The duke may even have been
sympathetic to the government's plans to surrender Maine, which
proceeded alongside the truce negotiations and formed an integral part
of the alliance policy. Because of the postures that York struck after
1450 historians have tended to assume that he was opposed to this
notorious scheme, but that is by no means clear. It is very likely that
he knew what was planned by the end of 1445 (if not earlier, since he
met Suffolk's embassy as it travelled through Normandy in 1444) and he
was certainly involved in the arrangements for compensating Maine's
English landholders in 1447. Interestingly York was never explicitly to
condemn the handover of the territory, although its loss was certainly a
prominent feature of popular and parliamentary criticism of William de
la Pole, by then duke of Suffolk, Edmund Beaufort, duke of Somerset, and
the other so-called 'traitors' of 1450.
It is from the period following his return to England in 1445 that
York's alienation from Henry VI's ministers is often supposed to have
dated. The duke found himself accused of mishandling the funds he had
been paid for the defence of Normandy, and his chief accuser, it
appeared, was a central figure in the government, Adam Moleyns, bishop
of Chichester. York had returned to England confident of reappointment
to the French lieutenancy, but he was obliged to wait for more than a
year and then to see the office go to Edmund Beaufort instead. It used
to be thought that because of his alleged hostility to the peace policy,
and his putatively close links to the duke of Gloucester (who died
mysteriously in 1447), Duke Richard was persona non grata with Suffolk's
regime: his appointment to the lieutenancy of Ireland on 30 July 1447
has sometimes been seen as a form of exile, the government's hope being
that, like the earls of March, his predecessors, he would go there and die.
However, events thus far do not support this interpretation. York was
certainly dismayed by the rumours concerning his performance in
Normandy, but he was explicitly vindicated by king and lords both in and
outside the parliament of 1445-6; it is not even known that Moleyns had
made the accusations York claimed, only that the duke saw in a public
attack on the bishop the opportunity to clear his own name. Similarly,
while York was probably disappointed not to regain the lieutenancy of
France, too much should not be made of this: the lieutenancy of Ireland,
which he was granted in return, was a post that his most distinguished
ancestors (notably Clarence himself) had held; it bestowed upon him
almost sovereign powers in the island; and it gave him the opportunity
to combine military service with the exploitation of his interests as an
Irish landlord. Finally, since the terms of his commission permitted him
to appoint a deputy and return to England, it cannot be seen as a form
of banishment. In some ways, indeed, 1446 and 1447 saw York more closely
involved in the governing regime than he had ever been: in October 1446
he was granted the abbey and town of Waltham because he 'will come often
to London for the king's business and his own' (CPR, 1446-52, 43); over
the next year he attended a number of council meetings and was named as
a witness to more than three-quarters of the charters issued from 1446
to 1448; during 1447-9 he was added to the peace commissions of eleven
counties beyond those to which he had been named at his inheritance (and
in some cases beyond the scope of his landholdings); and finally, almost
for the first time, he began to enjoy the kind of rewards more commonly
bestowed on courtiers-most notably, perhaps, the wardship and marriage
of the Holland heir (Henry) and a series of lands and offices once held
by Gloucester. This last detail is a reminder that there was almost
nothing to link York with Duke Humphrey in the latter's lifetime: in no
sense can York be considered his supporter, and it is not improbable
that, like other members of the nobility, he witnessed Gloucester's
destruction at the Bury parliament and, tacitly at least, assented to it.
When he finally left for Ireland, in June 1449, Duke Richard did so as a
loyal and well-regarded member of the Lancastrian establishment. If he
had been less involved in affairs during the preceding year or so, this
may well have been at his own choice. Many of the nobility seem to have
withdrawn from the court during 1448 as the government's troubles began
to mount. York cannot have wished to be associated with the humiliating
surrender of Le Mans in March 1448 and he may well have feared the
consequences of the extraordinary coup at Fougeres. A tour of duty in
Ireland must have appeared an attractive alternative. During his
fourteen months in the province York scored a series of easy (if
short-lived) victories, receiving the submission of most of the island's
leaders and campaigning effectively in Wicklow. At the Drogheda
parliament of April 1450 he followed the lead of the Commons at
Westminster by introducing an Act of Resumption. Like the lieutenant of
France he was short of money, and this limited his achievements, but the
contrast between this vigorous performance and the demoralizing stasis
of Somerset's rule in France must have impressed itself upon contemporaries.
Estates and connections
By the mid-1430s, when he had gained full control over his estates, York
was the richest and most extensive landowner among the king's subjects.
Estimates of his wealth have varied between £2874 and £5800 net, but the
most recent and reliable estimate suggests that his estates in England
and Wales were worth about £4000 a year (net) when he came into them,
and that his exchequer annuities yielded an average of £600 a year.
York's lands were scattered through England and the march of Wales, with
notable concentrations in the West Riding of Yorkshire; in Lincolnshire
and Northamptonshire; in Dorset and Somerset; in Herefordshire,
Shropshire, and the middle march of Wales; and in the centre of East
Anglia along the border of Norfolk and Suffolk. Beyond this he held the
earldom of Ulster and the lordships of Connacht and Trim, although only
the last of these Irish estates is likely to have yielded York any real
influence or income.
The possession of such vast holdings shaped York's activities as a lord:
like John of Gaunt before him he was a truly national figure, with
interests so widespread and diverse that it was difficult for him to
exert the kind of local authority typical of later medieval magnates. He
had no real 'country'-no county-sized area of concentrated influence
where local gentlemen might turn first of all to him for lordship-and
this helped to determine both the nature of his affinity and the role
that he and it were to play in the politics of the realm. York's
following, like Gaunt's or indeed the king's, was a disparate group of
often important men, many of whom had their own local allegiances and
whose links with York were forged mainly through military service and
the tenure of estate or household office. In part, of course, this
pattern was a consequence of the duke's long minority and his prolonged
service in France: many of the servants of the duchy of York had melted
away in the 1420s into Gloucester's service, for example; while Duke
Richard's appointment as Bedford's successor in Normandy presented him
with a ready-made following looking for a lord. A spry comment from an
anti-Yorkist chronicler has promoted the suggestion that York was unduly
influenced by the men who gathered round him in Normandy-in particular,
by Sir William Oldhall, who was one of York's most reliable agents
during the 1450s-but there is little to support this notion,
particularly when the duke's involvement in the peace policy of the
mid-1440s is taken into account. On the contrary, it seems likely that
York's high status, his extensive interests, and his relative
disengagement from the affairs of any particular locality beyond his
estates meant that he was exposed to a wide array of different voices.
If anyone besides the king and his ministers was likely to hear the
counsel of the realm, it was surely York, who numbered lords such as
Talbot, Ralph Cromwell, and Thomas Scales among his councillors, but
also enjoyed links with exchequer clerks, lawyers, the widows of Norman
soldiers, and local worthies from all parts of the country. The
maintenance of this kind of connection may have cost York dear-as much
as £1300 a year, according to one recent estimate-but it seems that his
money was well spent. Despite his inability to offer really consistent
local support, he was apparently able to co-ordinate the raising of
large retinues throughout the 1450s. If some of his servants kept away
from the duke's more controversial ventures, a sizeable and prestigious
core remained loyal to the end.
The making of York's rebellion
The last and best-known period in York's political life began in
September 1450, when he suddenly returned from Ireland and took up the
common cry for the traitors surrounding the king to be brought to
justice. This was a significant change of political direction for the
duke, and one that shaped the remainder of his career, but the reasons
for it are not immediately obvious. Modern historians have mostly
rejected the traditional interpretation, which laid stress on York's
dynastic interests and saw his participation in the popular ferments of
the 1450s as a device for seizing the crown. Instead, the search has
been for the causes of personal grievance on Duke Richard's part: was he
moved to anger, or even desperation, by the government's enormous debts
to him? Was he incensed by the new pre-eminence of Edmund Beaufort, duke
of Somerset, the man who had so recently lost France? Did he fear for
his own position, as an old rival took control of Henry VI's government?
Alternatively, was York simply an opportunist, moving (typically late)
to exploit the regime's difficulties, but without any fixed idea of
where his dissidence might take him?
One difficulty in reaching any conclusions lies in trying to establish
which elements of York's programme, as this slowly unfolded, were
intentional, and intended from the start. It is certainly unlikely that
the duke was seeking to gain the throne in 1450: previous legitimists
had soon revealed their desire to improve the realm by changing the
king, but York was not to assert his Mortimer-Clarence claim until 1460,
after ten years of activism explicitly devoted to other ends. Even in
that year, moreover, his move was greeted with hostility, and it seems
reasonable to suggest that the duke would have known all along that this
was a likely reaction and would have trimmed his policy accordingly. It
is possible that, in 1450, York was concerned to secure recognition as
heir presumptive to Henry VI: the king was still without a child and
there was a (somewhat faint) possibility of dynastic competition from
the house of Beaufort. Like most noblemen York took an active interest
in the claims and titles he possessed-in 1445 he had sought information
on his interest in the throne of Castile and in 1451 an agent of his was
to argue in parliament that the duke should be named as heir
apparent-but, at best, this can provide only a partial explanation for
his actions in 1450.
As far as personal grievances are concerned, meanwhile, it is difficult
to see what grounds York had for complaint. That the duke was part of
the establishment in the 1440s has already been illustrated. Financially
he had fared no worse than any of Henry VI's other major accountants:
indeed, somewhat remarkably, given the state of royal finances, he
received £1200 from the crown at the end of 1449, and even in May 1450
efforts were being made to find him money. He may have decided to return
to England to seek funds-a letter to Salisbury, written in June 1450,
suggests that he feared serious losses in Ireland unless he received
further payments-but this is rather a different matter from acting on a
sense of grievance, and if seeking money was York's initial aim, it was
soon overwhelmed by other purposes.
What, finally, of York's famous antagonism towards Somerset: was this
the motivation for his assault on the king's ministers? The problem here
is one of disentangling the personal feud between the two men from the
relative positions in which a wider politics had placed them: did York
attack the government because it contained Somerset, or did he attack
Somerset because he was the leader of the government? It is certainly
possible to find grounds for animosity between the two men: Beaufort's
performance in the last years of the war was undistinguished to say the
least, and York may have thought that he himself could have achieved
more; it has recently been suggested, moreover, that the lieutenant's
casual surrender of Rouen would particularly have rankled with Duke
Richard, since he had continued to be its captain. At the same time,
however, it is clear that once York had made his inflammatory moves of
September 1450 (and possibly even before then), he and Somerset were
destined to be at odds: Duke Richard's political standing came quickly
to depend on the argument that the government was run by traitors, and a
large part of his justification for taking up arms in 1450, 1452, and
1455 was that the enmity of leading ministers obliged him to take action
to defend himself; Duke Edmund, on the other hand, was not unjustified
in regarding much of York's behaviour as threatening, both to himself
and to the order of the realm; if he sought, in 1450, in 1452-3, and in
1455, to deal with the problem by repression instead of indulgence, it
was an understandable approach. Politics, as much as personality and
private interest, determined the conflict between York and Somerset.
Pursuing this further, it may be suggested that it was in the
extraordinary politics of 1450 that the most likely reasons for York's
sudden attack on the government are to be found. As Normandy fell to the
French and the king's bankruptcy was exposed in parliament, the
authority of Henry VI's ministers disintegrated. MPs and more lowly
members of society appeared to be united in the belief that the king had
been betrayed by a self-serving clique who had pillaged his possessions
in England and surrendered those in France. If Suffolk's trial and
murder had removed the leader of the gang, the rest remained in
positions of power, and until the king and the 'true lords' took action
against them, there could be no justice or order in the realm. This
judgement on the recent past dominated public life in England between
1449 and 1451, and it continued to exert a certain influence over the
public imagination thereafter. York, like other members of the nobility,
must have known that in certain ways it was wide of the mark, but this
did not mean that it could be ignored. In particular, in fact, it could
not be ignored by York, who had already been identified by some of the
government's critics as the figure most likely to visit retribution upon
the 'traitors'. This appears to be the explanation for the rough
reception that York and his men received at their landing in north Wales
in September: local agents of the royal household, and possibly their
commanders at the centre, had become alarmed about the duke's
intentions. It was at this point, perhaps, and not in 1447, that 'by
treating [the duke] as an enemy the court had made him one' (McFarlane,
405): if both the king's ministers and his subjects were going to cast
York as the agent of justice, he might as well fulfil their
expectations. Certainly, the moment must have seemed ripe for someone to
take drastic action: the king's officers could not govern without public
confidence, and it may have appeared that the removal of some of the
discredited men-not least, perhaps, the duke of Somerset-was the best
way to restore it.
Beyond all this, it might be added that, even if the government had not
moved against him in 1450, everything in York's make-up would have given
him the sense that he was the man to restore the situation. He was the
greatest prince of the royal blood, head and shoulders above other
lords, the natural successor to Bedford and Gloucester in the protection
of Henry VI's interests. He had already acted as the king's viceroy in
France and Ireland; why not in England too? What, if anything, York knew
of the deeds of men like Gaunt and Woodstock (or those of Montfort and
Lancaster), whose status was much the same as his and whose actions were
to prefigure his own, is not known; but one model of proper noble
service had been made available to him when, probably in 1445, York was
presented with an elegantly decorated translation of Claudian's life of
the consul Stilicho. It was an account of how the people of Rome and
other nations implored this virtuous prince to accept the office of
consul and restore good government to a city torn apart by the evil
advisers of a child emperor. Its translator had invited York to 'marke
stilicoes life' ('Mittelenglische Claudian-Ubersetzung', 256): in 1450
the moment had arrived when he might put this teaching to good use.
York and the politics of the 1450s
It was with a volley of bills and open letters addressed to the king
that York returned to English political life in September 1450. The
first of these sought to establish the duke's loyalty; the second
advertised his intention to seek justice against his accusers; but it
was the third that was truly controversial-it drew the king's attention
to the universal complaint that justice was not being done to those who
broke the king's law with impunity (in particular, the so-called
'traitors'), and offered York's services in bringing the guilty to book.
This was an open defiance of the government's authority, since the
essence of the 'traitors' idea was that it was the men about the king
who were most of all responsible for the disasters that had befallen the
realm. As far as York was concerned, this meant that a true subject was
obliged to act against the inner circle of authority in order to fulfil
the terms of his allegiance to king and realm, and this explains the
duke's many affirmations of loyalty to King Henry: it was the essential
justification for actions that, on the face of it, appeared disloyal.
Under normal circumstances, of course, attempts to separate a king's
chosen counsellors and servants from the ruler himself were unlikely to
succeed: defiance of royal agents easily shaded into defiance of the
king, and that was treason. As York and all the rest of the nobility
knew, however, these circumstances were not normal: Henry VI had shown
no more discernment than a child in the government of his realm; his
ministers were virtually self-appointed, and the policies pursued during
the 1420s, 1430s, and 1440s were essentially theirs. If this makes
nonsense of one aspect of the 'traitors' thesis, it exposes the truth of
another aspect: the government was not in any real sense the vehicle of
the king's will, and thus defiance of it was not treason; the regime
could legitimately be reshaped, and, with large sections of the public
arguing that it should be, York's actions had a certain justice in them.
In reality he was appealing not to the king with these manifestos, but
to the Lords and to the wider public: his plea was that those who were
less compromised by the disasters of 1449-50 must abandon those who were
more immediately responsible; a new government, in which the duke was to
play a more prominent role, must be established.
Not surprisingly York's demands fell on deaf ears. The king's circle saw
little reason for a general blood-letting, and the nobility, who had
begun to lend support to the beleaguered regime as the crisis mounted,
appear to have taken a similar view. In a public reply to York's bills,
his offers of assistance were politely rebuffed, and the duke left
London to prepare for the parliament summoned to meet in November 1450.
When it gathered on the 6th, MPs demonstrated their continuing
enthusiasm for reform by electing Oldhall, York's chamberlain, as
speaker and loudly calling for the traitors to be brought to justice.
When the duke himself arrived, with sword borne upright before him and a
large army at his back, the initiative was his: Somerset was promptly
imprisoned and the Lords waited to see what would happen next. What
followed was in part a demonstration of Duke Richard's hesitancy and
conservatism, and in part a reflection of the constraints of his
position. Elements of the Commons' programme were put into effect, but
the duke made no attempt to alter the institutional framework of Henry's
government, and the result was that, during the Christmas recess,
authority drifted back to the king and his household, Somerset was
released, and the Lords, many of whom had flirted with York while he was
in the ascendant, resumed their former obedience. During the sessions of
the parliament in 1451 York's power waned, and Thomas Younge's notorious
attempt to have him recognized as heir apparent must have seemed to many
an act of desperation. Why had York not done more to secure himself
during his brief ascendancy? It is not, of course, clear what he wanted:
if only the restoration of order, then this was being achieved without
his help; if a role for himself in the government, then his actions had
made this unthinkable unless the king himself were to be altogether
displaced-the men of Henry's household, who effectively disposed of
royal power, were hardly going to welcome a man who had posed as their
nemesis. What York had done, in effect, was to go too far without going
far enough. Perhaps he should have cut his losses and risked a direct
assault on the throne; but such a move was almost certain to fail. The
duke had cast himself as the true liegeman of Henry VI: any deviation
from this role was sure to be seen as the grossest kind of betrayal;
York had many potential supporters, but-apart, perhaps, from his own
servants-their support was for his public, not his private, interests.
It has been worth looking at the events of 1450 in some detail, because
for the next two years Duke Richard's options were very largely shaped
by what had happened in that year. He could not be secure while Somerset
and the household retained both control of the king and the support of
the Lords, yet there was little he could do to improve his lot. Moves
against Oldhall were under way by the end of 1451, and when, in January
1452, York reacted publicly against them and against their implications
for himself, he was thinly supported. Apart from the duke's own men only
the malcontent Thomas Courtenay, earl of Devon, and his crony Lord
Cobham were persuaded to join the rising that attempted to repeat the
coup of 1450: the rest of the nobility gathered around the king and
Somerset, and York was forced to capitulate at Dartford in early March.
His failure left him worse off than before. He was obliged to swear a
humiliating oath of submission, his supporters and tenants were harried
by judicial commissions, and his attempts to discredit Somerset were
treated as part and parcel of a private quarrel. As the common people
were reduced to order and the government enjoyed the unfamiliar taste of
victory in Gascony, it seemed that York's political career was at an
end: never again would he be able to take his proper place in the
Lancastrian establishment.
At this point, however, fate combined with the contradictions of Henry
VI's regime to bestow new opportunities upon Duke Richard. In the summer
of 1453 Somerset's governing consensus suddenly collapsed, as the
victories in Gascony were reversed, the king lost his mind, and war
broke out in the north between the Nevilles and the Percys. In the
resulting crisis York was the only person of sufficient stature to
restore the situation, and it must be this factor, above all, that
explains the decision of a non-partisan group of councillors to summon
him to London in October 1453, and the agreement in parliament to
appoint him protector and defender of the realm on 27 March 1454. Here
was a means for York to wrest control of government from Somerset and
the king's household men without bringing his loyalty to Henry VI into
question; and here was a means for the rest of political society to
contain the powerful duke and to create an effective government without
the kind of sacrifices that had been demanded in 1450. York certainly
did his part: he went to London full of emollient promises to attend the
council and do all 'that sholde or might be to the welfare of the king
and of his subgettes' (CPR, 1452-61, 143); he made no attacks on
Somerset or other sometime 'traitors' (though his ally, Norfolk, did);
and, on taking up the post of protector, he committed himself to rule
consultatively and representatively with the Lords. During the
succeeding months York made serious and well-founded attempts to pacify
the disputes in the north and north midlands, and he enjoyed some
success. Making genuine efforts to consult widely, he demonstrated the
same statesmanlike qualities that had marked his management of France
and Ireland: 'for a whole year', wrote one chronicler, 'he governed the
whole realm of England most nobly and in the best way' ('Benet's
chronicle', 212). There were certainly limits to his achievement, and
his tenure of office was to be brought to an abrupt halt in February
1455, but the duke's performance may have prompted many of his peers to
look more sympathetically at his claims in the years to come.
Unfortunately, however, the moulds of politics were changing in these
years, and the broad unity that had so long been preserved among the
nobility was breaking down. The deterioration of order in the
localities, which had become so dramatic and extensive by 1453, was now
combined with the emergence of a more aggressive Lancastrian dynasticism
to promote significant divisions among the elite. These had begun to
emerge even before York's protectorate: one of the reasons why it had
taken so long to arrange the duke's appointment was that a substantial
group of lords had grouped themselves around the queen, Margaret of
Anjou, who-since the birth of her son Edward in October 1453-was
attempting to secure a regency for herself. In the winter of 1453-4,
indeed, civil war looked a distinct possibility. It was held off by
York's readiness to make explicit his submission to the dynastic claims
of the new prince, and by the agreement of all but the most extreme
figures to join a broadly based regime under the duke's headship. When
Henry VI recovered his sanity, however, at Christmas 1454, those in the
household and the north who had opposed the protectorate seized the
opportunity to assert their interests. York was removed from office on 9
February 1455, and by early March a more hard-faced government was
taking steps against the duke. The fact that the Neville earls of
Warwick and Salisbury also fell under attack at this time reveals the
factional and divisive aims of those in control: although the government
proceeded with the language of treason and obedience, its narrowing base
and its sponsorship of conflict began to undermine its claims to such
public goods; when York and the Nevilles confronted the king, Somerset,
and the Percys at St Albans on 22 May 1455, there was a broad
equivalence between the two sides, and the first blows of a civil war
were struck.
The Yorkist victory, however, brought this war to a rapid halt. Just as
he had done in the early 1450s, the duke submitted to the king and
attempted to rebuild unity. This was to remain his posture and that of
his allies right up to the disasters of 1459. York was certainly
prepared to strain his allegiance to its very limits-securing
appointment to a second protectorate on 15 November 1455 and depriving
the king of personal authority a week later-but he would not cross the
bounds to an outright repudiation of Henry VI's sovereignty. As a
consequence his pre-eminence remained insecure. His protectorate was
soon terminated (on 25 February 1456) when parliamentary pressure for a
resumption weakened his support among the Lords, but the aim of
preserving unity, or oonhede, among the nobility lingered on for some
years and ensured that if York was not to be admitted to any special
power, he was not to be destroyed either. It seems likely that, provided
he behaved himself, most of the peerage had some respect for the duke.
Pressure from Queen Margaret and her growing band of partisans meant
that he was obliged to repeat his submission of 1452 on a number of
occasions between 1456 and 1459, but he was confirmed in possession of
the lieutenancy of Ireland, and even seems to have been able to direct
policy for a time in the wake of the 'loveday' settlement of 1458. Only
in 1459 did the bulk of the Lords finally accept the case for war
against the duke, and then the fault-lines of 1453-4 and 1455 were
recreated and York received the support of the Nevilles. Rather as at St
Albans, York, Warwick, and Salisbury revived the case that evil
counsellors around the king were destroying the common weal of the realm
and threatening their own security. On this occasion, however, their
propaganda cut no ice: finding most of the nobility in arms against them
at Ludford Bridge (near Ludlow, Shropshire) and deserted by a part of
the army, York and his allies fled the field during the night of 12-13
October 1459.
Exile, return, and death
The duke and his second son, Edmund, earl of Rutland, spent the next
eleven months in Ireland, attempting to gain the men and money for an
armed return to England, where the duke's estates were in royal hands as
a result of his attainder at the Coventry parliament (about the end of
November 1459). His younger children, including George, were all placed
in the custody of the duchess of Buckingham. An incidental result of
York's efforts was the famous Drogheda parliament of 8 February 1460, in
which the Anglo-Irish establishment obtained recognition as a distinct
political community, separate from England, ruled by its own laws and
financed by its own currency. In return for these concessions York
gained resources, protection for his person, and an extensive army of
archers, which he must have intended to take to England. Plans for a
co-ordinated invasion of the mainland were apparently made during a
conference with Warwick at Waterford in the spring of 1460, and the
duke's Neville allies, accompanied by his eldest son, Edward of March,
duly landed in Kent in June professing loyalty to Henry VI and
protesting about the misgovernment of the realm. With startling success,
they won support in London and the south-east and proceeded to defeat
the royal army at Northampton on 10 July, submitting to the king at the
battle's end. Over the next few weeks March and the Nevilles began to
secure the realm and to await York's return, which finally occurred near
Chester on or about 9 September 1460.
Much about the next few weeks is obscure: it is not known why it took
York so long to join his allies on the mainland; it is not known when he
began so famously to assert his claim to the throne (13 September is the
first date for which a plausible case can be made); it is not known
whether or not the initiative had been agreed, or even discussed, with
the Nevilles. It seems clear that there was no option for York but to
attempt to make himself king: all other avenues, as has been shown, led
nowhere; the duke could neither secure himself nor restore political
order without taking the drastic step from which he had so far shrunk;
and it may have seemed that by 1460 the polity of Henry VI was
sufficiently dislocated to permit a direct assault on the king.
Unfortunately for the duke, however, his own options were different from
those of his allies, even his sons. These men had gained support on the
old plea of reforming Henry VI's government. They had recently made
their loyalty to the king explicit. As the managers of a large and
diverse alliance, they could not easily abandon what they had promised,
and it seems clear that the message from the London elite, who played an
important role in the frantic politics of 1459-61, was that a deposition
could not be tolerated. York marched into London, seized the king, and
entered parliament on 10 October, announcing that he intended 'to
challenge his right' to the crown (Johnson, York, 214). The Lords'
response was unpromising: they went into conclave at Blackfriars and
sent the young earl of March to persuade his father to accept a
negotiated settlement. By 13 October York had been brought to abandon
his plans for an immediate coronation, and a few days later he submitted
his claim for discussion in parliament. An accord emerged on 31 October,
and its central feature was to leave Henry VI on the throne, while
settling the succession on York and his sons. It is possible that even
after this York attempted to get his way by inducing Henry to abdicate.
He must have realized that, like the treaty of Troyes on which it was
apparently based, the accord promised immediate war with the
disinherited heir. In any event, the king was moved to safety and the
duke was obliged to accept the terms agreed in October, at least for the
time being. Acting more or less as protector he marched north in early
December to deal with the forces of the prince of Wales and Queen
Margaret, which had regrouped in Yorkshire after the defeat at
Northampton. Venturing forth from his castle at Sandal on 30 December
1460, in what may have been an uncharacteristic attempt to surprise his
enemy, York was set upon by an unexpectedly large Lancastrian force. In
the ensuing battle of Wakefield, he and his second son, Edmund of
Rutland, were killed. As a macabre riposte to Duke Richard's recent
pretensions, his head was severed from his body and displayed on the
walls of York bearing a paper crown.
So ended the life of this curious figure, who, having played safe in the
prime of his years, abruptly changed tack at the age of thirty-nine,
pursuing ever more ambitious and dangerous policies until, with victory
almost in his grasp, he fell on an ill-chosen battlefield. Duke Richard
was the true founder of the royal house of York, but despite a career
that a recent biographer has described as 'the most successful failure
of the middle ages' (Johnson, 'Political career', abstract), he has
inspired little interest and even less sympathy among historians.
Notwithstanding his many claims to be acting for the 'common weal' of
the realm, York has usually been presented as a somewhat colourless
bungler: all along, it seems, he wanted power, but he could not decide
how far to go until the last minute, whereupon-fatally-he went too far.
In 1964 B. Wilkinson set the tone for most modern accounts of the duke's
career with his judgement that 'it would be folly to make a statesman
out of this fifteenth-century worldling' (Wilkinson, 88). This view
seems unfairly harsh: like many of his peers, his instincts were to make
the best of things in Henry VI's England, a world in which there were no
easy answers. York's opportunities were closely circumscribed and his
intentions in opposing Henry VI's government are far from clear; in fact
there may be a case for seeing him more as the victim of circumstances
than as their creator. His cautiousness, if ultimately unproductive, was
justified by the sheer impropriety of opposition to the government. On
the other hand, the recklessness that he demonstrated in 1450, 1452,
1455, 1459, and 1460 was also justified: sometimes by its results;
always by the need to do something to restore the authority that the
king, in his feebleness, had frittered away. In medieval England,
however, the restoration of authority could only be carried out from the
throne. York's final and most destructive venture was thus his
best-conceived one, but it is easy to see why it has won him few plaudits.
John Watts
Sources P. A. Johnson, Duke Richard of York, 1411-1460 (1988) + T. B.
Pugh, 'Richard Plantagenet (1411-60), duke of York, as the king's
lieutenant in France and Ireland', Aspects of medieval government and
society: essays presented to J. R. Lander, ed. J. G. Rowe (1986), 107-41
+ J. Watts, Henry VI and the politics of kingship (1996) + R. A.
Griffiths, The reign of King Henry VI: the exercise of royal authority,
1422-1461 (1981) + Chancery records + J. T. Rosenthal, 'The estates and
finances of Richard, duke of York, 1411-1460', Studies in Medieval and
Renaissance History, 2 (1965), 117-204 + G. L. Harriss, Cardinal
Beaufort: a study of Lancastrian ascendancy and decline (1988) + A. J.
Pollard, John Talbot and the war in France, 1427-1453, Royal Historical
Society Studies in History, 35 (1983) + C. T. Allmand, Lancastrian
Normandy, 1415-1450 (1983) + M. K. Jones, 'Somerset, York and the Wars
of the Roses', EngHR, 104 (1989), 285-307 + R. A. Griffiths, 'Duke
Richard of York's intentions in 1450 and the origins of the Wars of the
Roses', Journal of Medieval History, 1 (1975), 187-209 + M. L. Kekewich
and others, eds., The politics of fifteenth-century England: John Vale's
book (1995) + J. L. Watts, 'De consulatu Stiliconis: texts and politics
in the reign of Henry VI', Journal of Medieval History, 16 (1990),
251-66 + J. M. W. Bean, 'The financial position of Richard, duke of
York', War and government in the middle ages, ed. J. Gillingham and J.
C. Holt (1984), 182-98 + T. B. Pugh, Henry V and the Southampton plot of
1415, Southampton RS, 30 (1988) + A. J. Otway-Ruthven, A history of
medieval Ireland (1968) + 'John Benet's chronicle for the years 1400 to
1462', ed. G. L. Harriss and M. A. Harriss, Camden miscellany, XXIV, CS,
4th ser., 9 (1972) + E. Flugel, 'Eine mittelenglische
Claudian-Ubersetzung (1445)', Anglia, 28 (1905), 255-99 + P. A. Johnson,
'The political career of Richard, duke of York, to 1456', DPhil diss.,
U. Oxf., 1981 + B. Wilkinson, Constitutional history of England in the
fifteenth century (1399-1485) (1964) + Osbern Bokenam's Legenden, ed. C.
Horstmann (Heilbronn, 1883) + 'William Gregory's chronicle of London',
The historical collections of a citizen of London in the fifteenth
century, ed. J. Gairdner, CS, new ser., 17 (1876) + K. Dockray, 'The
battle of Wakefield and the Wars of the Roses', The Ricardian, 9
(1991-3), 238-58 + R. Knowles, 'The battle of Wakefield: the
topography', The Ricardian, 9 (1991-3), 259-65 + C. Ross, Edward IV
(1974) + Itineraries [of] William Worcestre, ed. J. H. Harvey, OMT
(1969) + K. B. McFarlane, 'The Lancastrian kings', Cambridge Medieval
History, 8, ed. C. W. Previte-Orton and Z. N. Brooke (1936), 363-417 +
CPR, 1446-61 + CEPR letters, 8.132
Archives BL, letters relating to a truce between England and Burgundy,
Add. Ch. 75479
Likenesses painted glass window, Cirencester; repro. in S. Lysons, A
collection of Gloucestershire antiquities (1804) · painted glass window,
Trinity Cam. [see illus.]
Wealth at death under £4600 p.a. net: Johnson, Duke Richard, 7, 21-4
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From: Christine Headley <christinelheadley@...>
To: [email protected];
Sent: Friday, July 15, 2011 6:29 AM
Subject: ODNB Life of the Day - Richard, Duke of York
I subscribe to the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography Life of the Day.
They usually choose people because it's their birthday - clearly not the
case this time - and I'm glad Richard Duke of York is having a turn.
Best wishes
Christine
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Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2011 07:00:00 +0100
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Richard of York, third duke of York (1411-1460), magnate and claimant
to the English throne, was the only son of Richard of Conisbrough,
fourth earl of Cambridge (1385-1415), and Anne Mortimer (b. after 1388,
d. before 1414), daughter of Roger (VII) Mortimer, fourth earl of March.
He was descended from Edward III through both parents, his father being
the son of that king's fourth son, Edmund of Langley, first duke of
York, and his mother the great-granddaughter of Edward's second son,
Lionel of Antwerp, duke of Clarence. It was this distinguished ancestry
that provided the basis for his explosive participation in the troubled
politics of the 1450s. In October 1460, after a decade of agitation and
intervention, he attempted to seize the throne on the grounds that his
descent from Clarence made him rightful king in place of Henry VI, who,
like the other Lancastrian kings, was descended from Edward III's third
son, John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster. The attempt failed, and York died
a few months later at the battle of Wakefield, but the claim, of course,
lived on to provide the basis for Edward IV's succession in March 1461.
Youth and inheritance
Richard of York was born on 22 September 1411, to parents who had
married in secret and were soon to be dead. His mother was gone within a
year or two; his father, who married again in 1414, was executed the
following year when details of his plot to depose Henry V came to light.
Cambridge's plan to raise the north and (apparently) to put Edmund (V)
Mortimer, earl of March, on the throne must have thrown his son's
dynastic position into sharp relief: the young Richard's mother had been
the elder of March's sisters, which made the boy himself a possible heir
to the Mortimer-Clarence claim to the throne. On Cambridge's death he
became a royal ward, and it is not altogether surprising that in March
1416 he was placed in the custody of the Lancastrians' leading gaoler,
Sir Robert Waterton. Three years into his reign, however, Henry V was
busy laying to rest the divisions of his father's time and Richard of
York was destined for rehabilitation. He was protected from the effects
of his father's attainder and, on the death of his uncle Edward, duke of
York, at Agincourt, the boy was recognized to be his heir. Not long
after Henry VI's accession York's wardship and marriage were sold to
Ralph Neville, earl of Westmorland. At 3000 marks the price was a high
one, but Neville's investment was amply repaid when, in January 1425,
Edmund, earl of March, died childless, and York, as his nephew, became
heir to the extensive Mortimer inheritance. At some stage in the 1420s,
possibly as early as 1424, the young duke was married off to Cecily
Neville (1415-1495), one of Westmorland's daughters with Joan Beaufort.
From the point of view of the Nevilles, who had married into most of the
leading magnate families of the day, it was a prestigious match that
helped to confirm the family's growing pre-eminence; from the point of
view of Henry VI's government, it was an ideal way to absorb a
potentially dangerous figure by attaching him to some of the dynasty's
staunchest supporters.
Over the next few years York was drawn more closely into the circle
around the young king. In 1426 he was knighted, and two years later he
was appointed to take up residence in the royal household. In 1430 York
took part in the king's coronation expedition to France. His retinue was
small, but he was handsomely rewarded for his involvement: over 1000
marks by the summer of 1431. Soon after his return, and still a minor
(though there appears to have been some uncertainty over this at the
time), he was granted livery of his estates on 12 May 1432. At the time
both inheritances were encumbered with debts, dowers, and obligations,
while the duchy of York was mainly in the hands of feoffees. By the
summer of 1434, however, a series of financial settlements and the
deaths of the two remaining dowagers had lifted the worst of these
burdens, and the duke was free to enjoy his extensive patrimony
undisturbed. The acquisition of his inheritance had cost him quite a
lot, but he had received fair-even generous-treatment from the
government. York's proximity to the king, both in blood and in person,
and his links with the families of Neville and Beaufort had stood him in
good stead.
Service in France
In 1433 York was admitted to the Order of the Garter-a mark of favour, a
certificate of loyalty, and perhaps a token of martial expectations. His
first taste of military command was to be as successor to John, duke of
Bedford, in the lieutenancy of France, a post for which he was, in many
ways, the obvious candidate: the royal commission, dated 8 May 1436,
recited the king's desire to see France ruled by 'some great prince of
our blood' (Johnson, York, 226), and there was no one else who fitted
the bill, apart from Humphrey, duke of Gloucester. York had agreed to
serve in France as early as February 1436, but his army did not reach
Harfleur until 7 June. Had it left England more promptly, it might have
been able to prevent the French reconquest of Paris and the
Ile-de-France, which took place during the spring, though it is
difficult to know where the blame for the expedition's dilatoriness
should lie: York was also to be late leaving for his second tour of duty
in 1441, and the government was sceptical of his excuses on both
occasions, but recruiting an army was no easy feat in the later stages
of the Hundred Years' War, and delays were probably unavoidable. In the
event the French advance was halted by York's forces. The brilliant
campaign of autumn 1436, which ensured the safety of Rouen, was actually
commanded by John, Lord Talbot, but Duke Richard too seems to have
carried out some useful work, regaining most of the Pays de Caux after
the rebellion of 1435, attending to the grievances of the Normans, and
surveying the English garrisons. During both of York's lieutenancies it
seems to have been a policy of his to delegate the basic management of
the war to leading captains: his retainer Talbot, as marshal, in 1436;
his brother-in-law Richard Neville, earl of Salisbury, as
lieutenant-general in 1437; and Talbot again as 'lieutenant-general for
the conduct of the war' (Pollard, 39) during York's second tour of duty
from 1441. Although the duke and his council retained overall control of
military policy throughout, it may be that York saw himself more as a
viceroy, responsible for government as a whole, than as a warrior. This
is certainly implicit in the attention that he gave to matters of
domestic governance in Normandy and the pays de conquete: it was for his
good rule of the duchy and for his genuine attempts to deal with the
problems created by a declining military occupation that York would be
remembered in France. His role in the fighting of the war was
undistinguished, and a number of English chroniclers noted the fact.
Faced with the imminent expiry of his indentures-though not of his
lieutenancy, the term of which was indefinite-York sought permission to
return home in the spring of 1437. His successor was to be the earl of
Warwick, and York was instructed to remain in Normandy until his
arrival, which was delayed until the following November. It is difficult
to know whether the decision to replace York reflects disappointment
with his performance or not: the duke may even have wished to stand
down, possibly because of difficulties in extracting money from the
Norman exchequer for the payment of his troops. In any event Warwick's
service was soon cut short by his death in April 1439, and Henry VI's
government found itself once again faced with the task of providing for
the rule of Lancastrian France. It was apparently as a compromise
candidate that York emerged as the new lieutenant on 2 July 1440:
Gloucester appears to have sought his own appointment, while Cardinal
Beaufort, the regime's paymaster, probably pressed the claims of his
nephew John Beaufort, earl of Somerset. York, however, was the most
suitable choice for a post which now, more than ever, demanded a
flexible, diplomatic, and authoritative holder: as the government
pursued both peace and war with greater vigour than before, the duke was
sufficiently neutral, consultative, and grand to act effectively on its
behalf; he was also well connected with all parties, including the
military establishment in France.
On this occasion York demanded adequate funding and increased powers
before he would accept the job: he went to France as a second Bedford,
with all the powers that Duke John had enjoyed after 1432 and a promise
of £20,000 a year from the English exchequer to fund his troops. Apart
from these improved terms of service, however, the patterns of the first
lieutenancy were repeated. York left England late, not arriving in
Normandy until the end of June 1441. He then moved speedily down the
Seine to Pontoise where Talbot was struggling to lift Charles VII's
siege, but this was to be his only military action in the three years
before the truce of Tours. It was not a particularly impressive one: if
York had helped to secure Pontoise for a further few months, he may also
have frustrated a daring scheme of Talbot's that could have resulted in
the capture of the French king. Caution, it seems, got the better of
York, and not for the last time in his career.
Over the next few years the duke busied himself with matters of
governance and diplomacy while the war effort in Normandy ground slowly
to a halt. In part this was because Charles VII had turned his attention
to the south-west, but it is clear that York's reluctance to engage the
French directly caused dissatisfaction in the English government and it
may help to explain why Cardinal Beaufort was able to engineer a major
military command for his nephew John. The earl of Somerset's expedition,
planned from late 1442 and launched in the summer of 1443, involved a
major diversion of men, funds, and authority away from York and the
Norman theatre. Duke Richard dispatched an embassy to remonstrate with
the English government in June 1443, but it had no effect, and the
campaign itself added injury to insult: Somerset's attack on Brittany
and the duke of Alencon's stronghold of La Guerche disrupted York's
attempts, conducted during 1442-3, to involve the English in an alliance
of French princes. In the light of all this it is hardly surprising
that, following the expedition's failure, the government seems to have
felt the need to appease York: tallies for the payments due at
Michaelmas 1443 arrived in February 1444 and, later in that year, the
duke was given a major apanage in southern Normandy, while earldoms
(and, in Edmund's case, lands) were granted to his eldest sons. After
this no more of York's wages were paid until 1446, but at least the
truce contracted in May 1444 reduced his expenses and removed the need
for further military activity. In September 1445 York returned to
England: his indentures were about to expire, parliament was in session,
and-rather ironically, given the government's own failures in this
regard-his management of Norman finances was under investigation.
York and English politics before 1450
It now seems clear that Cardinal Beaufort, William de la Pole, earl of
Suffolk, and the other leading councillors and courtiers who, in the
first instance, managed Henry VI's authority in the 1430s and 1440s
intended Richard of York to be a pillar of the Lancastrian regime. This
did not mean that the already wealthy duke was to be showered with
gifts, nor did it mean that he was to be given a formal role in the
government of England. York was not, for example, appointed to the
re-established council in November 1437, but nothing should be inferred
from this: at twenty-six the duke would have been considered rather
youthful for what was in any case a rather anomalous role; exclusion
from the council would scarcely have excluded him from influence; and it
is likely that already the expectation was that his service to the crown
would be overseas, at least while he was of military age. It is not
known what part, if any, York played in the politics of 1437-41, during
which time he was in England and Henry VI, somewhat uncertainly, came of
age. There is no reason to suppose that he supported the moves of
Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, against Cardinal Beaufort in 1439-40,
despite Gloucester's suggestion that York and other lords had been
wrongfully kept out of power; nor should it be assumed that he was
opposed to the release of the duke of Orleans. He seems to have kept a
low profile at this time, participating in a scheme to restore order in
Wales in 1437-8, sharing in the custody of the Beauchamp wardship in
1439, and touring his estates. When, in early 1441, the 'longe
bareynesse' of his marriage was suddenly ended and a son born, York
named him Henry (Bokenham's Legenden, 273). This demonstration of
dynastic loyalty earned a gift of £100 worth of jewels from the grateful
king: the restoration of the heir of Cambridge and Mortimer must have
seemed to be complete.
As lieutenant of France for the second time York became embroiled in the
government's various diplomatic initiatives, including the moves
associated with the truce of Tours. It has often been assumed that Duke
Richard was hostile to the peace negotiations of the 1440s, but there is
absolutely no evidence for this. While the confusions of policy in the
early years of the decade must have been exasperating for anyone charged
with responsibility for the defence of Lancastrian France, there is
nothing to suggest that York preferred war to diplomacy as a means of
preserving English interests. As the plan to seek a truce with Charles
VII and a marriage alliance with the house of Anjou emerged as the
central plank of royal policy in 1444, York seems to have given it his
full support. In the new spirit of Anglo-French amity, for example, he
sent forces to assist the dauphin's campaign in Alsace in the summer of
1444. The following year, and possibly in response to promptings from
the government, he opened negotiations for a marriage between his eldest
son (now Edward of Rouen-the future Edward IV-born on 28 April 1442) and
one of the French king's daughters. The duke may even have been
sympathetic to the government's plans to surrender Maine, which
proceeded alongside the truce negotiations and formed an integral part
of the alliance policy. Because of the postures that York struck after
1450 historians have tended to assume that he was opposed to this
notorious scheme, but that is by no means clear. It is very likely that
he knew what was planned by the end of 1445 (if not earlier, since he
met Suffolk's embassy as it travelled through Normandy in 1444) and he
was certainly involved in the arrangements for compensating Maine's
English landholders in 1447. Interestingly York was never explicitly to
condemn the handover of the territory, although its loss was certainly a
prominent feature of popular and parliamentary criticism of William de
la Pole, by then duke of Suffolk, Edmund Beaufort, duke of Somerset, and
the other so-called 'traitors' of 1450.
It is from the period following his return to England in 1445 that
York's alienation from Henry VI's ministers is often supposed to have
dated. The duke found himself accused of mishandling the funds he had
been paid for the defence of Normandy, and his chief accuser, it
appeared, was a central figure in the government, Adam Moleyns, bishop
of Chichester. York had returned to England confident of reappointment
to the French lieutenancy, but he was obliged to wait for more than a
year and then to see the office go to Edmund Beaufort instead. It used
to be thought that because of his alleged hostility to the peace policy,
and his putatively close links to the duke of Gloucester (who died
mysteriously in 1447), Duke Richard was persona non grata with Suffolk's
regime: his appointment to the lieutenancy of Ireland on 30 July 1447
has sometimes been seen as a form of exile, the government's hope being
that, like the earls of March, his predecessors, he would go there and die.
However, events thus far do not support this interpretation. York was
certainly dismayed by the rumours concerning his performance in
Normandy, but he was explicitly vindicated by king and lords both in and
outside the parliament of 1445-6; it is not even known that Moleyns had
made the accusations York claimed, only that the duke saw in a public
attack on the bishop the opportunity to clear his own name. Similarly,
while York was probably disappointed not to regain the lieutenancy of
France, too much should not be made of this: the lieutenancy of Ireland,
which he was granted in return, was a post that his most distinguished
ancestors (notably Clarence himself) had held; it bestowed upon him
almost sovereign powers in the island; and it gave him the opportunity
to combine military service with the exploitation of his interests as an
Irish landlord. Finally, since the terms of his commission permitted him
to appoint a deputy and return to England, it cannot be seen as a form
of banishment. In some ways, indeed, 1446 and 1447 saw York more closely
involved in the governing regime than he had ever been: in October 1446
he was granted the abbey and town of Waltham because he 'will come often
to London for the king's business and his own' (CPR, 1446-52, 43); over
the next year he attended a number of council meetings and was named as
a witness to more than three-quarters of the charters issued from 1446
to 1448; during 1447-9 he was added to the peace commissions of eleven
counties beyond those to which he had been named at his inheritance (and
in some cases beyond the scope of his landholdings); and finally, almost
for the first time, he began to enjoy the kind of rewards more commonly
bestowed on courtiers-most notably, perhaps, the wardship and marriage
of the Holland heir (Henry) and a series of lands and offices once held
by Gloucester. This last detail is a reminder that there was almost
nothing to link York with Duke Humphrey in the latter's lifetime: in no
sense can York be considered his supporter, and it is not improbable
that, like other members of the nobility, he witnessed Gloucester's
destruction at the Bury parliament and, tacitly at least, assented to it.
When he finally left for Ireland, in June 1449, Duke Richard did so as a
loyal and well-regarded member of the Lancastrian establishment. If he
had been less involved in affairs during the preceding year or so, this
may well have been at his own choice. Many of the nobility seem to have
withdrawn from the court during 1448 as the government's troubles began
to mount. York cannot have wished to be associated with the humiliating
surrender of Le Mans in March 1448 and he may well have feared the
consequences of the extraordinary coup at Fougeres. A tour of duty in
Ireland must have appeared an attractive alternative. During his
fourteen months in the province York scored a series of easy (if
short-lived) victories, receiving the submission of most of the island's
leaders and campaigning effectively in Wicklow. At the Drogheda
parliament of April 1450 he followed the lead of the Commons at
Westminster by introducing an Act of Resumption. Like the lieutenant of
France he was short of money, and this limited his achievements, but the
contrast between this vigorous performance and the demoralizing stasis
of Somerset's rule in France must have impressed itself upon contemporaries.
Estates and connections
By the mid-1430s, when he had gained full control over his estates, York
was the richest and most extensive landowner among the king's subjects.
Estimates of his wealth have varied between £2874 and £5800 net, but the
most recent and reliable estimate suggests that his estates in England
and Wales were worth about £4000 a year (net) when he came into them,
and that his exchequer annuities yielded an average of £600 a year.
York's lands were scattered through England and the march of Wales, with
notable concentrations in the West Riding of Yorkshire; in Lincolnshire
and Northamptonshire; in Dorset and Somerset; in Herefordshire,
Shropshire, and the middle march of Wales; and in the centre of East
Anglia along the border of Norfolk and Suffolk. Beyond this he held the
earldom of Ulster and the lordships of Connacht and Trim, although only
the last of these Irish estates is likely to have yielded York any real
influence or income.
The possession of such vast holdings shaped York's activities as a lord:
like John of Gaunt before him he was a truly national figure, with
interests so widespread and diverse that it was difficult for him to
exert the kind of local authority typical of later medieval magnates. He
had no real 'country'-no county-sized area of concentrated influence
where local gentlemen might turn first of all to him for lordship-and
this helped to determine both the nature of his affinity and the role
that he and it were to play in the politics of the realm. York's
following, like Gaunt's or indeed the king's, was a disparate group of
often important men, many of whom had their own local allegiances and
whose links with York were forged mainly through military service and
the tenure of estate or household office. In part, of course, this
pattern was a consequence of the duke's long minority and his prolonged
service in France: many of the servants of the duchy of York had melted
away in the 1420s into Gloucester's service, for example; while Duke
Richard's appointment as Bedford's successor in Normandy presented him
with a ready-made following looking for a lord. A spry comment from an
anti-Yorkist chronicler has promoted the suggestion that York was unduly
influenced by the men who gathered round him in Normandy-in particular,
by Sir William Oldhall, who was one of York's most reliable agents
during the 1450s-but there is little to support this notion,
particularly when the duke's involvement in the peace policy of the
mid-1440s is taken into account. On the contrary, it seems likely that
York's high status, his extensive interests, and his relative
disengagement from the affairs of any particular locality beyond his
estates meant that he was exposed to a wide array of different voices.
If anyone besides the king and his ministers was likely to hear the
counsel of the realm, it was surely York, who numbered lords such as
Talbot, Ralph Cromwell, and Thomas Scales among his councillors, but
also enjoyed links with exchequer clerks, lawyers, the widows of Norman
soldiers, and local worthies from all parts of the country. The
maintenance of this kind of connection may have cost York dear-as much
as £1300 a year, according to one recent estimate-but it seems that his
money was well spent. Despite his inability to offer really consistent
local support, he was apparently able to co-ordinate the raising of
large retinues throughout the 1450s. If some of his servants kept away
from the duke's more controversial ventures, a sizeable and prestigious
core remained loyal to the end.
The making of York's rebellion
The last and best-known period in York's political life began in
September 1450, when he suddenly returned from Ireland and took up the
common cry for the traitors surrounding the king to be brought to
justice. This was a significant change of political direction for the
duke, and one that shaped the remainder of his career, but the reasons
for it are not immediately obvious. Modern historians have mostly
rejected the traditional interpretation, which laid stress on York's
dynastic interests and saw his participation in the popular ferments of
the 1450s as a device for seizing the crown. Instead, the search has
been for the causes of personal grievance on Duke Richard's part: was he
moved to anger, or even desperation, by the government's enormous debts
to him? Was he incensed by the new pre-eminence of Edmund Beaufort, duke
of Somerset, the man who had so recently lost France? Did he fear for
his own position, as an old rival took control of Henry VI's government?
Alternatively, was York simply an opportunist, moving (typically late)
to exploit the regime's difficulties, but without any fixed idea of
where his dissidence might take him?
One difficulty in reaching any conclusions lies in trying to establish
which elements of York's programme, as this slowly unfolded, were
intentional, and intended from the start. It is certainly unlikely that
the duke was seeking to gain the throne in 1450: previous legitimists
had soon revealed their desire to improve the realm by changing the
king, but York was not to assert his Mortimer-Clarence claim until 1460,
after ten years of activism explicitly devoted to other ends. Even in
that year, moreover, his move was greeted with hostility, and it seems
reasonable to suggest that the duke would have known all along that this
was a likely reaction and would have trimmed his policy accordingly. It
is possible that, in 1450, York was concerned to secure recognition as
heir presumptive to Henry VI: the king was still without a child and
there was a (somewhat faint) possibility of dynastic competition from
the house of Beaufort. Like most noblemen York took an active interest
in the claims and titles he possessed-in 1445 he had sought information
on his interest in the throne of Castile and in 1451 an agent of his was
to argue in parliament that the duke should be named as heir
apparent-but, at best, this can provide only a partial explanation for
his actions in 1450.
As far as personal grievances are concerned, meanwhile, it is difficult
to see what grounds York had for complaint. That the duke was part of
the establishment in the 1440s has already been illustrated. Financially
he had fared no worse than any of Henry VI's other major accountants:
indeed, somewhat remarkably, given the state of royal finances, he
received £1200 from the crown at the end of 1449, and even in May 1450
efforts were being made to find him money. He may have decided to return
to England to seek funds-a letter to Salisbury, written in June 1450,
suggests that he feared serious losses in Ireland unless he received
further payments-but this is rather a different matter from acting on a
sense of grievance, and if seeking money was York's initial aim, it was
soon overwhelmed by other purposes.
What, finally, of York's famous antagonism towards Somerset: was this
the motivation for his assault on the king's ministers? The problem here
is one of disentangling the personal feud between the two men from the
relative positions in which a wider politics had placed them: did York
attack the government because it contained Somerset, or did he attack
Somerset because he was the leader of the government? It is certainly
possible to find grounds for animosity between the two men: Beaufort's
performance in the last years of the war was undistinguished to say the
least, and York may have thought that he himself could have achieved
more; it has recently been suggested, moreover, that the lieutenant's
casual surrender of Rouen would particularly have rankled with Duke
Richard, since he had continued to be its captain. At the same time,
however, it is clear that once York had made his inflammatory moves of
September 1450 (and possibly even before then), he and Somerset were
destined to be at odds: Duke Richard's political standing came quickly
to depend on the argument that the government was run by traitors, and a
large part of his justification for taking up arms in 1450, 1452, and
1455 was that the enmity of leading ministers obliged him to take action
to defend himself; Duke Edmund, on the other hand, was not unjustified
in regarding much of York's behaviour as threatening, both to himself
and to the order of the realm; if he sought, in 1450, in 1452-3, and in
1455, to deal with the problem by repression instead of indulgence, it
was an understandable approach. Politics, as much as personality and
private interest, determined the conflict between York and Somerset.
Pursuing this further, it may be suggested that it was in the
extraordinary politics of 1450 that the most likely reasons for York's
sudden attack on the government are to be found. As Normandy fell to the
French and the king's bankruptcy was exposed in parliament, the
authority of Henry VI's ministers disintegrated. MPs and more lowly
members of society appeared to be united in the belief that the king had
been betrayed by a self-serving clique who had pillaged his possessions
in England and surrendered those in France. If Suffolk's trial and
murder had removed the leader of the gang, the rest remained in
positions of power, and until the king and the 'true lords' took action
against them, there could be no justice or order in the realm. This
judgement on the recent past dominated public life in England between
1449 and 1451, and it continued to exert a certain influence over the
public imagination thereafter. York, like other members of the nobility,
must have known that in certain ways it was wide of the mark, but this
did not mean that it could be ignored. In particular, in fact, it could
not be ignored by York, who had already been identified by some of the
government's critics as the figure most likely to visit retribution upon
the 'traitors'. This appears to be the explanation for the rough
reception that York and his men received at their landing in north Wales
in September: local agents of the royal household, and possibly their
commanders at the centre, had become alarmed about the duke's
intentions. It was at this point, perhaps, and not in 1447, that 'by
treating [the duke] as an enemy the court had made him one' (McFarlane,
405): if both the king's ministers and his subjects were going to cast
York as the agent of justice, he might as well fulfil their
expectations. Certainly, the moment must have seemed ripe for someone to
take drastic action: the king's officers could not govern without public
confidence, and it may have appeared that the removal of some of the
discredited men-not least, perhaps, the duke of Somerset-was the best
way to restore it.
Beyond all this, it might be added that, even if the government had not
moved against him in 1450, everything in York's make-up would have given
him the sense that he was the man to restore the situation. He was the
greatest prince of the royal blood, head and shoulders above other
lords, the natural successor to Bedford and Gloucester in the protection
of Henry VI's interests. He had already acted as the king's viceroy in
France and Ireland; why not in England too? What, if anything, York knew
of the deeds of men like Gaunt and Woodstock (or those of Montfort and
Lancaster), whose status was much the same as his and whose actions were
to prefigure his own, is not known; but one model of proper noble
service had been made available to him when, probably in 1445, York was
presented with an elegantly decorated translation of Claudian's life of
the consul Stilicho. It was an account of how the people of Rome and
other nations implored this virtuous prince to accept the office of
consul and restore good government to a city torn apart by the evil
advisers of a child emperor. Its translator had invited York to 'marke
stilicoes life' ('Mittelenglische Claudian-Ubersetzung', 256): in 1450
the moment had arrived when he might put this teaching to good use.
York and the politics of the 1450s
It was with a volley of bills and open letters addressed to the king
that York returned to English political life in September 1450. The
first of these sought to establish the duke's loyalty; the second
advertised his intention to seek justice against his accusers; but it
was the third that was truly controversial-it drew the king's attention
to the universal complaint that justice was not being done to those who
broke the king's law with impunity (in particular, the so-called
'traitors'), and offered York's services in bringing the guilty to book.
This was an open defiance of the government's authority, since the
essence of the 'traitors' idea was that it was the men about the king
who were most of all responsible for the disasters that had befallen the
realm. As far as York was concerned, this meant that a true subject was
obliged to act against the inner circle of authority in order to fulfil
the terms of his allegiance to king and realm, and this explains the
duke's many affirmations of loyalty to King Henry: it was the essential
justification for actions that, on the face of it, appeared disloyal.
Under normal circumstances, of course, attempts to separate a king's
chosen counsellors and servants from the ruler himself were unlikely to
succeed: defiance of royal agents easily shaded into defiance of the
king, and that was treason. As York and all the rest of the nobility
knew, however, these circumstances were not normal: Henry VI had shown
no more discernment than a child in the government of his realm; his
ministers were virtually self-appointed, and the policies pursued during
the 1420s, 1430s, and 1440s were essentially theirs. If this makes
nonsense of one aspect of the 'traitors' thesis, it exposes the truth of
another aspect: the government was not in any real sense the vehicle of
the king's will, and thus defiance of it was not treason; the regime
could legitimately be reshaped, and, with large sections of the public
arguing that it should be, York's actions had a certain justice in them.
In reality he was appealing not to the king with these manifestos, but
to the Lords and to the wider public: his plea was that those who were
less compromised by the disasters of 1449-50 must abandon those who were
more immediately responsible; a new government, in which the duke was to
play a more prominent role, must be established.
Not surprisingly York's demands fell on deaf ears. The king's circle saw
little reason for a general blood-letting, and the nobility, who had
begun to lend support to the beleaguered regime as the crisis mounted,
appear to have taken a similar view. In a public reply to York's bills,
his offers of assistance were politely rebuffed, and the duke left
London to prepare for the parliament summoned to meet in November 1450.
When it gathered on the 6th, MPs demonstrated their continuing
enthusiasm for reform by electing Oldhall, York's chamberlain, as
speaker and loudly calling for the traitors to be brought to justice.
When the duke himself arrived, with sword borne upright before him and a
large army at his back, the initiative was his: Somerset was promptly
imprisoned and the Lords waited to see what would happen next. What
followed was in part a demonstration of Duke Richard's hesitancy and
conservatism, and in part a reflection of the constraints of his
position. Elements of the Commons' programme were put into effect, but
the duke made no attempt to alter the institutional framework of Henry's
government, and the result was that, during the Christmas recess,
authority drifted back to the king and his household, Somerset was
released, and the Lords, many of whom had flirted with York while he was
in the ascendant, resumed their former obedience. During the sessions of
the parliament in 1451 York's power waned, and Thomas Younge's notorious
attempt to have him recognized as heir apparent must have seemed to many
an act of desperation. Why had York not done more to secure himself
during his brief ascendancy? It is not, of course, clear what he wanted:
if only the restoration of order, then this was being achieved without
his help; if a role for himself in the government, then his actions had
made this unthinkable unless the king himself were to be altogether
displaced-the men of Henry's household, who effectively disposed of
royal power, were hardly going to welcome a man who had posed as their
nemesis. What York had done, in effect, was to go too far without going
far enough. Perhaps he should have cut his losses and risked a direct
assault on the throne; but such a move was almost certain to fail. The
duke had cast himself as the true liegeman of Henry VI: any deviation
from this role was sure to be seen as the grossest kind of betrayal;
York had many potential supporters, but-apart, perhaps, from his own
servants-their support was for his public, not his private, interests.
It has been worth looking at the events of 1450 in some detail, because
for the next two years Duke Richard's options were very largely shaped
by what had happened in that year. He could not be secure while Somerset
and the household retained both control of the king and the support of
the Lords, yet there was little he could do to improve his lot. Moves
against Oldhall were under way by the end of 1451, and when, in January
1452, York reacted publicly against them and against their implications
for himself, he was thinly supported. Apart from the duke's own men only
the malcontent Thomas Courtenay, earl of Devon, and his crony Lord
Cobham were persuaded to join the rising that attempted to repeat the
coup of 1450: the rest of the nobility gathered around the king and
Somerset, and York was forced to capitulate at Dartford in early March.
His failure left him worse off than before. He was obliged to swear a
humiliating oath of submission, his supporters and tenants were harried
by judicial commissions, and his attempts to discredit Somerset were
treated as part and parcel of a private quarrel. As the common people
were reduced to order and the government enjoyed the unfamiliar taste of
victory in Gascony, it seemed that York's political career was at an
end: never again would he be able to take his proper place in the
Lancastrian establishment.
At this point, however, fate combined with the contradictions of Henry
VI's regime to bestow new opportunities upon Duke Richard. In the summer
of 1453 Somerset's governing consensus suddenly collapsed, as the
victories in Gascony were reversed, the king lost his mind, and war
broke out in the north between the Nevilles and the Percys. In the
resulting crisis York was the only person of sufficient stature to
restore the situation, and it must be this factor, above all, that
explains the decision of a non-partisan group of councillors to summon
him to London in October 1453, and the agreement in parliament to
appoint him protector and defender of the realm on 27 March 1454. Here
was a means for York to wrest control of government from Somerset and
the king's household men without bringing his loyalty to Henry VI into
question; and here was a means for the rest of political society to
contain the powerful duke and to create an effective government without
the kind of sacrifices that had been demanded in 1450. York certainly
did his part: he went to London full of emollient promises to attend the
council and do all 'that sholde or might be to the welfare of the king
and of his subgettes' (CPR, 1452-61, 143); he made no attacks on
Somerset or other sometime 'traitors' (though his ally, Norfolk, did);
and, on taking up the post of protector, he committed himself to rule
consultatively and representatively with the Lords. During the
succeeding months York made serious and well-founded attempts to pacify
the disputes in the north and north midlands, and he enjoyed some
success. Making genuine efforts to consult widely, he demonstrated the
same statesmanlike qualities that had marked his management of France
and Ireland: 'for a whole year', wrote one chronicler, 'he governed the
whole realm of England most nobly and in the best way' ('Benet's
chronicle', 212). There were certainly limits to his achievement, and
his tenure of office was to be brought to an abrupt halt in February
1455, but the duke's performance may have prompted many of his peers to
look more sympathetically at his claims in the years to come.
Unfortunately, however, the moulds of politics were changing in these
years, and the broad unity that had so long been preserved among the
nobility was breaking down. The deterioration of order in the
localities, which had become so dramatic and extensive by 1453, was now
combined with the emergence of a more aggressive Lancastrian dynasticism
to promote significant divisions among the elite. These had begun to
emerge even before York's protectorate: one of the reasons why it had
taken so long to arrange the duke's appointment was that a substantial
group of lords had grouped themselves around the queen, Margaret of
Anjou, who-since the birth of her son Edward in October 1453-was
attempting to secure a regency for herself. In the winter of 1453-4,
indeed, civil war looked a distinct possibility. It was held off by
York's readiness to make explicit his submission to the dynastic claims
of the new prince, and by the agreement of all but the most extreme
figures to join a broadly based regime under the duke's headship. When
Henry VI recovered his sanity, however, at Christmas 1454, those in the
household and the north who had opposed the protectorate seized the
opportunity to assert their interests. York was removed from office on 9
February 1455, and by early March a more hard-faced government was
taking steps against the duke. The fact that the Neville earls of
Warwick and Salisbury also fell under attack at this time reveals the
factional and divisive aims of those in control: although the government
proceeded with the language of treason and obedience, its narrowing base
and its sponsorship of conflict began to undermine its claims to such
public goods; when York and the Nevilles confronted the king, Somerset,
and the Percys at St Albans on 22 May 1455, there was a broad
equivalence between the two sides, and the first blows of a civil war
were struck.
The Yorkist victory, however, brought this war to a rapid halt. Just as
he had done in the early 1450s, the duke submitted to the king and
attempted to rebuild unity. This was to remain his posture and that of
his allies right up to the disasters of 1459. York was certainly
prepared to strain his allegiance to its very limits-securing
appointment to a second protectorate on 15 November 1455 and depriving
the king of personal authority a week later-but he would not cross the
bounds to an outright repudiation of Henry VI's sovereignty. As a
consequence his pre-eminence remained insecure. His protectorate was
soon terminated (on 25 February 1456) when parliamentary pressure for a
resumption weakened his support among the Lords, but the aim of
preserving unity, or oonhede, among the nobility lingered on for some
years and ensured that if York was not to be admitted to any special
power, he was not to be destroyed either. It seems likely that, provided
he behaved himself, most of the peerage had some respect for the duke.
Pressure from Queen Margaret and her growing band of partisans meant
that he was obliged to repeat his submission of 1452 on a number of
occasions between 1456 and 1459, but he was confirmed in possession of
the lieutenancy of Ireland, and even seems to have been able to direct
policy for a time in the wake of the 'loveday' settlement of 1458. Only
in 1459 did the bulk of the Lords finally accept the case for war
against the duke, and then the fault-lines of 1453-4 and 1455 were
recreated and York received the support of the Nevilles. Rather as at St
Albans, York, Warwick, and Salisbury revived the case that evil
counsellors around the king were destroying the common weal of the realm
and threatening their own security. On this occasion, however, their
propaganda cut no ice: finding most of the nobility in arms against them
at Ludford Bridge (near Ludlow, Shropshire) and deserted by a part of
the army, York and his allies fled the field during the night of 12-13
October 1459.
Exile, return, and death
The duke and his second son, Edmund, earl of Rutland, spent the next
eleven months in Ireland, attempting to gain the men and money for an
armed return to England, where the duke's estates were in royal hands as
a result of his attainder at the Coventry parliament (about the end of
November 1459). His younger children, including George, were all placed
in the custody of the duchess of Buckingham. An incidental result of
York's efforts was the famous Drogheda parliament of 8 February 1460, in
which the Anglo-Irish establishment obtained recognition as a distinct
political community, separate from England, ruled by its own laws and
financed by its own currency. In return for these concessions York
gained resources, protection for his person, and an extensive army of
archers, which he must have intended to take to England. Plans for a
co-ordinated invasion of the mainland were apparently made during a
conference with Warwick at Waterford in the spring of 1460, and the
duke's Neville allies, accompanied by his eldest son, Edward of March,
duly landed in Kent in June professing loyalty to Henry VI and
protesting about the misgovernment of the realm. With startling success,
they won support in London and the south-east and proceeded to defeat
the royal army at Northampton on 10 July, submitting to the king at the
battle's end. Over the next few weeks March and the Nevilles began to
secure the realm and to await York's return, which finally occurred near
Chester on or about 9 September 1460.
Much about the next few weeks is obscure: it is not known why it took
York so long to join his allies on the mainland; it is not known when he
began so famously to assert his claim to the throne (13 September is the
first date for which a plausible case can be made); it is not known
whether or not the initiative had been agreed, or even discussed, with
the Nevilles. It seems clear that there was no option for York but to
attempt to make himself king: all other avenues, as has been shown, led
nowhere; the duke could neither secure himself nor restore political
order without taking the drastic step from which he had so far shrunk;
and it may have seemed that by 1460 the polity of Henry VI was
sufficiently dislocated to permit a direct assault on the king.
Unfortunately for the duke, however, his own options were different from
those of his allies, even his sons. These men had gained support on the
old plea of reforming Henry VI's government. They had recently made
their loyalty to the king explicit. As the managers of a large and
diverse alliance, they could not easily abandon what they had promised,
and it seems clear that the message from the London elite, who played an
important role in the frantic politics of 1459-61, was that a deposition
could not be tolerated. York marched into London, seized the king, and
entered parliament on 10 October, announcing that he intended 'to
challenge his right' to the crown (Johnson, York, 214). The Lords'
response was unpromising: they went into conclave at Blackfriars and
sent the young earl of March to persuade his father to accept a
negotiated settlement. By 13 October York had been brought to abandon
his plans for an immediate coronation, and a few days later he submitted
his claim for discussion in parliament. An accord emerged on 31 October,
and its central feature was to leave Henry VI on the throne, while
settling the succession on York and his sons. It is possible that even
after this York attempted to get his way by inducing Henry to abdicate.
He must have realized that, like the treaty of Troyes on which it was
apparently based, the accord promised immediate war with the
disinherited heir. In any event, the king was moved to safety and the
duke was obliged to accept the terms agreed in October, at least for the
time being. Acting more or less as protector he marched north in early
December to deal with the forces of the prince of Wales and Queen
Margaret, which had regrouped in Yorkshire after the defeat at
Northampton. Venturing forth from his castle at Sandal on 30 December
1460, in what may have been an uncharacteristic attempt to surprise his
enemy, York was set upon by an unexpectedly large Lancastrian force. In
the ensuing battle of Wakefield, he and his second son, Edmund of
Rutland, were killed. As a macabre riposte to Duke Richard's recent
pretensions, his head was severed from his body and displayed on the
walls of York bearing a paper crown.
So ended the life of this curious figure, who, having played safe in the
prime of his years, abruptly changed tack at the age of thirty-nine,
pursuing ever more ambitious and dangerous policies until, with victory
almost in his grasp, he fell on an ill-chosen battlefield. Duke Richard
was the true founder of the royal house of York, but despite a career
that a recent biographer has described as 'the most successful failure
of the middle ages' (Johnson, 'Political career', abstract), he has
inspired little interest and even less sympathy among historians.
Notwithstanding his many claims to be acting for the 'common weal' of
the realm, York has usually been presented as a somewhat colourless
bungler: all along, it seems, he wanted power, but he could not decide
how far to go until the last minute, whereupon-fatally-he went too far.
In 1964 B. Wilkinson set the tone for most modern accounts of the duke's
career with his judgement that 'it would be folly to make a statesman
out of this fifteenth-century worldling' (Wilkinson, 88). This view
seems unfairly harsh: like many of his peers, his instincts were to make
the best of things in Henry VI's England, a world in which there were no
easy answers. York's opportunities were closely circumscribed and his
intentions in opposing Henry VI's government are far from clear; in fact
there may be a case for seeing him more as the victim of circumstances
than as their creator. His cautiousness, if ultimately unproductive, was
justified by the sheer impropriety of opposition to the government. On
the other hand, the recklessness that he demonstrated in 1450, 1452,
1455, 1459, and 1460 was also justified: sometimes by its results;
always by the need to do something to restore the authority that the
king, in his feebleness, had frittered away. In medieval England,
however, the restoration of authority could only be carried out from the
throne. York's final and most destructive venture was thus his
best-conceived one, but it is easy to see why it has won him few plaudits.
John Watts
Sources P. A. Johnson, Duke Richard of York, 1411-1460 (1988) + T. B.
Pugh, 'Richard Plantagenet (1411-60), duke of York, as the king's
lieutenant in France and Ireland', Aspects of medieval government and
society: essays presented to J. R. Lander, ed. J. G. Rowe (1986), 107-41
+ J. Watts, Henry VI and the politics of kingship (1996) + R. A.
Griffiths, The reign of King Henry VI: the exercise of royal authority,
1422-1461 (1981) + Chancery records + J. T. Rosenthal, 'The estates and
finances of Richard, duke of York, 1411-1460', Studies in Medieval and
Renaissance History, 2 (1965), 117-204 + G. L. Harriss, Cardinal
Beaufort: a study of Lancastrian ascendancy and decline (1988) + A. J.
Pollard, John Talbot and the war in France, 1427-1453, Royal Historical
Society Studies in History, 35 (1983) + C. T. Allmand, Lancastrian
Normandy, 1415-1450 (1983) + M. K. Jones, 'Somerset, York and the Wars
of the Roses', EngHR, 104 (1989), 285-307 + R. A. Griffiths, 'Duke
Richard of York's intentions in 1450 and the origins of the Wars of the
Roses', Journal of Medieval History, 1 (1975), 187-209 + M. L. Kekewich
and others, eds., The politics of fifteenth-century England: John Vale's
book (1995) + J. L. Watts, 'De consulatu Stiliconis: texts and politics
in the reign of Henry VI', Journal of Medieval History, 16 (1990),
251-66 + J. M. W. Bean, 'The financial position of Richard, duke of
York', War and government in the middle ages, ed. J. Gillingham and J.
C. Holt (1984), 182-98 + T. B. Pugh, Henry V and the Southampton plot of
1415, Southampton RS, 30 (1988) + A. J. Otway-Ruthven, A history of
medieval Ireland (1968) + 'John Benet's chronicle for the years 1400 to
1462', ed. G. L. Harriss and M. A. Harriss, Camden miscellany, XXIV, CS,
4th ser., 9 (1972) + E. Flugel, 'Eine mittelenglische
Claudian-Ubersetzung (1445)', Anglia, 28 (1905), 255-99 + P. A. Johnson,
'The political career of Richard, duke of York, to 1456', DPhil diss.,
U. Oxf., 1981 + B. Wilkinson, Constitutional history of England in the
fifteenth century (1399-1485) (1964) + Osbern Bokenam's Legenden, ed. C.
Horstmann (Heilbronn, 1883) + 'William Gregory's chronicle of London',
The historical collections of a citizen of London in the fifteenth
century, ed. J. Gairdner, CS, new ser., 17 (1876) + K. Dockray, 'The
battle of Wakefield and the Wars of the Roses', The Ricardian, 9
(1991-3), 238-58 + R. Knowles, 'The battle of Wakefield: the
topography', The Ricardian, 9 (1991-3), 259-65 + C. Ross, Edward IV
(1974) + Itineraries [of] William Worcestre, ed. J. H. Harvey, OMT
(1969) + K. B. McFarlane, 'The Lancastrian kings', Cambridge Medieval
History, 8, ed. C. W. Previte-Orton and Z. N. Brooke (1936), 363-417 +
CPR, 1446-61 + CEPR letters, 8.132
Archives BL, letters relating to a truce between England and Burgundy,
Add. Ch. 75479
Likenesses painted glass window, Cirencester; repro. in S. Lysons, A
collection of Gloucestershire antiquities (1804) · painted glass window,
Trinity Cam. [see illus.]
Wealth at death under £4600 p.a. net: Johnson, Duke Richard, 7, 21-4
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Re: ODNB Life of the Day - Richard, Duke of York
2011-07-15 17:07:19
Here's the link to the article
<http://www.oxforddnb.com/public/lotw/1.html> .
Joan
---
author of This Time and Loyalty Binds Me, novels about Richard III in
the 21st-century
This Time was General Fiction Finalist of 2010 Next Generation Indie
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website: http://www.joanszechtman.com/
blog: http://rtoaaa.blogspot.com/
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--- In , Christine Headley
<christinelheadley@...> wrote:
>
>
> I subscribe to the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography Life of the
Day.
>
> They usually choose people because it's their birthday - clearly not
the
> case this time - and I'm glad Richard Duke of York is having a turn.
>
> Best wishes
> Christine
>
>
> -------- Original Message --------
> Subject: A most successful failure?
> Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2011 07:00:00 +0100
> From: oxforddnb-lotd@...
> Reply-To: epm-oxforddnb@...
> To: ODNBLIFEOFTHEDAY-L@...
>
>
>
>
>
>
> To read this Life of the Day complete with a picture of the subject,
> visit http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/lotw/2011-07-15
>
>
>
> Richard of York, third duke of York (1411-1460), magnate and claimant
> to the English throne, was the only son of Richard of Conisbrough,
> fourth earl of Cambridge (1385-1415), and Anne Mortimer (b. after
1388,
> d. before 1414), daughter of Roger (VII) Mortimer, fourth earl of
March.
> He was descended from Edward III through both parents, his father
being
> the son of that king's fourth son, Edmund of Langley, first duke of
> York, and his mother the great-granddaughter of Edward's second son,
> Lionel of Antwerp, duke of Clarence. It was this distinguished
ancestry
> that provided the basis for his explosive participation in the
troubled
> politics of the 1450s. In October 1460, after a decade of agitation
and
> intervention, he attempted to seize the throne on the grounds that his
> descent from Clarence made him rightful king in place of Henry VI,
who,
> like the other Lancastrian kings, was descended from Edward III's
third
> son, John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster. The attempt failed, and York
died
> a few months later at the battle of Wakefield, but the claim, of
course,
> lived on to provide the basis for Edward IV's succession in March
1461.
>
> Youth and inheritance
>
> Richard of York was born on 22 September 1411, to parents who had
> married in secret and were soon to be dead. His mother was gone within
a
> year or two; his father, who married again in 1414, was executed the
> following year when details of his plot to depose Henry V came to
light.
> Cambridge's plan to raise the north and (apparently) to put Edmund (V)
> Mortimer, earl of March, on the throne must have thrown his son's
> dynastic position into sharp relief: the young Richard's mother had
been
> the elder of March's sisters, which made the boy himself a possible
heir
> to the Mortimer-Clarence claim to the throne. On Cambridge's death he
> became a royal ward, and it is not altogether surprising that in March
> 1416 he was placed in the custody of the Lancastrians' leading gaoler,
> Sir Robert Waterton. Three years into his reign, however, Henry V was
> busy laying to rest the divisions of his father's time and Richard of
> York was destined for rehabilitation. He was protected from the
effects
> of his father's attainder and, on the death of his uncle Edward, duke
of
> York, at Agincourt, the boy was recognized to be his heir. Not long
> after Henry VI's accession York's wardship and marriage were sold to
> Ralph Neville, earl of Westmorland. At 3000 marks the price was a high
> one, but Neville's investment was amply repaid when, in January 1425,
> Edmund, earl of March, died childless, and York, as his nephew, became
> heir to the extensive Mortimer inheritance. At some stage in the
1420s,
> possibly as early as 1424, the young duke was married off to Cecily
> Neville (1415-1495), one of Westmorland's daughters with Joan
Beaufort.
> From the point of view of the Nevilles, who had married into most of
the
> leading magnate families of the day, it was a prestigious match that
> helped to confirm the family's growing pre-eminence; from the point of
> view of Henry VI's government, it was an ideal way to absorb a
> potentially dangerous figure by attaching him to some of the dynasty's
> staunchest supporters.
>
> Over the next few years York was drawn more closely into the circle
> around the young king. In 1426 he was knighted, and two years later he
> was appointed to take up residence in the royal household. In 1430
York
> took part in the king's coronation expedition to France. His retinue
was
> small, but he was handsomely rewarded for his involvement: over 1000
> marks by the summer of 1431. Soon after his return, and still a minor
> (though there appears to have been some uncertainty over this at the
> time), he was granted livery of his estates on 12 May 1432. At the
time
> both inheritances were encumbered with debts, dowers, and obligations,
> while the duchy of York was mainly in the hands of feoffees. By the
> summer of 1434, however, a series of financial settlements and the
> deaths of the two remaining dowagers had lifted the worst of these
> burdens, and the duke was free to enjoy his extensive patrimony
> undisturbed. The acquisition of his inheritance had cost him quite a
> lot, but he had received fair-even generous-treatment from the
> government. York's proximity to the king, both in blood and in person,
> and his links with the families of Neville and Beaufort had stood him
in
> good stead.
>
> Service in France
>
> In 1433 York was admitted to the Order of the Garter-a mark of favour,
a
> certificate of loyalty, and perhaps a token of martial expectations.
His
> first taste of military command was to be as successor to John, duke
of
> Bedford, in the lieutenancy of France, a post for which he was, in
many
> ways, the obvious candidate: the royal commission, dated 8 May 1436,
> recited the king's desire to see France ruled by 'some great prince of
> our blood' (Johnson, York, 226), and there was no one else who fitted
> the bill, apart from Humphrey, duke of Gloucester. York had agreed to
> serve in France as early as February 1436, but his army did not reach
> Harfleur until 7 June. Had it left England more promptly, it might
have
> been able to prevent the French reconquest of Paris and the
> Ile-de-France, which took place during the spring, though it is
> difficult to know where the blame for the expedition's dilatoriness
> should lie: York was also to be late leaving for his second tour of
duty
> in 1441, and the government was sceptical of his excuses on both
> occasions, but recruiting an army was no easy feat in the later stages
> of the Hundred Years' War, and delays were probably unavoidable. In
the
> event the French advance was halted by York's forces. The brilliant
> campaign of autumn 1436, which ensured the safety of Rouen, was
actually
> commanded by John, Lord Talbot, but Duke Richard too seems to have
> carried out some useful work, regaining most of the Pays de Caux after
> the rebellion of 1435, attending to the grievances of the Normans, and
> surveying the English garrisons. During both of York's lieutenancies
it
> seems to have been a policy of his to delegate the basic management of
> the war to leading captains: his retainer Talbot, as marshal, in 1436;
> his brother-in-law Richard Neville, earl of Salisbury, as
> lieutenant-general in 1437; and Talbot again as 'lieutenant-general
for
> the conduct of the war' (Pollard, 39) during York's second tour of
duty
> from 1441. Although the duke and his council retained overall control
of
> military policy throughout, it may be that York saw himself more as a
> viceroy, responsible for government as a whole, than as a warrior.
This
> is certainly implicit in the attention that he gave to matters of
> domestic governance in Normandy and the pays de conquete: it was for
his
> good rule of the duchy and for his genuine attempts to deal with the
> problems created by a declining military occupation that York would be
> remembered in France. His role in the fighting of the war was
> undistinguished, and a number of English chroniclers noted the fact.
>
> Faced with the imminent expiry of his indentures-though not of his
> lieutenancy, the term of which was indefinite-York sought permission
to
> return home in the spring of 1437. His successor was to be the earl of
> Warwick, and York was instructed to remain in Normandy until his
> arrival, which was delayed until the following November. It is
difficult
> to know whether the decision to replace York reflects disappointment
> with his performance or not: the duke may even have wished to stand
> down, possibly because of difficulties in extracting money from the
> Norman exchequer for the payment of his troops. In any event Warwick's
> service was soon cut short by his death in April 1439, and Henry VI's
> government found itself once again faced with the task of providing
for
> the rule of Lancastrian France. It was apparently as a compromise
> candidate that York emerged as the new lieutenant on 2 July 1440:
> Gloucester appears to have sought his own appointment, while Cardinal
> Beaufort, the regime's paymaster, probably pressed the claims of his
> nephew John Beaufort, earl of Somerset. York, however, was the most
> suitable choice for a post which now, more than ever, demanded a
> flexible, diplomatic, and authoritative holder: as the government
> pursued both peace and war with greater vigour than before, the duke
was
> sufficiently neutral, consultative, and grand to act effectively on
its
> behalf; he was also well connected with all parties, including the
> military establishment in France.
>
> On this occasion York demanded adequate funding and increased powers
> before he would accept the job: he went to France as a second Bedford,
> with all the powers that Duke John had enjoyed after 1432 and a
promise
> of £20,000 a year from the English exchequer to fund his troops.
Apart
> from these improved terms of service, however, the patterns of the
first
> lieutenancy were repeated. York left England late, not arriving in
> Normandy until the end of June 1441. He then moved speedily down the
> Seine to Pontoise where Talbot was struggling to lift Charles VII's
> siege, but this was to be his only military action in the three years
> before the truce of Tours. It was not a particularly impressive one:
if
> York had helped to secure Pontoise for a further few months, he may
also
> have frustrated a daring scheme of Talbot's that could have resulted
in
> the capture of the French king. Caution, it seems, got the better of
> York, and not for the last time in his career.
>
> Over the next few years the duke busied himself with matters of
> governance and diplomacy while the war effort in Normandy ground
slowly
> to a halt. In part this was because Charles VII had turned his
attention
> to the south-west, but it is clear that York's reluctance to engage
the
> French directly caused dissatisfaction in the English government and
it
> may help to explain why Cardinal Beaufort was able to engineer a major
> military command for his nephew John. The earl of Somerset's
expedition,
> planned from late 1442 and launched in the summer of 1443, involved a
> major diversion of men, funds, and authority away from York and the
> Norman theatre. Duke Richard dispatched an embassy to remonstrate with
> the English government in June 1443, but it had no effect, and the
> campaign itself added injury to insult: Somerset's attack on Brittany
> and the duke of Alencon's stronghold of La Guerche disrupted York's
> attempts, conducted during 1442-3, to involve the English in an
alliance
> of French princes. In the light of all this it is hardly surprising
> that, following the expedition's failure, the government seems to have
> felt the need to appease York: tallies for the payments due at
> Michaelmas 1443 arrived in February 1444 and, later in that year, the
> duke was given a major apanage in southern Normandy, while earldoms
> (and, in Edmund's case, lands) were granted to his eldest sons. After
> this no more of York's wages were paid until 1446, but at least the
> truce contracted in May 1444 reduced his expenses and removed the need
> for further military activity. In September 1445 York returned to
> England: his indentures were about to expire, parliament was in
session,
> and-rather ironically, given the government's own failures in this
> regard-his management of Norman finances was under investigation.
>
> York and English politics before 1450
>
> It now seems clear that Cardinal Beaufort, William de la Pole, earl of
> Suffolk, and the other leading councillors and courtiers who, in the
> first instance, managed Henry VI's authority in the 1430s and 1440s
> intended Richard of York to be a pillar of the Lancastrian regime.
This
> did not mean that the already wealthy duke was to be showered with
> gifts, nor did it mean that he was to be given a formal role in the
> government of England. York was not, for example, appointed to the
> re-established council in November 1437, but nothing should be
inferred
> from this: at twenty-six the duke would have been considered rather
> youthful for what was in any case a rather anomalous role; exclusion
> from the council would scarcely have excluded him from influence; and
it
> is likely that already the expectation was that his service to the
crown
> would be overseas, at least while he was of military age. It is not
> known what part, if any, York played in the politics of 1437-41,
during
> which time he was in England and Henry VI, somewhat uncertainly, came
of
> age. There is no reason to suppose that he supported the moves of
> Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, against Cardinal Beaufort in 1439-40,
> despite Gloucester's suggestion that York and other lords had been
> wrongfully kept out of power; nor should it be assumed that he was
> opposed to the release of the duke of Orleans. He seems to have kept a
> low profile at this time, participating in a scheme to restore order
in
> Wales in 1437-8, sharing in the custody of the Beauchamp wardship in
> 1439, and touring his estates. When, in early 1441, the 'longe
> bareynesse' of his marriage was suddenly ended and a son born, York
> named him Henry (Bokenham's Legenden, 273). This demonstration of
> dynastic loyalty earned a gift of £100 worth of jewels from the
grateful
> king: the restoration of the heir of Cambridge and Mortimer must have
> seemed to be complete.
>
> As lieutenant of France for the second time York became embroiled in
the
> government's various diplomatic initiatives, including the moves
> associated with the truce of Tours. It has often been assumed that
Duke
> Richard was hostile to the peace negotiations of the 1440s, but there
is
> absolutely no evidence for this. While the confusions of policy in the
> early years of the decade must have been exasperating for anyone
charged
> with responsibility for the defence of Lancastrian France, there is
> nothing to suggest that York preferred war to diplomacy as a means of
> preserving English interests. As the plan to seek a truce with Charles
> VII and a marriage alliance with the house of Anjou emerged as the
> central plank of royal policy in 1444, York seems to have given it his
> full support. In the new spirit of Anglo-French amity, for example, he
> sent forces to assist the dauphin's campaign in Alsace in the summer
of
> 1444. The following year, and possibly in response to promptings from
> the government, he opened negotiations for a marriage between his
eldest
> son (now Edward of Rouen-the future Edward IV-born on 28 April 1442)
and
> one of the French king's daughters. The duke may even have been
> sympathetic to the government's plans to surrender Maine, which
> proceeded alongside the truce negotiations and formed an integral part
> of the alliance policy. Because of the postures that York struck after
> 1450 historians have tended to assume that he was opposed to this
> notorious scheme, but that is by no means clear. It is very likely
that
> he knew what was planned by the end of 1445 (if not earlier, since he
> met Suffolk's embassy as it travelled through Normandy in 1444) and he
> was certainly involved in the arrangements for compensating Maine's
> English landholders in 1447. Interestingly York was never explicitly
to
> condemn the handover of the territory, although its loss was certainly
a
> prominent feature of popular and parliamentary criticism of William de
> la Pole, by then duke of Suffolk, Edmund Beaufort, duke of Somerset,
and
> the other so-called 'traitors' of 1450.
>
> It is from the period following his return to England in 1445 that
> York's alienation from Henry VI's ministers is often supposed to have
> dated. The duke found himself accused of mishandling the funds he had
> been paid for the defence of Normandy, and his chief accuser, it
> appeared, was a central figure in the government, Adam Moleyns, bishop
> of Chichester. York had returned to England confident of reappointment
> to the French lieutenancy, but he was obliged to wait for more than a
> year and then to see the office go to Edmund Beaufort instead. It used
> to be thought that because of his alleged hostility to the peace
policy,
> and his putatively close links to the duke of Gloucester (who died
> mysteriously in 1447), Duke Richard was persona non grata with
Suffolk's
> regime: his appointment to the lieutenancy of Ireland on 30 July 1447
> has sometimes been seen as a form of exile, the government's hope
being
> that, like the earls of March, his predecessors, he would go there and
die.
>
> However, events thus far do not support this interpretation. York was
> certainly dismayed by the rumours concerning his performance in
> Normandy, but he was explicitly vindicated by king and lords both in
and
> outside the parliament of 1445-6; it is not even known that Moleyns
had
> made the accusations York claimed, only that the duke saw in a public
> attack on the bishop the opportunity to clear his own name. Similarly,
> while York was probably disappointed not to regain the lieutenancy of
> France, too much should not be made of this: the lieutenancy of
Ireland,
> which he was granted in return, was a post that his most distinguished
> ancestors (notably Clarence himself) had held; it bestowed upon him
> almost sovereign powers in the island; and it gave him the opportunity
> to combine military service with the exploitation of his interests as
an
> Irish landlord. Finally, since the terms of his commission permitted
him
> to appoint a deputy and return to England, it cannot be seen as a form
> of banishment. In some ways, indeed, 1446 and 1447 saw York more
closely
> involved in the governing regime than he had ever been: in October
1446
> he was granted the abbey and town of Waltham because he 'will come
often
> to London for the king's business and his own' (CPR, 1446-52, 43);
over
> the next year he attended a number of council meetings and was named
as
> a witness to more than three-quarters of the charters issued from 1446
> to 1448; during 1447-9 he was added to the peace commissions of eleven
> counties beyond those to which he had been named at his inheritance
(and
> in some cases beyond the scope of his landholdings); and finally,
almost
> for the first time, he began to enjoy the kind of rewards more
commonly
> bestowed on courtiers-most notably, perhaps, the wardship and marriage
> of the Holland heir (Henry) and a series of lands and offices once
held
> by Gloucester. This last detail is a reminder that there was almost
> nothing to link York with Duke Humphrey in the latter's lifetime: in
no
> sense can York be considered his supporter, and it is not improbable
> that, like other members of the nobility, he witnessed Gloucester's
> destruction at the Bury parliament and, tacitly at least, assented to
it.
>
> When he finally left for Ireland, in June 1449, Duke Richard did so as
a
> loyal and well-regarded member of the Lancastrian establishment. If he
> had been less involved in affairs during the preceding year or so,
this
> may well have been at his own choice. Many of the nobility seem to
have
> withdrawn from the court during 1448 as the government's troubles
began
> to mount. York cannot have wished to be associated with the
humiliating
> surrender of Le Mans in March 1448 and he may well have feared the
> consequences of the extraordinary coup at Fougeres. A tour of duty in
> Ireland must have appeared an attractive alternative. During his
> fourteen months in the province York scored a series of easy (if
> short-lived) victories, receiving the submission of most of the
island's
> leaders and campaigning effectively in Wicklow. At the Drogheda
> parliament of April 1450 he followed the lead of the Commons at
> Westminster by introducing an Act of Resumption. Like the lieutenant
of
> France he was short of money, and this limited his achievements, but
the
> contrast between this vigorous performance and the demoralizing stasis
> of Somerset's rule in France must have impressed itself upon
contemporaries.
>
> Estates and connections
>
> By the mid-1430s, when he had gained full control over his estates,
York
> was the richest and most extensive landowner among the king's
subjects.
> Estimates of his wealth have varied between £2874 and £5800
net, but the
> most recent and reliable estimate suggests that his estates in England
> and Wales were worth about £4000 a year (net) when he came into
them,
> and that his exchequer annuities yielded an average of £600 a
year.
> York's lands were scattered through England and the march of Wales,
with
> notable concentrations in the West Riding of Yorkshire; in
Lincolnshire
> and Northamptonshire; in Dorset and Somerset; in Herefordshire,
> Shropshire, and the middle march of Wales; and in the centre of East
> Anglia along the border of Norfolk and Suffolk. Beyond this he held
the
> earldom of Ulster and the lordships of Connacht and Trim, although
only
> the last of these Irish estates is likely to have yielded York any
real
> influence or income.
>
> The possession of such vast holdings shaped York's activities as a
lord:
> like John of Gaunt before him he was a truly national figure, with
> interests so widespread and diverse that it was difficult for him to
> exert the kind of local authority typical of later medieval magnates.
He
> had no real 'country'-no county-sized area of concentrated influence
> where local gentlemen might turn first of all to him for lordship-and
> this helped to determine both the nature of his affinity and the role
> that he and it were to play in the politics of the realm. York's
> following, like Gaunt's or indeed the king's, was a disparate group of
> often important men, many of whom had their own local allegiances and
> whose links with York were forged mainly through military service and
> the tenure of estate or household office. In part, of course, this
> pattern was a consequence of the duke's long minority and his
prolonged
> service in France: many of the servants of the duchy of York had
melted
> away in the 1420s into Gloucester's service, for example; while Duke
> Richard's appointment as Bedford's successor in Normandy presented him
> with a ready-made following looking for a lord. A spry comment from an
> anti-Yorkist chronicler has promoted the suggestion that York was
unduly
> influenced by the men who gathered round him in Normandy-in
particular,
> by Sir William Oldhall, who was one of York's most reliable agents
> during the 1450s-but there is little to support this notion,
> particularly when the duke's involvement in the peace policy of the
> mid-1440s is taken into account. On the contrary, it seems likely that
> York's high status, his extensive interests, and his relative
> disengagement from the affairs of any particular locality beyond his
> estates meant that he was exposed to a wide array of different voices.
> If anyone besides the king and his ministers was likely to hear the
> counsel of the realm, it was surely York, who numbered lords such as
> Talbot, Ralph Cromwell, and Thomas Scales among his councillors, but
> also enjoyed links with exchequer clerks, lawyers, the widows of
Norman
> soldiers, and local worthies from all parts of the country. The
> maintenance of this kind of connection may have cost York dear-as much
> as £1300 a year, according to one recent estimate-but it seems
that his
> money was well spent. Despite his inability to offer really consistent
> local support, he was apparently able to co-ordinate the raising of
> large retinues throughout the 1450s. If some of his servants kept away
> from the duke's more controversial ventures, a sizeable and
prestigious
> core remained loyal to the end.
>
> The making of York's rebellion
>
> The last and best-known period in York's political life began in
> September 1450, when he suddenly returned from Ireland and took up the
> common cry for the traitors surrounding the king to be brought to
> justice. This was a significant change of political direction for the
> duke, and one that shaped the remainder of his career, but the reasons
> for it are not immediately obvious. Modern historians have mostly
> rejected the traditional interpretation, which laid stress on York's
> dynastic interests and saw his participation in the popular ferments
of
> the 1450s as a device for seizing the crown. Instead, the search has
> been for the causes of personal grievance on Duke Richard's part: was
he
> moved to anger, or even desperation, by the government's enormous
debts
> to him? Was he incensed by the new pre-eminence of Edmund Beaufort,
duke
> of Somerset, the man who had so recently lost France? Did he fear for
> his own position, as an old rival took control of Henry VI's
government?
> Alternatively, was York simply an opportunist, moving (typically late)
> to exploit the regime's difficulties, but without any fixed idea of
> where his dissidence might take him?
>
> One difficulty in reaching any conclusions lies in trying to establish
> which elements of York's programme, as this slowly unfolded, were
> intentional, and intended from the start. It is certainly unlikely
that
> the duke was seeking to gain the throne in 1450: previous legitimists
> had soon revealed their desire to improve the realm by changing the
> king, but York was not to assert his Mortimer-Clarence claim until
1460,
> after ten years of activism explicitly devoted to other ends. Even in
> that year, moreover, his move was greeted with hostility, and it seems
> reasonable to suggest that the duke would have known all along that
this
> was a likely reaction and would have trimmed his policy accordingly.
It
> is possible that, in 1450, York was concerned to secure recognition as
> heir presumptive to Henry VI: the king was still without a child and
> there was a (somewhat faint) possibility of dynastic competition from
> the house of Beaufort. Like most noblemen York took an active interest
> in the claims and titles he possessed-in 1445 he had sought
information
> on his interest in the throne of Castile and in 1451 an agent of his
was
> to argue in parliament that the duke should be named as heir
> apparent-but, at best, this can provide only a partial explanation for
> his actions in 1450.
>
> As far as personal grievances are concerned, meanwhile, it is
difficult
> to see what grounds York had for complaint. That the duke was part of
> the establishment in the 1440s has already been illustrated.
Financially
> he had fared no worse than any of Henry VI's other major accountants:
> indeed, somewhat remarkably, given the state of royal finances, he
> received £1200 from the crown at the end of 1449, and even in May
1450
> efforts were being made to find him money. He may have decided to
return
> to England to seek funds-a letter to Salisbury, written in June 1450,
> suggests that he feared serious losses in Ireland unless he received
> further payments-but this is rather a different matter from acting on
a
> sense of grievance, and if seeking money was York's initial aim, it
was
> soon overwhelmed by other purposes.
>
> What, finally, of York's famous antagonism towards Somerset: was this
> the motivation for his assault on the king's ministers? The problem
here
> is one of disentangling the personal feud between the two men from the
> relative positions in which a wider politics had placed them: did York
> attack the government because it contained Somerset, or did he attack
> Somerset because he was the leader of the government? It is certainly
> possible to find grounds for animosity between the two men: Beaufort's
> performance in the last years of the war was undistinguished to say
the
> least, and York may have thought that he himself could have achieved
> more; it has recently been suggested, moreover, that the lieutenant's
> casual surrender of Rouen would particularly have rankled with Duke
> Richard, since he had continued to be its captain. At the same time,
> however, it is clear that once York had made his inflammatory moves of
> September 1450 (and possibly even before then), he and Somerset were
> destined to be at odds: Duke Richard's political standing came quickly
> to depend on the argument that the government was run by traitors, and
a
> large part of his justification for taking up arms in 1450, 1452, and
> 1455 was that the enmity of leading ministers obliged him to take
action
> to defend himself; Duke Edmund, on the other hand, was not unjustified
> in regarding much of York's behaviour as threatening, both to himself
> and to the order of the realm; if he sought, in 1450, in 1452-3, and
in
> 1455, to deal with the problem by repression instead of indulgence, it
> was an understandable approach. Politics, as much as personality and
> private interest, determined the conflict between York and Somerset.
>
> Pursuing this further, it may be suggested that it was in the
> extraordinary politics of 1450 that the most likely reasons for York's
> sudden attack on the government are to be found. As Normandy fell to
the
> French and the king's bankruptcy was exposed in parliament, the
> authority of Henry VI's ministers disintegrated. MPs and more lowly
> members of society appeared to be united in the belief that the king
had
> been betrayed by a self-serving clique who had pillaged his
possessions
> in England and surrendered those in France. If Suffolk's trial and
> murder had removed the leader of the gang, the rest remained in
> positions of power, and until the king and the 'true lords' took
action
> against them, there could be no justice or order in the realm. This
> judgement on the recent past dominated public life in England between
> 1449 and 1451, and it continued to exert a certain influence over the
> public imagination thereafter. York, like other members of the
nobility,
> must have known that in certain ways it was wide of the mark, but this
> did not mean that it could be ignored. In particular, in fact, it
could
> not be ignored by York, who had already been identified by some of the
> government's critics as the figure most likely to visit retribution
upon
> the 'traitors'. This appears to be the explanation for the rough
> reception that York and his men received at their landing in north
Wales
> in September: local agents of the royal household, and possibly their
> commanders at the centre, had become alarmed about the duke's
> intentions. It was at this point, perhaps, and not in 1447, that 'by
> treating [the duke] as an enemy the court had made him one'
(McFarlane,
> 405): if both the king's ministers and his subjects were going to cast
> York as the agent of justice, he might as well fulfil their
> expectations. Certainly, the moment must have seemed ripe for someone
to
> take drastic action: the king's officers could not govern without
public
> confidence, and it may have appeared that the removal of some of the
> discredited men-not least, perhaps, the duke of Somerset-was the best
> way to restore it.
>
> Beyond all this, it might be added that, even if the government had
not
> moved against him in 1450, everything in York's make-up would have
given
> him the sense that he was the man to restore the situation. He was the
> greatest prince of the royal blood, head and shoulders above other
> lords, the natural successor to Bedford and Gloucester in the
protection
> of Henry VI's interests. He had already acted as the king's viceroy in
> France and Ireland; why not in England too? What, if anything, York
knew
> of the deeds of men like Gaunt and Woodstock (or those of Montfort and
> Lancaster), whose status was much the same as his and whose actions
were
> to prefigure his own, is not known; but one model of proper noble
> service had been made available to him when, probably in 1445, York
was
> presented with an elegantly decorated translation of Claudian's life
of
> the consul Stilicho. It was an account of how the people of Rome and
> other nations implored this virtuous prince to accept the office of
> consul and restore good government to a city torn apart by the evil
> advisers of a child emperor. Its translator had invited York to 'marke
> stilicoes life' ('Mittelenglische Claudian-Ubersetzung', 256): in
1450
> the moment had arrived when he might put this teaching to good use.
>
> York and the politics of the 1450s
>
> It was with a volley of bills and open letters addressed to the king
> that York returned to English political life in September 1450. The
> first of these sought to establish the duke's loyalty; the second
> advertised his intention to seek justice against his accusers; but it
> was the third that was truly controversial-it drew the king's
attention
> to the universal complaint that justice was not being done to those
who
> broke the king's law with impunity (in particular, the so-called
> 'traitors'), and offered York's services in bringing the guilty to
book.
> This was an open defiance of the government's authority, since the
> essence of the 'traitors' idea was that it was the men about the king
> who were most of all responsible for the disasters that had befallen
the
> realm. As far as York was concerned, this meant that a true subject
was
> obliged to act against the inner circle of authority in order to
fulfil
> the terms of his allegiance to king and realm, and this explains the
> duke's many affirmations of loyalty to King Henry: it was the
essential
> justification for actions that, on the face of it, appeared disloyal.
> Under normal circumstances, of course, attempts to separate a king's
> chosen counsellors and servants from the ruler himself were unlikely
to
> succeed: defiance of royal agents easily shaded into defiance of the
> king, and that was treason. As York and all the rest of the nobility
> knew, however, these circumstances were not normal: Henry VI had shown
> no more discernment than a child in the government of his realm; his
> ministers were virtually self-appointed, and the policies pursued
during
> the 1420s, 1430s, and 1440s were essentially theirs. If this makes
> nonsense of one aspect of the 'traitors' thesis, it exposes the truth
of
> another aspect: the government was not in any real sense the vehicle
of
> the king's will, and thus defiance of it was not treason; the regime
> could legitimately be reshaped, and, with large sections of the public
> arguing that it should be, York's actions had a certain justice in
them.
> In reality he was appealing not to the king with these manifestos, but
> to the Lords and to the wider public: his plea was that those who were
> less compromised by the disasters of 1449-50 must abandon those who
were
> more immediately responsible; a new government, in which the duke was
to
> play a more prominent role, must be established.
>
> Not surprisingly York's demands fell on deaf ears. The king's circle
saw
> little reason for a general blood-letting, and the nobility, who had
> begun to lend support to the beleaguered regime as the crisis mounted,
> appear to have taken a similar view. In a public reply to York's
bills,
> his offers of assistance were politely rebuffed, and the duke left
> London to prepare for the parliament summoned to meet in November
1450.
> When it gathered on the 6th, MPs demonstrated their continuing
> enthusiasm for reform by electing Oldhall, York's chamberlain, as
> speaker and loudly calling for the traitors to be brought to justice.
> When the duke himself arrived, with sword borne upright before him and
a
> large army at his back, the initiative was his: Somerset was promptly
> imprisoned and the Lords waited to see what would happen next. What
> followed was in part a demonstration of Duke Richard's hesitancy and
> conservatism, and in part a reflection of the constraints of his
> position. Elements of the Commons' programme were put into effect, but
> the duke made no attempt to alter the institutional framework of
Henry's
> government, and the result was that, during the Christmas recess,
> authority drifted back to the king and his household, Somerset was
> released, and the Lords, many of whom had flirted with York while he
was
> in the ascendant, resumed their former obedience. During the sessions
of
> the parliament in 1451 York's power waned, and Thomas Younge's
notorious
> attempt to have him recognized as heir apparent must have seemed to
many
> an act of desperation. Why had York not done more to secure himself
> during his brief ascendancy? It is not, of course, clear what he
wanted:
> if only the restoration of order, then this was being achieved without
> his help; if a role for himself in the government, then his actions
had
> made this unthinkable unless the king himself were to be altogether
> displaced-the men of Henry's household, who effectively disposed of
> royal power, were hardly going to welcome a man who had posed as their
> nemesis. What York had done, in effect, was to go too far without
going
> far enough. Perhaps he should have cut his losses and risked a direct
> assault on the throne; but such a move was almost certain to fail. The
> duke had cast himself as the true liegeman of Henry VI: any deviation
> from this role was sure to be seen as the grossest kind of betrayal;
> York had many potential supporters, but-apart, perhaps, from his own
> servants-their support was for his public, not his private, interests.
>
> It has been worth looking at the events of 1450 in some detail,
because
> for the next two years Duke Richard's options were very largely shaped
> by what had happened in that year. He could not be secure while
Somerset
> and the household retained both control of the king and the support of
> the Lords, yet there was little he could do to improve his lot. Moves
> against Oldhall were under way by the end of 1451, and when, in
January
> 1452, York reacted publicly against them and against their
implications
> for himself, he was thinly supported. Apart from the duke's own men
only
> the malcontent Thomas Courtenay, earl of Devon, and his crony Lord
> Cobham were persuaded to join the rising that attempted to repeat the
> coup of 1450: the rest of the nobility gathered around the king and
> Somerset, and York was forced to capitulate at Dartford in early
March.
> His failure left him worse off than before. He was obliged to swear a
> humiliating oath of submission, his supporters and tenants were
harried
> by judicial commissions, and his attempts to discredit Somerset were
> treated as part and parcel of a private quarrel. As the common people
> were reduced to order and the government enjoyed the unfamiliar taste
of
> victory in Gascony, it seemed that York's political career was at an
> end: never again would he be able to take his proper place in the
> Lancastrian establishment.
>
> At this point, however, fate combined with the contradictions of Henry
> VI's regime to bestow new opportunities upon Duke Richard. In the
summer
> of 1453 Somerset's governing consensus suddenly collapsed, as the
> victories in Gascony were reversed, the king lost his mind, and war
> broke out in the north between the Nevilles and the Percys. In the
> resulting crisis York was the only person of sufficient stature to
> restore the situation, and it must be this factor, above all, that
> explains the decision of a non-partisan group of councillors to summon
> him to London in October 1453, and the agreement in parliament to
> appoint him protector and defender of the realm on 27 March 1454. Here
> was a means for York to wrest control of government from Somerset and
> the king's household men without bringing his loyalty to Henry VI into
> question; and here was a means for the rest of political society to
> contain the powerful duke and to create an effective government
without
> the kind of sacrifices that had been demanded in 1450. York certainly
> did his part: he went to London full of emollient promises to attend
the
> council and do all 'that sholde or might be to the welfare of the king
> and of his subgettes' (CPR, 1452-61, 143); he made no attacks on
> Somerset or other sometime 'traitors' (though his ally, Norfolk, did);
> and, on taking up the post of protector, he committed himself to rule
> consultatively and representatively with the Lords. During the
> succeeding months York made serious and well-founded attempts to
pacify
> the disputes in the north and north midlands, and he enjoyed some
> success. Making genuine efforts to consult widely, he demonstrated the
> same statesmanlike qualities that had marked his management of France
> and Ireland: 'for a whole year', wrote one chronicler, 'he governed
the
> whole realm of England most nobly and in the best way' ('Benet's
> chronicle', 212). There were certainly limits to his achievement, and
> his tenure of office was to be brought to an abrupt halt in February
> 1455, but the duke's performance may have prompted many of his peers
to
> look more sympathetically at his claims in the years to come.
>
> Unfortunately, however, the moulds of politics were changing in these
> years, and the broad unity that had so long been preserved among the
> nobility was breaking down. The deterioration of order in the
> localities, which had become so dramatic and extensive by 1453, was
now
> combined with the emergence of a more aggressive Lancastrian
dynasticism
> to promote significant divisions among the elite. These had begun to
> emerge even before York's protectorate: one of the reasons why it had
> taken so long to arrange the duke's appointment was that a substantial
> group of lords had grouped themselves around the queen, Margaret of
> Anjou, who-since the birth of her son Edward in October 1453-was
> attempting to secure a regency for herself. In the winter of 1453-4,
> indeed, civil war looked a distinct possibility. It was held off by
> York's readiness to make explicit his submission to the dynastic
claims
> of the new prince, and by the agreement of all but the most extreme
> figures to join a broadly based regime under the duke's headship. When
> Henry VI recovered his sanity, however, at Christmas 1454, those in
the
> household and the north who had opposed the protectorate seized the
> opportunity to assert their interests. York was removed from office on
9
> February 1455, and by early March a more hard-faced government was
> taking steps against the duke. The fact that the Neville earls of
> Warwick and Salisbury also fell under attack at this time reveals the
> factional and divisive aims of those in control: although the
government
> proceeded with the language of treason and obedience, its narrowing
base
> and its sponsorship of conflict began to undermine its claims to such
> public goods; when York and the Nevilles confronted the king,
Somerset,
> and the Percys at St Albans on 22 May 1455, there was a broad
> equivalence between the two sides, and the first blows of a civil war
> were struck.
>
> The Yorkist victory, however, brought this war to a rapid halt. Just
as
> he had done in the early 1450s, the duke submitted to the king and
> attempted to rebuild unity. This was to remain his posture and that of
> his allies right up to the disasters of 1459. York was certainly
> prepared to strain his allegiance to its very limits-securing
> appointment to a second protectorate on 15 November 1455 and depriving
> the king of personal authority a week later-but he would not cross the
> bounds to an outright repudiation of Henry VI's sovereignty. As a
> consequence his pre-eminence remained insecure. His protectorate was
> soon terminated (on 25 February 1456) when parliamentary pressure for
a
> resumption weakened his support among the Lords, but the aim of
> preserving unity, or oonhede, among the nobility lingered on for some
> years and ensured that if York was not to be admitted to any special
> power, he was not to be destroyed either. It seems likely that,
provided
> he behaved himself, most of the peerage had some respect for the duke.
> Pressure from Queen Margaret and her growing band of partisans meant
> that he was obliged to repeat his submission of 1452 on a number of
> occasions between 1456 and 1459, but he was confirmed in possession of
> the lieutenancy of Ireland, and even seems to have been able to direct
> policy for a time in the wake of the 'loveday' settlement of 1458.
Only
> in 1459 did the bulk of the Lords finally accept the case for war
> against the duke, and then the fault-lines of 1453-4 and 1455 were
> recreated and York received the support of the Nevilles. Rather as at
St
> Albans, York, Warwick, and Salisbury revived the case that evil
> counsellors around the king were destroying the common weal of the
realm
> and threatening their own security. On this occasion, however, their
> propaganda cut no ice: finding most of the nobility in arms against
them
> at Ludford Bridge (near Ludlow, Shropshire) and deserted by a part of
> the army, York and his allies fled the field during the night of 12-13
> October 1459.
>
> Exile, return, and death
>
> The duke and his second son, Edmund, earl of Rutland, spent the next
> eleven months in Ireland, attempting to gain the men and money for an
> armed return to England, where the duke's estates were in royal hands
as
> a result of his attainder at the Coventry parliament (about the end of
> November 1459). His younger children, including George, were all
placed
> in the custody of the duchess of Buckingham. An incidental result of
> York's efforts was the famous Drogheda parliament of 8 February 1460,
in
> which the Anglo-Irish establishment obtained recognition as a distinct
> political community, separate from England, ruled by its own laws and
> financed by its own currency. In return for these concessions York
> gained resources, protection for his person, and an extensive army of
> archers, which he must have intended to take to England. Plans for a
> co-ordinated invasion of the mainland were apparently made during a
> conference with Warwick at Waterford in the spring of 1460, and the
> duke's Neville allies, accompanied by his eldest son, Edward of March,
> duly landed in Kent in June professing loyalty to Henry VI and
> protesting about the misgovernment of the realm. With startling
success,
> they won support in London and the south-east and proceeded to defeat
> the royal army at Northampton on 10 July, submitting to the king at
the
> battle's end. Over the next few weeks March and the Nevilles began to
> secure the realm and to await York's return, which finally occurred
near
> Chester on or about 9 September 1460.
>
> Much about the next few weeks is obscure: it is not known why it took
> York so long to join his allies on the mainland; it is not known when
he
> began so famously to assert his claim to the throne (13 September is
the
> first date for which a plausible case can be made); it is not known
> whether or not the initiative had been agreed, or even discussed, with
> the Nevilles. It seems clear that there was no option for York but to
> attempt to make himself king: all other avenues, as has been shown,
led
> nowhere; the duke could neither secure himself nor restore political
> order without taking the drastic step from which he had so far shrunk;
> and it may have seemed that by 1460 the polity of Henry VI was
> sufficiently dislocated to permit a direct assault on the king.
> Unfortunately for the duke, however, his own options were different
from
> those of his allies, even his sons. These men had gained support on
the
> old plea of reforming Henry VI's government. They had recently made
> their loyalty to the king explicit. As the managers of a large and
> diverse alliance, they could not easily abandon what they had
promised,
> and it seems clear that the message from the London elite, who played
an
> important role in the frantic politics of 1459-61, was that a
deposition
> could not be tolerated. York marched into London, seized the king, and
> entered parliament on 10 October, announcing that he intended 'to
> challenge his right' to the crown (Johnson, York, 214). The Lords'
> response was unpromising: they went into conclave at Blackfriars and
> sent the young earl of March to persuade his father to accept a
> negotiated settlement. By 13 October York had been brought to abandon
> his plans for an immediate coronation, and a few days later he
submitted
> his claim for discussion in parliament. An accord emerged on 31
October,
> and its central feature was to leave Henry VI on the throne, while
> settling the succession on York and his sons. It is possible that even
> after this York attempted to get his way by inducing Henry to
abdicate.
> He must have realized that, like the treaty of Troyes on which it was
> apparently based, the accord promised immediate war with the
> disinherited heir. In any event, the king was moved to safety and the
> duke was obliged to accept the terms agreed in October, at least for
the
> time being. Acting more or less as protector he marched north in early
> December to deal with the forces of the prince of Wales and Queen
> Margaret, which had regrouped in Yorkshire after the defeat at
> Northampton. Venturing forth from his castle at Sandal on 30 December
> 1460, in what may have been an uncharacteristic attempt to surprise
his
> enemy, York was set upon by an unexpectedly large Lancastrian force.
In
> the ensuing battle of Wakefield, he and his second son, Edmund of
> Rutland, were killed. As a macabre riposte to Duke Richard's recent
> pretensions, his head was severed from his body and displayed on the
> walls of York bearing a paper crown.
>
> So ended the life of this curious figure, who, having played safe in
the
> prime of his years, abruptly changed tack at the age of thirty-nine,
> pursuing ever more ambitious and dangerous policies until, with
victory
> almost in his grasp, he fell on an ill-chosen battlefield. Duke
Richard
> was the true founder of the royal house of York, but despite a career
> that a recent biographer has described as 'the most successful failure
> of the middle ages' (Johnson, 'Political career', abstract), he has
> inspired little interest and even less sympathy among historians.
> Notwithstanding his many claims to be acting for the 'common weal' of
> the realm, York has usually been presented as a somewhat colourless
> bungler: all along, it seems, he wanted power, but he could not decide
> how far to go until the last minute, whereupon-fatally-he went too
far.
> In 1964 B. Wilkinson set the tone for most modern accounts of the
duke's
> career with his judgement that 'it would be folly to make a statesman
> out of this fifteenth-century worldling' (Wilkinson, 88). This view
> seems unfairly harsh: like many of his peers, his instincts were to
make
> the best of things in Henry VI's England, a world in which there were
no
> easy answers. York's opportunities were closely circumscribed and his
> intentions in opposing Henry VI's government are far from clear; in
fact
> there may be a case for seeing him more as the victim of circumstances
> than as their creator. His cautiousness, if ultimately unproductive,
was
> justified by the sheer impropriety of opposition to the government. On
> the other hand, the recklessness that he demonstrated in 1450, 1452,
> 1455, 1459, and 1460 was also justified: sometimes by its results;
> always by the need to do something to restore the authority that the
> king, in his feebleness, had frittered away. In medieval England,
> however, the restoration of authority could only be carried out from
the
> throne. York's final and most destructive venture was thus his
> best-conceived one, but it is easy to see why it has won him few
plaudits.
>
> John Watts
>
> Sources P. A. Johnson, Duke Richard of York, 1411-1460 (1988) + T. B.
> Pugh, 'Richard Plantagenet (1411-60), duke of York, as the king's
> lieutenant in France and Ireland', Aspects of medieval government and
> society: essays presented to J. R. Lander, ed. J. G. Rowe (1986),
107-41
> + J. Watts, Henry VI and the politics of kingship (1996) + R. A.
> Griffiths, The reign of King Henry VI: the exercise of royal
authority,
> 1422-1461 (1981) + Chancery records + J. T. Rosenthal, 'The estates
and
> finances of Richard, duke of York, 1411-1460', Studies in Medieval and
> Renaissance History, 2 (1965), 117-204 + G. L. Harriss, Cardinal
> Beaufort: a study of Lancastrian ascendancy and decline (1988) + A. J.
> Pollard, John Talbot and the war in France, 1427-1453, Royal
Historical
> Society Studies in History, 35 (1983) + C. T. Allmand, Lancastrian
> Normandy, 1415-1450 (1983) + M. K. Jones, 'Somerset, York and the Wars
> of the Roses', EngHR, 104 (1989), 285-307 + R. A. Griffiths, 'Duke
> Richard of York's intentions in 1450 and the origins of the Wars of
the
> Roses', Journal of Medieval History, 1 (1975), 187-209 + M. L.
Kekewich
> and others, eds., The politics of fifteenth-century England: John
Vale's
> book (1995) + J. L. Watts, 'De consulatu Stiliconis: texts and
politics
> in the reign of Henry VI', Journal of Medieval History, 16 (1990),
> 251-66 + J. M. W. Bean, 'The financial position of Richard, duke of
> York', War and government in the middle ages, ed. J. Gillingham and J.
> C. Holt (1984), 182-98 + T. B. Pugh, Henry V and the Southampton plot
of
> 1415, Southampton RS, 30 (1988) + A. J. Otway-Ruthven, A history of
> medieval Ireland (1968) + 'John Benet's chronicle for the years 1400
to
> 1462', ed. G. L. Harriss and M. A. Harriss, Camden miscellany, XXIV,
CS,
> 4th ser., 9 (1972) + E. Flugel, 'Eine mittelenglische
> Claudian-Ubersetzung (1445)', Anglia, 28 (1905), 255-99 + P. A.
Johnson,
> 'The political career of Richard, duke of York, to 1456', DPhil diss.,
> U. Oxf., 1981 + B. Wilkinson, Constitutional history of England in the
> fifteenth century (1399-1485) (1964) + Osbern Bokenam's Legenden, ed.
C.
> Horstmann (Heilbronn, 1883) + 'William Gregory's chronicle of London',
> The historical collections of a citizen of London in the fifteenth
> century, ed. J. Gairdner, CS, new ser., 17 (1876) + K. Dockray, 'The
> battle of Wakefield and the Wars of the Roses', The Ricardian, 9
> (1991-3), 238-58 + R. Knowles, 'The battle of Wakefield: the
> topography', The Ricardian, 9 (1991-3), 259-65 + C. Ross, Edward IV
> (1974) + Itineraries [of] William Worcestre, ed. J. H. Harvey, OMT
> (1969) + K. B. McFarlane, 'The Lancastrian kings', Cambridge Medieval
> History, 8, ed. C. W. Previte-Orton and Z. N. Brooke (1936), 363-417 +
> CPR, 1446-61 + CEPR letters, 8.132
> Archives BL, letters relating to a truce between England and Burgundy,
> Add. Ch. 75479
> Likenesses painted glass window, Cirencester; repro. in S. Lysons, A
> collection of Gloucestershire antiquities (1804) · painted glass
window,
> Trinity Cam. [see illus.]
> Wealth at death under £4600 p.a. net: Johnson, Duke Richard, 7,
21-4
>
>
>
>
>
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Joan
---
author of This Time and Loyalty Binds Me, novels about Richard III in
the 21st-century
This Time was General Fiction Finalist of 2010 Next Generation Indie
Book Awards
website: http://www.joanszechtman.com/
blog: http://rtoaaa.blogspot.com/
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--- In , Christine Headley
<christinelheadley@...> wrote:
>
>
> I subscribe to the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography Life of the
Day.
>
> They usually choose people because it's their birthday - clearly not
the
> case this time - and I'm glad Richard Duke of York is having a turn.
>
> Best wishes
> Christine
>
>
> -------- Original Message --------
> Subject: A most successful failure?
> Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2011 07:00:00 +0100
> From: oxforddnb-lotd@...
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> To: ODNBLIFEOFTHEDAY-L@...
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>
> To read this Life of the Day complete with a picture of the subject,
> visit http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/lotw/2011-07-15
>
>
>
> Richard of York, third duke of York (1411-1460), magnate and claimant
> to the English throne, was the only son of Richard of Conisbrough,
> fourth earl of Cambridge (1385-1415), and Anne Mortimer (b. after
1388,
> d. before 1414), daughter of Roger (VII) Mortimer, fourth earl of
March.
> He was descended from Edward III through both parents, his father
being
> the son of that king's fourth son, Edmund of Langley, first duke of
> York, and his mother the great-granddaughter of Edward's second son,
> Lionel of Antwerp, duke of Clarence. It was this distinguished
ancestry
> that provided the basis for his explosive participation in the
troubled
> politics of the 1450s. In October 1460, after a decade of agitation
and
> intervention, he attempted to seize the throne on the grounds that his
> descent from Clarence made him rightful king in place of Henry VI,
who,
> like the other Lancastrian kings, was descended from Edward III's
third
> son, John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster. The attempt failed, and York
died
> a few months later at the battle of Wakefield, but the claim, of
course,
> lived on to provide the basis for Edward IV's succession in March
1461.
>
> Youth and inheritance
>
> Richard of York was born on 22 September 1411, to parents who had
> married in secret and were soon to be dead. His mother was gone within
a
> year or two; his father, who married again in 1414, was executed the
> following year when details of his plot to depose Henry V came to
light.
> Cambridge's plan to raise the north and (apparently) to put Edmund (V)
> Mortimer, earl of March, on the throne must have thrown his son's
> dynastic position into sharp relief: the young Richard's mother had
been
> the elder of March's sisters, which made the boy himself a possible
heir
> to the Mortimer-Clarence claim to the throne. On Cambridge's death he
> became a royal ward, and it is not altogether surprising that in March
> 1416 he was placed in the custody of the Lancastrians' leading gaoler,
> Sir Robert Waterton. Three years into his reign, however, Henry V was
> busy laying to rest the divisions of his father's time and Richard of
> York was destined for rehabilitation. He was protected from the
effects
> of his father's attainder and, on the death of his uncle Edward, duke
of
> York, at Agincourt, the boy was recognized to be his heir. Not long
> after Henry VI's accession York's wardship and marriage were sold to
> Ralph Neville, earl of Westmorland. At 3000 marks the price was a high
> one, but Neville's investment was amply repaid when, in January 1425,
> Edmund, earl of March, died childless, and York, as his nephew, became
> heir to the extensive Mortimer inheritance. At some stage in the
1420s,
> possibly as early as 1424, the young duke was married off to Cecily
> Neville (1415-1495), one of Westmorland's daughters with Joan
Beaufort.
> From the point of view of the Nevilles, who had married into most of
the
> leading magnate families of the day, it was a prestigious match that
> helped to confirm the family's growing pre-eminence; from the point of
> view of Henry VI's government, it was an ideal way to absorb a
> potentially dangerous figure by attaching him to some of the dynasty's
> staunchest supporters.
>
> Over the next few years York was drawn more closely into the circle
> around the young king. In 1426 he was knighted, and two years later he
> was appointed to take up residence in the royal household. In 1430
York
> took part in the king's coronation expedition to France. His retinue
was
> small, but he was handsomely rewarded for his involvement: over 1000
> marks by the summer of 1431. Soon after his return, and still a minor
> (though there appears to have been some uncertainty over this at the
> time), he was granted livery of his estates on 12 May 1432. At the
time
> both inheritances were encumbered with debts, dowers, and obligations,
> while the duchy of York was mainly in the hands of feoffees. By the
> summer of 1434, however, a series of financial settlements and the
> deaths of the two remaining dowagers had lifted the worst of these
> burdens, and the duke was free to enjoy his extensive patrimony
> undisturbed. The acquisition of his inheritance had cost him quite a
> lot, but he had received fair-even generous-treatment from the
> government. York's proximity to the king, both in blood and in person,
> and his links with the families of Neville and Beaufort had stood him
in
> good stead.
>
> Service in France
>
> In 1433 York was admitted to the Order of the Garter-a mark of favour,
a
> certificate of loyalty, and perhaps a token of martial expectations.
His
> first taste of military command was to be as successor to John, duke
of
> Bedford, in the lieutenancy of France, a post for which he was, in
many
> ways, the obvious candidate: the royal commission, dated 8 May 1436,
> recited the king's desire to see France ruled by 'some great prince of
> our blood' (Johnson, York, 226), and there was no one else who fitted
> the bill, apart from Humphrey, duke of Gloucester. York had agreed to
> serve in France as early as February 1436, but his army did not reach
> Harfleur until 7 June. Had it left England more promptly, it might
have
> been able to prevent the French reconquest of Paris and the
> Ile-de-France, which took place during the spring, though it is
> difficult to know where the blame for the expedition's dilatoriness
> should lie: York was also to be late leaving for his second tour of
duty
> in 1441, and the government was sceptical of his excuses on both
> occasions, but recruiting an army was no easy feat in the later stages
> of the Hundred Years' War, and delays were probably unavoidable. In
the
> event the French advance was halted by York's forces. The brilliant
> campaign of autumn 1436, which ensured the safety of Rouen, was
actually
> commanded by John, Lord Talbot, but Duke Richard too seems to have
> carried out some useful work, regaining most of the Pays de Caux after
> the rebellion of 1435, attending to the grievances of the Normans, and
> surveying the English garrisons. During both of York's lieutenancies
it
> seems to have been a policy of his to delegate the basic management of
> the war to leading captains: his retainer Talbot, as marshal, in 1436;
> his brother-in-law Richard Neville, earl of Salisbury, as
> lieutenant-general in 1437; and Talbot again as 'lieutenant-general
for
> the conduct of the war' (Pollard, 39) during York's second tour of
duty
> from 1441. Although the duke and his council retained overall control
of
> military policy throughout, it may be that York saw himself more as a
> viceroy, responsible for government as a whole, than as a warrior.
This
> is certainly implicit in the attention that he gave to matters of
> domestic governance in Normandy and the pays de conquete: it was for
his
> good rule of the duchy and for his genuine attempts to deal with the
> problems created by a declining military occupation that York would be
> remembered in France. His role in the fighting of the war was
> undistinguished, and a number of English chroniclers noted the fact.
>
> Faced with the imminent expiry of his indentures-though not of his
> lieutenancy, the term of which was indefinite-York sought permission
to
> return home in the spring of 1437. His successor was to be the earl of
> Warwick, and York was instructed to remain in Normandy until his
> arrival, which was delayed until the following November. It is
difficult
> to know whether the decision to replace York reflects disappointment
> with his performance or not: the duke may even have wished to stand
> down, possibly because of difficulties in extracting money from the
> Norman exchequer for the payment of his troops. In any event Warwick's
> service was soon cut short by his death in April 1439, and Henry VI's
> government found itself once again faced with the task of providing
for
> the rule of Lancastrian France. It was apparently as a compromise
> candidate that York emerged as the new lieutenant on 2 July 1440:
> Gloucester appears to have sought his own appointment, while Cardinal
> Beaufort, the regime's paymaster, probably pressed the claims of his
> nephew John Beaufort, earl of Somerset. York, however, was the most
> suitable choice for a post which now, more than ever, demanded a
> flexible, diplomatic, and authoritative holder: as the government
> pursued both peace and war with greater vigour than before, the duke
was
> sufficiently neutral, consultative, and grand to act effectively on
its
> behalf; he was also well connected with all parties, including the
> military establishment in France.
>
> On this occasion York demanded adequate funding and increased powers
> before he would accept the job: he went to France as a second Bedford,
> with all the powers that Duke John had enjoyed after 1432 and a
promise
> of £20,000 a year from the English exchequer to fund his troops.
Apart
> from these improved terms of service, however, the patterns of the
first
> lieutenancy were repeated. York left England late, not arriving in
> Normandy until the end of June 1441. He then moved speedily down the
> Seine to Pontoise where Talbot was struggling to lift Charles VII's
> siege, but this was to be his only military action in the three years
> before the truce of Tours. It was not a particularly impressive one:
if
> York had helped to secure Pontoise for a further few months, he may
also
> have frustrated a daring scheme of Talbot's that could have resulted
in
> the capture of the French king. Caution, it seems, got the better of
> York, and not for the last time in his career.
>
> Over the next few years the duke busied himself with matters of
> governance and diplomacy while the war effort in Normandy ground
slowly
> to a halt. In part this was because Charles VII had turned his
attention
> to the south-west, but it is clear that York's reluctance to engage
the
> French directly caused dissatisfaction in the English government and
it
> may help to explain why Cardinal Beaufort was able to engineer a major
> military command for his nephew John. The earl of Somerset's
expedition,
> planned from late 1442 and launched in the summer of 1443, involved a
> major diversion of men, funds, and authority away from York and the
> Norman theatre. Duke Richard dispatched an embassy to remonstrate with
> the English government in June 1443, but it had no effect, and the
> campaign itself added injury to insult: Somerset's attack on Brittany
> and the duke of Alencon's stronghold of La Guerche disrupted York's
> attempts, conducted during 1442-3, to involve the English in an
alliance
> of French princes. In the light of all this it is hardly surprising
> that, following the expedition's failure, the government seems to have
> felt the need to appease York: tallies for the payments due at
> Michaelmas 1443 arrived in February 1444 and, later in that year, the
> duke was given a major apanage in southern Normandy, while earldoms
> (and, in Edmund's case, lands) were granted to his eldest sons. After
> this no more of York's wages were paid until 1446, but at least the
> truce contracted in May 1444 reduced his expenses and removed the need
> for further military activity. In September 1445 York returned to
> England: his indentures were about to expire, parliament was in
session,
> and-rather ironically, given the government's own failures in this
> regard-his management of Norman finances was under investigation.
>
> York and English politics before 1450
>
> It now seems clear that Cardinal Beaufort, William de la Pole, earl of
> Suffolk, and the other leading councillors and courtiers who, in the
> first instance, managed Henry VI's authority in the 1430s and 1440s
> intended Richard of York to be a pillar of the Lancastrian regime.
This
> did not mean that the already wealthy duke was to be showered with
> gifts, nor did it mean that he was to be given a formal role in the
> government of England. York was not, for example, appointed to the
> re-established council in November 1437, but nothing should be
inferred
> from this: at twenty-six the duke would have been considered rather
> youthful for what was in any case a rather anomalous role; exclusion
> from the council would scarcely have excluded him from influence; and
it
> is likely that already the expectation was that his service to the
crown
> would be overseas, at least while he was of military age. It is not
> known what part, if any, York played in the politics of 1437-41,
during
> which time he was in England and Henry VI, somewhat uncertainly, came
of
> age. There is no reason to suppose that he supported the moves of
> Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, against Cardinal Beaufort in 1439-40,
> despite Gloucester's suggestion that York and other lords had been
> wrongfully kept out of power; nor should it be assumed that he was
> opposed to the release of the duke of Orleans. He seems to have kept a
> low profile at this time, participating in a scheme to restore order
in
> Wales in 1437-8, sharing in the custody of the Beauchamp wardship in
> 1439, and touring his estates. When, in early 1441, the 'longe
> bareynesse' of his marriage was suddenly ended and a son born, York
> named him Henry (Bokenham's Legenden, 273). This demonstration of
> dynastic loyalty earned a gift of £100 worth of jewels from the
grateful
> king: the restoration of the heir of Cambridge and Mortimer must have
> seemed to be complete.
>
> As lieutenant of France for the second time York became embroiled in
the
> government's various diplomatic initiatives, including the moves
> associated with the truce of Tours. It has often been assumed that
Duke
> Richard was hostile to the peace negotiations of the 1440s, but there
is
> absolutely no evidence for this. While the confusions of policy in the
> early years of the decade must have been exasperating for anyone
charged
> with responsibility for the defence of Lancastrian France, there is
> nothing to suggest that York preferred war to diplomacy as a means of
> preserving English interests. As the plan to seek a truce with Charles
> VII and a marriage alliance with the house of Anjou emerged as the
> central plank of royal policy in 1444, York seems to have given it his
> full support. In the new spirit of Anglo-French amity, for example, he
> sent forces to assist the dauphin's campaign in Alsace in the summer
of
> 1444. The following year, and possibly in response to promptings from
> the government, he opened negotiations for a marriage between his
eldest
> son (now Edward of Rouen-the future Edward IV-born on 28 April 1442)
and
> one of the French king's daughters. The duke may even have been
> sympathetic to the government's plans to surrender Maine, which
> proceeded alongside the truce negotiations and formed an integral part
> of the alliance policy. Because of the postures that York struck after
> 1450 historians have tended to assume that he was opposed to this
> notorious scheme, but that is by no means clear. It is very likely
that
> he knew what was planned by the end of 1445 (if not earlier, since he
> met Suffolk's embassy as it travelled through Normandy in 1444) and he
> was certainly involved in the arrangements for compensating Maine's
> English landholders in 1447. Interestingly York was never explicitly
to
> condemn the handover of the territory, although its loss was certainly
a
> prominent feature of popular and parliamentary criticism of William de
> la Pole, by then duke of Suffolk, Edmund Beaufort, duke of Somerset,
and
> the other so-called 'traitors' of 1450.
>
> It is from the period following his return to England in 1445 that
> York's alienation from Henry VI's ministers is often supposed to have
> dated. The duke found himself accused of mishandling the funds he had
> been paid for the defence of Normandy, and his chief accuser, it
> appeared, was a central figure in the government, Adam Moleyns, bishop
> of Chichester. York had returned to England confident of reappointment
> to the French lieutenancy, but he was obliged to wait for more than a
> year and then to see the office go to Edmund Beaufort instead. It used
> to be thought that because of his alleged hostility to the peace
policy,
> and his putatively close links to the duke of Gloucester (who died
> mysteriously in 1447), Duke Richard was persona non grata with
Suffolk's
> regime: his appointment to the lieutenancy of Ireland on 30 July 1447
> has sometimes been seen as a form of exile, the government's hope
being
> that, like the earls of March, his predecessors, he would go there and
die.
>
> However, events thus far do not support this interpretation. York was
> certainly dismayed by the rumours concerning his performance in
> Normandy, but he was explicitly vindicated by king and lords both in
and
> outside the parliament of 1445-6; it is not even known that Moleyns
had
> made the accusations York claimed, only that the duke saw in a public
> attack on the bishop the opportunity to clear his own name. Similarly,
> while York was probably disappointed not to regain the lieutenancy of
> France, too much should not be made of this: the lieutenancy of
Ireland,
> which he was granted in return, was a post that his most distinguished
> ancestors (notably Clarence himself) had held; it bestowed upon him
> almost sovereign powers in the island; and it gave him the opportunity
> to combine military service with the exploitation of his interests as
an
> Irish landlord. Finally, since the terms of his commission permitted
him
> to appoint a deputy and return to England, it cannot be seen as a form
> of banishment. In some ways, indeed, 1446 and 1447 saw York more
closely
> involved in the governing regime than he had ever been: in October
1446
> he was granted the abbey and town of Waltham because he 'will come
often
> to London for the king's business and his own' (CPR, 1446-52, 43);
over
> the next year he attended a number of council meetings and was named
as
> a witness to more than three-quarters of the charters issued from 1446
> to 1448; during 1447-9 he was added to the peace commissions of eleven
> counties beyond those to which he had been named at his inheritance
(and
> in some cases beyond the scope of his landholdings); and finally,
almost
> for the first time, he began to enjoy the kind of rewards more
commonly
> bestowed on courtiers-most notably, perhaps, the wardship and marriage
> of the Holland heir (Henry) and a series of lands and offices once
held
> by Gloucester. This last detail is a reminder that there was almost
> nothing to link York with Duke Humphrey in the latter's lifetime: in
no
> sense can York be considered his supporter, and it is not improbable
> that, like other members of the nobility, he witnessed Gloucester's
> destruction at the Bury parliament and, tacitly at least, assented to
it.
>
> When he finally left for Ireland, in June 1449, Duke Richard did so as
a
> loyal and well-regarded member of the Lancastrian establishment. If he
> had been less involved in affairs during the preceding year or so,
this
> may well have been at his own choice. Many of the nobility seem to
have
> withdrawn from the court during 1448 as the government's troubles
began
> to mount. York cannot have wished to be associated with the
humiliating
> surrender of Le Mans in March 1448 and he may well have feared the
> consequences of the extraordinary coup at Fougeres. A tour of duty in
> Ireland must have appeared an attractive alternative. During his
> fourteen months in the province York scored a series of easy (if
> short-lived) victories, receiving the submission of most of the
island's
> leaders and campaigning effectively in Wicklow. At the Drogheda
> parliament of April 1450 he followed the lead of the Commons at
> Westminster by introducing an Act of Resumption. Like the lieutenant
of
> France he was short of money, and this limited his achievements, but
the
> contrast between this vigorous performance and the demoralizing stasis
> of Somerset's rule in France must have impressed itself upon
contemporaries.
>
> Estates and connections
>
> By the mid-1430s, when he had gained full control over his estates,
York
> was the richest and most extensive landowner among the king's
subjects.
> Estimates of his wealth have varied between £2874 and £5800
net, but the
> most recent and reliable estimate suggests that his estates in England
> and Wales were worth about £4000 a year (net) when he came into
them,
> and that his exchequer annuities yielded an average of £600 a
year.
> York's lands were scattered through England and the march of Wales,
with
> notable concentrations in the West Riding of Yorkshire; in
Lincolnshire
> and Northamptonshire; in Dorset and Somerset; in Herefordshire,
> Shropshire, and the middle march of Wales; and in the centre of East
> Anglia along the border of Norfolk and Suffolk. Beyond this he held
the
> earldom of Ulster and the lordships of Connacht and Trim, although
only
> the last of these Irish estates is likely to have yielded York any
real
> influence or income.
>
> The possession of such vast holdings shaped York's activities as a
lord:
> like John of Gaunt before him he was a truly national figure, with
> interests so widespread and diverse that it was difficult for him to
> exert the kind of local authority typical of later medieval magnates.
He
> had no real 'country'-no county-sized area of concentrated influence
> where local gentlemen might turn first of all to him for lordship-and
> this helped to determine both the nature of his affinity and the role
> that he and it were to play in the politics of the realm. York's
> following, like Gaunt's or indeed the king's, was a disparate group of
> often important men, many of whom had their own local allegiances and
> whose links with York were forged mainly through military service and
> the tenure of estate or household office. In part, of course, this
> pattern was a consequence of the duke's long minority and his
prolonged
> service in France: many of the servants of the duchy of York had
melted
> away in the 1420s into Gloucester's service, for example; while Duke
> Richard's appointment as Bedford's successor in Normandy presented him
> with a ready-made following looking for a lord. A spry comment from an
> anti-Yorkist chronicler has promoted the suggestion that York was
unduly
> influenced by the men who gathered round him in Normandy-in
particular,
> by Sir William Oldhall, who was one of York's most reliable agents
> during the 1450s-but there is little to support this notion,
> particularly when the duke's involvement in the peace policy of the
> mid-1440s is taken into account. On the contrary, it seems likely that
> York's high status, his extensive interests, and his relative
> disengagement from the affairs of any particular locality beyond his
> estates meant that he was exposed to a wide array of different voices.
> If anyone besides the king and his ministers was likely to hear the
> counsel of the realm, it was surely York, who numbered lords such as
> Talbot, Ralph Cromwell, and Thomas Scales among his councillors, but
> also enjoyed links with exchequer clerks, lawyers, the widows of
Norman
> soldiers, and local worthies from all parts of the country. The
> maintenance of this kind of connection may have cost York dear-as much
> as £1300 a year, according to one recent estimate-but it seems
that his
> money was well spent. Despite his inability to offer really consistent
> local support, he was apparently able to co-ordinate the raising of
> large retinues throughout the 1450s. If some of his servants kept away
> from the duke's more controversial ventures, a sizeable and
prestigious
> core remained loyal to the end.
>
> The making of York's rebellion
>
> The last and best-known period in York's political life began in
> September 1450, when he suddenly returned from Ireland and took up the
> common cry for the traitors surrounding the king to be brought to
> justice. This was a significant change of political direction for the
> duke, and one that shaped the remainder of his career, but the reasons
> for it are not immediately obvious. Modern historians have mostly
> rejected the traditional interpretation, which laid stress on York's
> dynastic interests and saw his participation in the popular ferments
of
> the 1450s as a device for seizing the crown. Instead, the search has
> been for the causes of personal grievance on Duke Richard's part: was
he
> moved to anger, or even desperation, by the government's enormous
debts
> to him? Was he incensed by the new pre-eminence of Edmund Beaufort,
duke
> of Somerset, the man who had so recently lost France? Did he fear for
> his own position, as an old rival took control of Henry VI's
government?
> Alternatively, was York simply an opportunist, moving (typically late)
> to exploit the regime's difficulties, but without any fixed idea of
> where his dissidence might take him?
>
> One difficulty in reaching any conclusions lies in trying to establish
> which elements of York's programme, as this slowly unfolded, were
> intentional, and intended from the start. It is certainly unlikely
that
> the duke was seeking to gain the throne in 1450: previous legitimists
> had soon revealed their desire to improve the realm by changing the
> king, but York was not to assert his Mortimer-Clarence claim until
1460,
> after ten years of activism explicitly devoted to other ends. Even in
> that year, moreover, his move was greeted with hostility, and it seems
> reasonable to suggest that the duke would have known all along that
this
> was a likely reaction and would have trimmed his policy accordingly.
It
> is possible that, in 1450, York was concerned to secure recognition as
> heir presumptive to Henry VI: the king was still without a child and
> there was a (somewhat faint) possibility of dynastic competition from
> the house of Beaufort. Like most noblemen York took an active interest
> in the claims and titles he possessed-in 1445 he had sought
information
> on his interest in the throne of Castile and in 1451 an agent of his
was
> to argue in parliament that the duke should be named as heir
> apparent-but, at best, this can provide only a partial explanation for
> his actions in 1450.
>
> As far as personal grievances are concerned, meanwhile, it is
difficult
> to see what grounds York had for complaint. That the duke was part of
> the establishment in the 1440s has already been illustrated.
Financially
> he had fared no worse than any of Henry VI's other major accountants:
> indeed, somewhat remarkably, given the state of royal finances, he
> received £1200 from the crown at the end of 1449, and even in May
1450
> efforts were being made to find him money. He may have decided to
return
> to England to seek funds-a letter to Salisbury, written in June 1450,
> suggests that he feared serious losses in Ireland unless he received
> further payments-but this is rather a different matter from acting on
a
> sense of grievance, and if seeking money was York's initial aim, it
was
> soon overwhelmed by other purposes.
>
> What, finally, of York's famous antagonism towards Somerset: was this
> the motivation for his assault on the king's ministers? The problem
here
> is one of disentangling the personal feud between the two men from the
> relative positions in which a wider politics had placed them: did York
> attack the government because it contained Somerset, or did he attack
> Somerset because he was the leader of the government? It is certainly
> possible to find grounds for animosity between the two men: Beaufort's
> performance in the last years of the war was undistinguished to say
the
> least, and York may have thought that he himself could have achieved
> more; it has recently been suggested, moreover, that the lieutenant's
> casual surrender of Rouen would particularly have rankled with Duke
> Richard, since he had continued to be its captain. At the same time,
> however, it is clear that once York had made his inflammatory moves of
> September 1450 (and possibly even before then), he and Somerset were
> destined to be at odds: Duke Richard's political standing came quickly
> to depend on the argument that the government was run by traitors, and
a
> large part of his justification for taking up arms in 1450, 1452, and
> 1455 was that the enmity of leading ministers obliged him to take
action
> to defend himself; Duke Edmund, on the other hand, was not unjustified
> in regarding much of York's behaviour as threatening, both to himself
> and to the order of the realm; if he sought, in 1450, in 1452-3, and
in
> 1455, to deal with the problem by repression instead of indulgence, it
> was an understandable approach. Politics, as much as personality and
> private interest, determined the conflict between York and Somerset.
>
> Pursuing this further, it may be suggested that it was in the
> extraordinary politics of 1450 that the most likely reasons for York's
> sudden attack on the government are to be found. As Normandy fell to
the
> French and the king's bankruptcy was exposed in parliament, the
> authority of Henry VI's ministers disintegrated. MPs and more lowly
> members of society appeared to be united in the belief that the king
had
> been betrayed by a self-serving clique who had pillaged his
possessions
> in England and surrendered those in France. If Suffolk's trial and
> murder had removed the leader of the gang, the rest remained in
> positions of power, and until the king and the 'true lords' took
action
> against them, there could be no justice or order in the realm. This
> judgement on the recent past dominated public life in England between
> 1449 and 1451, and it continued to exert a certain influence over the
> public imagination thereafter. York, like other members of the
nobility,
> must have known that in certain ways it was wide of the mark, but this
> did not mean that it could be ignored. In particular, in fact, it
could
> not be ignored by York, who had already been identified by some of the
> government's critics as the figure most likely to visit retribution
upon
> the 'traitors'. This appears to be the explanation for the rough
> reception that York and his men received at their landing in north
Wales
> in September: local agents of the royal household, and possibly their
> commanders at the centre, had become alarmed about the duke's
> intentions. It was at this point, perhaps, and not in 1447, that 'by
> treating [the duke] as an enemy the court had made him one'
(McFarlane,
> 405): if both the king's ministers and his subjects were going to cast
> York as the agent of justice, he might as well fulfil their
> expectations. Certainly, the moment must have seemed ripe for someone
to
> take drastic action: the king's officers could not govern without
public
> confidence, and it may have appeared that the removal of some of the
> discredited men-not least, perhaps, the duke of Somerset-was the best
> way to restore it.
>
> Beyond all this, it might be added that, even if the government had
not
> moved against him in 1450, everything in York's make-up would have
given
> him the sense that he was the man to restore the situation. He was the
> greatest prince of the royal blood, head and shoulders above other
> lords, the natural successor to Bedford and Gloucester in the
protection
> of Henry VI's interests. He had already acted as the king's viceroy in
> France and Ireland; why not in England too? What, if anything, York
knew
> of the deeds of men like Gaunt and Woodstock (or those of Montfort and
> Lancaster), whose status was much the same as his and whose actions
were
> to prefigure his own, is not known; but one model of proper noble
> service had been made available to him when, probably in 1445, York
was
> presented with an elegantly decorated translation of Claudian's life
of
> the consul Stilicho. It was an account of how the people of Rome and
> other nations implored this virtuous prince to accept the office of
> consul and restore good government to a city torn apart by the evil
> advisers of a child emperor. Its translator had invited York to 'marke
> stilicoes life' ('Mittelenglische Claudian-Ubersetzung', 256): in
1450
> the moment had arrived when he might put this teaching to good use.
>
> York and the politics of the 1450s
>
> It was with a volley of bills and open letters addressed to the king
> that York returned to English political life in September 1450. The
> first of these sought to establish the duke's loyalty; the second
> advertised his intention to seek justice against his accusers; but it
> was the third that was truly controversial-it drew the king's
attention
> to the universal complaint that justice was not being done to those
who
> broke the king's law with impunity (in particular, the so-called
> 'traitors'), and offered York's services in bringing the guilty to
book.
> This was an open defiance of the government's authority, since the
> essence of the 'traitors' idea was that it was the men about the king
> who were most of all responsible for the disasters that had befallen
the
> realm. As far as York was concerned, this meant that a true subject
was
> obliged to act against the inner circle of authority in order to
fulfil
> the terms of his allegiance to king and realm, and this explains the
> duke's many affirmations of loyalty to King Henry: it was the
essential
> justification for actions that, on the face of it, appeared disloyal.
> Under normal circumstances, of course, attempts to separate a king's
> chosen counsellors and servants from the ruler himself were unlikely
to
> succeed: defiance of royal agents easily shaded into defiance of the
> king, and that was treason. As York and all the rest of the nobility
> knew, however, these circumstances were not normal: Henry VI had shown
> no more discernment than a child in the government of his realm; his
> ministers were virtually self-appointed, and the policies pursued
during
> the 1420s, 1430s, and 1440s were essentially theirs. If this makes
> nonsense of one aspect of the 'traitors' thesis, it exposes the truth
of
> another aspect: the government was not in any real sense the vehicle
of
> the king's will, and thus defiance of it was not treason; the regime
> could legitimately be reshaped, and, with large sections of the public
> arguing that it should be, York's actions had a certain justice in
them.
> In reality he was appealing not to the king with these manifestos, but
> to the Lords and to the wider public: his plea was that those who were
> less compromised by the disasters of 1449-50 must abandon those who
were
> more immediately responsible; a new government, in which the duke was
to
> play a more prominent role, must be established.
>
> Not surprisingly York's demands fell on deaf ears. The king's circle
saw
> little reason for a general blood-letting, and the nobility, who had
> begun to lend support to the beleaguered regime as the crisis mounted,
> appear to have taken a similar view. In a public reply to York's
bills,
> his offers of assistance were politely rebuffed, and the duke left
> London to prepare for the parliament summoned to meet in November
1450.
> When it gathered on the 6th, MPs demonstrated their continuing
> enthusiasm for reform by electing Oldhall, York's chamberlain, as
> speaker and loudly calling for the traitors to be brought to justice.
> When the duke himself arrived, with sword borne upright before him and
a
> large army at his back, the initiative was his: Somerset was promptly
> imprisoned and the Lords waited to see what would happen next. What
> followed was in part a demonstration of Duke Richard's hesitancy and
> conservatism, and in part a reflection of the constraints of his
> position. Elements of the Commons' programme were put into effect, but
> the duke made no attempt to alter the institutional framework of
Henry's
> government, and the result was that, during the Christmas recess,
> authority drifted back to the king and his household, Somerset was
> released, and the Lords, many of whom had flirted with York while he
was
> in the ascendant, resumed their former obedience. During the sessions
of
> the parliament in 1451 York's power waned, and Thomas Younge's
notorious
> attempt to have him recognized as heir apparent must have seemed to
many
> an act of desperation. Why had York not done more to secure himself
> during his brief ascendancy? It is not, of course, clear what he
wanted:
> if only the restoration of order, then this was being achieved without
> his help; if a role for himself in the government, then his actions
had
> made this unthinkable unless the king himself were to be altogether
> displaced-the men of Henry's household, who effectively disposed of
> royal power, were hardly going to welcome a man who had posed as their
> nemesis. What York had done, in effect, was to go too far without
going
> far enough. Perhaps he should have cut his losses and risked a direct
> assault on the throne; but such a move was almost certain to fail. The
> duke had cast himself as the true liegeman of Henry VI: any deviation
> from this role was sure to be seen as the grossest kind of betrayal;
> York had many potential supporters, but-apart, perhaps, from his own
> servants-their support was for his public, not his private, interests.
>
> It has been worth looking at the events of 1450 in some detail,
because
> for the next two years Duke Richard's options were very largely shaped
> by what had happened in that year. He could not be secure while
Somerset
> and the household retained both control of the king and the support of
> the Lords, yet there was little he could do to improve his lot. Moves
> against Oldhall were under way by the end of 1451, and when, in
January
> 1452, York reacted publicly against them and against their
implications
> for himself, he was thinly supported. Apart from the duke's own men
only
> the malcontent Thomas Courtenay, earl of Devon, and his crony Lord
> Cobham were persuaded to join the rising that attempted to repeat the
> coup of 1450: the rest of the nobility gathered around the king and
> Somerset, and York was forced to capitulate at Dartford in early
March.
> His failure left him worse off than before. He was obliged to swear a
> humiliating oath of submission, his supporters and tenants were
harried
> by judicial commissions, and his attempts to discredit Somerset were
> treated as part and parcel of a private quarrel. As the common people
> were reduced to order and the government enjoyed the unfamiliar taste
of
> victory in Gascony, it seemed that York's political career was at an
> end: never again would he be able to take his proper place in the
> Lancastrian establishment.
>
> At this point, however, fate combined with the contradictions of Henry
> VI's regime to bestow new opportunities upon Duke Richard. In the
summer
> of 1453 Somerset's governing consensus suddenly collapsed, as the
> victories in Gascony were reversed, the king lost his mind, and war
> broke out in the north between the Nevilles and the Percys. In the
> resulting crisis York was the only person of sufficient stature to
> restore the situation, and it must be this factor, above all, that
> explains the decision of a non-partisan group of councillors to summon
> him to London in October 1453, and the agreement in parliament to
> appoint him protector and defender of the realm on 27 March 1454. Here
> was a means for York to wrest control of government from Somerset and
> the king's household men without bringing his loyalty to Henry VI into
> question; and here was a means for the rest of political society to
> contain the powerful duke and to create an effective government
without
> the kind of sacrifices that had been demanded in 1450. York certainly
> did his part: he went to London full of emollient promises to attend
the
> council and do all 'that sholde or might be to the welfare of the king
> and of his subgettes' (CPR, 1452-61, 143); he made no attacks on
> Somerset or other sometime 'traitors' (though his ally, Norfolk, did);
> and, on taking up the post of protector, he committed himself to rule
> consultatively and representatively with the Lords. During the
> succeeding months York made serious and well-founded attempts to
pacify
> the disputes in the north and north midlands, and he enjoyed some
> success. Making genuine efforts to consult widely, he demonstrated the
> same statesmanlike qualities that had marked his management of France
> and Ireland: 'for a whole year', wrote one chronicler, 'he governed
the
> whole realm of England most nobly and in the best way' ('Benet's
> chronicle', 212). There were certainly limits to his achievement, and
> his tenure of office was to be brought to an abrupt halt in February
> 1455, but the duke's performance may have prompted many of his peers
to
> look more sympathetically at his claims in the years to come.
>
> Unfortunately, however, the moulds of politics were changing in these
> years, and the broad unity that had so long been preserved among the
> nobility was breaking down. The deterioration of order in the
> localities, which had become so dramatic and extensive by 1453, was
now
> combined with the emergence of a more aggressive Lancastrian
dynasticism
> to promote significant divisions among the elite. These had begun to
> emerge even before York's protectorate: one of the reasons why it had
> taken so long to arrange the duke's appointment was that a substantial
> group of lords had grouped themselves around the queen, Margaret of
> Anjou, who-since the birth of her son Edward in October 1453-was
> attempting to secure a regency for herself. In the winter of 1453-4,
> indeed, civil war looked a distinct possibility. It was held off by
> York's readiness to make explicit his submission to the dynastic
claims
> of the new prince, and by the agreement of all but the most extreme
> figures to join a broadly based regime under the duke's headship. When
> Henry VI recovered his sanity, however, at Christmas 1454, those in
the
> household and the north who had opposed the protectorate seized the
> opportunity to assert their interests. York was removed from office on
9
> February 1455, and by early March a more hard-faced government was
> taking steps against the duke. The fact that the Neville earls of
> Warwick and Salisbury also fell under attack at this time reveals the
> factional and divisive aims of those in control: although the
government
> proceeded with the language of treason and obedience, its narrowing
base
> and its sponsorship of conflict began to undermine its claims to such
> public goods; when York and the Nevilles confronted the king,
Somerset,
> and the Percys at St Albans on 22 May 1455, there was a broad
> equivalence between the two sides, and the first blows of a civil war
> were struck.
>
> The Yorkist victory, however, brought this war to a rapid halt. Just
as
> he had done in the early 1450s, the duke submitted to the king and
> attempted to rebuild unity. This was to remain his posture and that of
> his allies right up to the disasters of 1459. York was certainly
> prepared to strain his allegiance to its very limits-securing
> appointment to a second protectorate on 15 November 1455 and depriving
> the king of personal authority a week later-but he would not cross the
> bounds to an outright repudiation of Henry VI's sovereignty. As a
> consequence his pre-eminence remained insecure. His protectorate was
> soon terminated (on 25 February 1456) when parliamentary pressure for
a
> resumption weakened his support among the Lords, but the aim of
> preserving unity, or oonhede, among the nobility lingered on for some
> years and ensured that if York was not to be admitted to any special
> power, he was not to be destroyed either. It seems likely that,
provided
> he behaved himself, most of the peerage had some respect for the duke.
> Pressure from Queen Margaret and her growing band of partisans meant
> that he was obliged to repeat his submission of 1452 on a number of
> occasions between 1456 and 1459, but he was confirmed in possession of
> the lieutenancy of Ireland, and even seems to have been able to direct
> policy for a time in the wake of the 'loveday' settlement of 1458.
Only
> in 1459 did the bulk of the Lords finally accept the case for war
> against the duke, and then the fault-lines of 1453-4 and 1455 were
> recreated and York received the support of the Nevilles. Rather as at
St
> Albans, York, Warwick, and Salisbury revived the case that evil
> counsellors around the king were destroying the common weal of the
realm
> and threatening their own security. On this occasion, however, their
> propaganda cut no ice: finding most of the nobility in arms against
them
> at Ludford Bridge (near Ludlow, Shropshire) and deserted by a part of
> the army, York and his allies fled the field during the night of 12-13
> October 1459.
>
> Exile, return, and death
>
> The duke and his second son, Edmund, earl of Rutland, spent the next
> eleven months in Ireland, attempting to gain the men and money for an
> armed return to England, where the duke's estates were in royal hands
as
> a result of his attainder at the Coventry parliament (about the end of
> November 1459). His younger children, including George, were all
placed
> in the custody of the duchess of Buckingham. An incidental result of
> York's efforts was the famous Drogheda parliament of 8 February 1460,
in
> which the Anglo-Irish establishment obtained recognition as a distinct
> political community, separate from England, ruled by its own laws and
> financed by its own currency. In return for these concessions York
> gained resources, protection for his person, and an extensive army of
> archers, which he must have intended to take to England. Plans for a
> co-ordinated invasion of the mainland were apparently made during a
> conference with Warwick at Waterford in the spring of 1460, and the
> duke's Neville allies, accompanied by his eldest son, Edward of March,
> duly landed in Kent in June professing loyalty to Henry VI and
> protesting about the misgovernment of the realm. With startling
success,
> they won support in London and the south-east and proceeded to defeat
> the royal army at Northampton on 10 July, submitting to the king at
the
> battle's end. Over the next few weeks March and the Nevilles began to
> secure the realm and to await York's return, which finally occurred
near
> Chester on or about 9 September 1460.
>
> Much about the next few weeks is obscure: it is not known why it took
> York so long to join his allies on the mainland; it is not known when
he
> began so famously to assert his claim to the throne (13 September is
the
> first date for which a plausible case can be made); it is not known
> whether or not the initiative had been agreed, or even discussed, with
> the Nevilles. It seems clear that there was no option for York but to
> attempt to make himself king: all other avenues, as has been shown,
led
> nowhere; the duke could neither secure himself nor restore political
> order without taking the drastic step from which he had so far shrunk;
> and it may have seemed that by 1460 the polity of Henry VI was
> sufficiently dislocated to permit a direct assault on the king.
> Unfortunately for the duke, however, his own options were different
from
> those of his allies, even his sons. These men had gained support on
the
> old plea of reforming Henry VI's government. They had recently made
> their loyalty to the king explicit. As the managers of a large and
> diverse alliance, they could not easily abandon what they had
promised,
> and it seems clear that the message from the London elite, who played
an
> important role in the frantic politics of 1459-61, was that a
deposition
> could not be tolerated. York marched into London, seized the king, and
> entered parliament on 10 October, announcing that he intended 'to
> challenge his right' to the crown (Johnson, York, 214). The Lords'
> response was unpromising: they went into conclave at Blackfriars and
> sent the young earl of March to persuade his father to accept a
> negotiated settlement. By 13 October York had been brought to abandon
> his plans for an immediate coronation, and a few days later he
submitted
> his claim for discussion in parliament. An accord emerged on 31
October,
> and its central feature was to leave Henry VI on the throne, while
> settling the succession on York and his sons. It is possible that even
> after this York attempted to get his way by inducing Henry to
abdicate.
> He must have realized that, like the treaty of Troyes on which it was
> apparently based, the accord promised immediate war with the
> disinherited heir. In any event, the king was moved to safety and the
> duke was obliged to accept the terms agreed in October, at least for
the
> time being. Acting more or less as protector he marched north in early
> December to deal with the forces of the prince of Wales and Queen
> Margaret, which had regrouped in Yorkshire after the defeat at
> Northampton. Venturing forth from his castle at Sandal on 30 December
> 1460, in what may have been an uncharacteristic attempt to surprise
his
> enemy, York was set upon by an unexpectedly large Lancastrian force.
In
> the ensuing battle of Wakefield, he and his second son, Edmund of
> Rutland, were killed. As a macabre riposte to Duke Richard's recent
> pretensions, his head was severed from his body and displayed on the
> walls of York bearing a paper crown.
>
> So ended the life of this curious figure, who, having played safe in
the
> prime of his years, abruptly changed tack at the age of thirty-nine,
> pursuing ever more ambitious and dangerous policies until, with
victory
> almost in his grasp, he fell on an ill-chosen battlefield. Duke
Richard
> was the true founder of the royal house of York, but despite a career
> that a recent biographer has described as 'the most successful failure
> of the middle ages' (Johnson, 'Political career', abstract), he has
> inspired little interest and even less sympathy among historians.
> Notwithstanding his many claims to be acting for the 'common weal' of
> the realm, York has usually been presented as a somewhat colourless
> bungler: all along, it seems, he wanted power, but he could not decide
> how far to go until the last minute, whereupon-fatally-he went too
far.
> In 1964 B. Wilkinson set the tone for most modern accounts of the
duke's
> career with his judgement that 'it would be folly to make a statesman
> out of this fifteenth-century worldling' (Wilkinson, 88). This view
> seems unfairly harsh: like many of his peers, his instincts were to
make
> the best of things in Henry VI's England, a world in which there were
no
> easy answers. York's opportunities were closely circumscribed and his
> intentions in opposing Henry VI's government are far from clear; in
fact
> there may be a case for seeing him more as the victim of circumstances
> than as their creator. His cautiousness, if ultimately unproductive,
was
> justified by the sheer impropriety of opposition to the government. On
> the other hand, the recklessness that he demonstrated in 1450, 1452,
> 1455, 1459, and 1460 was also justified: sometimes by its results;
> always by the need to do something to restore the authority that the
> king, in his feebleness, had frittered away. In medieval England,
> however, the restoration of authority could only be carried out from
the
> throne. York's final and most destructive venture was thus his
> best-conceived one, but it is easy to see why it has won him few
plaudits.
>
> John Watts
>
> Sources P. A. Johnson, Duke Richard of York, 1411-1460 (1988) + T. B.
> Pugh, 'Richard Plantagenet (1411-60), duke of York, as the king's
> lieutenant in France and Ireland', Aspects of medieval government and
> society: essays presented to J. R. Lander, ed. J. G. Rowe (1986),
107-41
> + J. Watts, Henry VI and the politics of kingship (1996) + R. A.
> Griffiths, The reign of King Henry VI: the exercise of royal
authority,
> 1422-1461 (1981) + Chancery records + J. T. Rosenthal, 'The estates
and
> finances of Richard, duke of York, 1411-1460', Studies in Medieval and
> Renaissance History, 2 (1965), 117-204 + G. L. Harriss, Cardinal
> Beaufort: a study of Lancastrian ascendancy and decline (1988) + A. J.
> Pollard, John Talbot and the war in France, 1427-1453, Royal
Historical
> Society Studies in History, 35 (1983) + C. T. Allmand, Lancastrian
> Normandy, 1415-1450 (1983) + M. K. Jones, 'Somerset, York and the Wars
> of the Roses', EngHR, 104 (1989), 285-307 + R. A. Griffiths, 'Duke
> Richard of York's intentions in 1450 and the origins of the Wars of
the
> Roses', Journal of Medieval History, 1 (1975), 187-209 + M. L.
Kekewich
> and others, eds., The politics of fifteenth-century England: John
Vale's
> book (1995) + J. L. Watts, 'De consulatu Stiliconis: texts and
politics
> in the reign of Henry VI', Journal of Medieval History, 16 (1990),
> 251-66 + J. M. W. Bean, 'The financial position of Richard, duke of
> York', War and government in the middle ages, ed. J. Gillingham and J.
> C. Holt (1984), 182-98 + T. B. Pugh, Henry V and the Southampton plot
of
> 1415, Southampton RS, 30 (1988) + A. J. Otway-Ruthven, A history of
> medieval Ireland (1968) + 'John Benet's chronicle for the years 1400
to
> 1462', ed. G. L. Harriss and M. A. Harriss, Camden miscellany, XXIV,
CS,
> 4th ser., 9 (1972) + E. Flugel, 'Eine mittelenglische
> Claudian-Ubersetzung (1445)', Anglia, 28 (1905), 255-99 + P. A.
Johnson,
> 'The political career of Richard, duke of York, to 1456', DPhil diss.,
> U. Oxf., 1981 + B. Wilkinson, Constitutional history of England in the
> fifteenth century (1399-1485) (1964) + Osbern Bokenam's Legenden, ed.
C.
> Horstmann (Heilbronn, 1883) + 'William Gregory's chronicle of London',
> The historical collections of a citizen of London in the fifteenth
> century, ed. J. Gairdner, CS, new ser., 17 (1876) + K. Dockray, 'The
> battle of Wakefield and the Wars of the Roses', The Ricardian, 9
> (1991-3), 238-58 + R. Knowles, 'The battle of Wakefield: the
> topography', The Ricardian, 9 (1991-3), 259-65 + C. Ross, Edward IV
> (1974) + Itineraries [of] William Worcestre, ed. J. H. Harvey, OMT
> (1969) + K. B. McFarlane, 'The Lancastrian kings', Cambridge Medieval
> History, 8, ed. C. W. Previte-Orton and Z. N. Brooke (1936), 363-417 +
> CPR, 1446-61 + CEPR letters, 8.132
> Archives BL, letters relating to a truce between England and Burgundy,
> Add. Ch. 75479
> Likenesses painted glass window, Cirencester; repro. in S. Lysons, A
> collection of Gloucestershire antiquities (1804) · painted glass
window,
> Trinity Cam. [see illus.]
> Wealth at death under £4600 p.a. net: Johnson, Duke Richard, 7,
21-4
>
>
>
>
>
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Re: ODNB Life of the Day - Richard, Duke of York
2011-07-18 23:01:51
--- In , "joanszechtman" <u2nohoo@...> wrote:
>
> Here's the link to the article
> <http://www.oxforddnb.com/public/lotw/1.html> .
>
> Joan
Carol responds:
You beat me to it: I was going to post the same link. Please note that ODNB are only posted for one week, so if you want to print it, you should do so now.
Carol
>
> Here's the link to the article
> <http://www.oxforddnb.com/public/lotw/1.html> .
>
> Joan
Carol responds:
You beat me to it: I was going to post the same link. Please note that ODNB are only posted for one week, so if you want to print it, you should do so now.
Carol
Re: ODNB Life of the Day - Richard, Duke of York
2011-07-19 18:33:34
The following year, and possibly in response to promptings from the government, he opened negotiations for a marriage between his eldest son (now Edward of Rouenthe future Edward IVborn on 28 April 1442) and one of the French king's daughters.
How different history would have been if these negotiations had gone through!
--- On Mon, 7/18/11, justcarol67 <justcarol67@...> wrote:
From: justcarol67 <justcarol67@...>
Subject: Re: ODNB Life of the Day - Richard, Duke of York
To:
Date: Monday, July 18, 2011, 4:58 PM
--- In , "joanszechtman" <u2nohoo@...> wrote:
>
> Here's the link to the article
> <http://www.oxforddnb.com/public/lotw/1.html> .
>
> Joan
Carol responds:
You beat me to it: I was going to post the same link. Please note that ODNB are only posted for one week, so if you want to print it, you should do so now.
Carol
How different history would have been if these negotiations had gone through!
--- On Mon, 7/18/11, justcarol67 <justcarol67@...> wrote:
From: justcarol67 <justcarol67@...>
Subject: Re: ODNB Life of the Day - Richard, Duke of York
To:
Date: Monday, July 18, 2011, 4:58 PM
--- In , "joanszechtman" <u2nohoo@...> wrote:
>
> Here's the link to the article
> <http://www.oxforddnb.com/public/lotw/1.html> .
>
> Joan
Carol responds:
You beat me to it: I was going to post the same link. Please note that ODNB are only posted for one week, so if you want to print it, you should do so now.
Carol
Re: ODNB Life of the Day - Richard, Duke of York
2013-03-18 20:08:12
Belatedly, thanks very much!
--- In , "joanszechtman" <u2nohoo@...> wrote:
>
> Here's the link to the article
> <http://www.oxforddnb.com/public/lotw/1.html> .
>
> Joan
> ---
> author of This Time and Loyalty Binds Me, novels about Richard III in
> the 21st-century
> This Time was General Fiction Finalist of 2010 Next Generation Indie
> Book Awards
> website: http://www.joanszechtman.com/
> blog: http://rtoaaa.blogspot.com/
> ebook This Time: http://www.smashwords.com/books/view/3935
> ebook Loyalty Binds Me: http://www.smashwords.com/books/view/61786
>
>
> --- In , Christine Headley
> <christinelheadley@> wrote:
> >
> >
> > I subscribe to the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography Life of the
> Day.
> >
> > They usually choose people because it's their birthday - clearly not
> the
> > case this time - and I'm glad Richard Duke of York is having a turn.
> >
> > Best wishes
> > Christine
> >
> >
> > -------- Original Message --------
> > Subject: A most successful failure?
> > Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2011 07:00:00 +0100
> > From: oxforddnb-lotd@
> > Reply-To: epm-oxforddnb@
> > To: ODNBLIFEOFTHEDAY-L@
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > To read this Life of the Day complete with a picture of the subject,
> > visit http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/lotw/2011-07-15
> >
> >
> >
> > Richard of York, third duke of York (1411-1460), magnate and claimant
> > to the English throne, was the only son of Richard of Conisbrough,
> > fourth earl of Cambridge (1385-1415), and Anne Mortimer (b. after
> 1388,
> > d. before 1414), daughter of Roger (VII) Mortimer, fourth earl of
> March.
> > He was descended from Edward III through both parents, his father
> being
> > the son of that king's fourth son, Edmund of Langley, first duke of
> > York, and his mother the great-granddaughter of Edward's second son,
> > Lionel of Antwerp, duke of Clarence. It was this distinguished
> ancestry
> > that provided the basis for his explosive participation in the
> troubled
> > politics of the 1450s. In October 1460, after a decade of agitation
> and
> > intervention, he attempted to seize the throne on the grounds that his
> > descent from Clarence made him rightful king in place of Henry VI,
> who,
> > like the other Lancastrian kings, was descended from Edward III's
> third
> > son, John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster. The attempt failed, and York
> died
> > a few months later at the battle of Wakefield, but the claim, of
> course,
> > lived on to provide the basis for Edward IV's succession in March
> 1461.
> >
> > Youth and inheritance
> >
> > Richard of York was born on 22 September 1411, to parents who had
> > married in secret and were soon to be dead. His mother was gone within
> a
> > year or two; his father, who married again in 1414, was executed the
> > following year when details of his plot to depose Henry V came to
> light.
> > Cambridge's plan to raise the north and (apparently) to put Edmund (V)
> > Mortimer, earl of March, on the throne must have thrown his son's
> > dynastic position into sharp relief: the young Richard's mother had
> been
> > the elder of March's sisters, which made the boy himself a possible
> heir
> > to the Mortimer-Clarence claim to the throne. On Cambridge's death he
> > became a royal ward, and it is not altogether surprising that in March
> > 1416 he was placed in the custody of the Lancastrians' leading gaoler,
> > Sir Robert Waterton. Three years into his reign, however, Henry V was
> > busy laying to rest the divisions of his father's time and Richard of
> > York was destined for rehabilitation. He was protected from the
> effects
> > of his father's attainder and, on the death of his uncle Edward, duke
> of
> > York, at Agincourt, the boy was recognized to be his heir. Not long
> > after Henry VI's accession York's wardship and marriage were sold to
> > Ralph Neville, earl of Westmorland. At 3000 marks the price was a high
> > one, but Neville's investment was amply repaid when, in January 1425,
> > Edmund, earl of March, died childless, and York, as his nephew, became
> > heir to the extensive Mortimer inheritance. At some stage in the
> 1420s,
> > possibly as early as 1424, the young duke was married off to Cecily
> > Neville (1415-1495), one of Westmorland's daughters with Joan
> Beaufort.
> > From the point of view of the Nevilles, who had married into most of
> the
> > leading magnate families of the day, it was a prestigious match that
> > helped to confirm the family's growing pre-eminence; from the point of
> > view of Henry VI's government, it was an ideal way to absorb a
> > potentially dangerous figure by attaching him to some of the dynasty's
> > staunchest supporters.
> >
> > Over the next few years York was drawn more closely into the circle
> > around the young king. In 1426 he was knighted, and two years later he
> > was appointed to take up residence in the royal household. In 1430
> York
> > took part in the king's coronation expedition to France. His retinue
> was
> > small, but he was handsomely rewarded for his involvement: over 1000
> > marks by the summer of 1431. Soon after his return, and still a minor
> > (though there appears to have been some uncertainty over this at the
> > time), he was granted livery of his estates on 12 May 1432. At the
> time
> > both inheritances were encumbered with debts, dowers, and obligations,
> > while the duchy of York was mainly in the hands of feoffees. By the
> > summer of 1434, however, a series of financial settlements and the
> > deaths of the two remaining dowagers had lifted the worst of these
> > burdens, and the duke was free to enjoy his extensive patrimony
> > undisturbed. The acquisition of his inheritance had cost him quite a
> > lot, but he had received fair-even generous-treatment from the
> > government. York's proximity to the king, both in blood and in person,
> > and his links with the families of Neville and Beaufort had stood him
> in
> > good stead.
> >
> > Service in France
> >
> > In 1433 York was admitted to the Order of the Garter-a mark of favour,
> a
> > certificate of loyalty, and perhaps a token of martial expectations.
> His
> > first taste of military command was to be as successor to John, duke
> of
> > Bedford, in the lieutenancy of France, a post for which he was, in
> many
> > ways, the obvious candidate: the royal commission, dated 8 May 1436,
> > recited the king's desire to see France ruled by 'some great prince of
> > our blood' (Johnson, York, 226), and there was no one else who fitted
> > the bill, apart from Humphrey, duke of Gloucester. York had agreed to
> > serve in France as early as February 1436, but his army did not reach
> > Harfleur until 7 June. Had it left England more promptly, it might
> have
> > been able to prevent the French reconquest of Paris and the
> > Ile-de-France, which took place during the spring, though it is
> > difficult to know where the blame for the expedition's dilatoriness
> > should lie: York was also to be late leaving for his second tour of
> duty
> > in 1441, and the government was sceptical of his excuses on both
> > occasions, but recruiting an army was no easy feat in the later stages
> > of the Hundred Years' War, and delays were probably unavoidable. In
> the
> > event the French advance was halted by York's forces. The brilliant
> > campaign of autumn 1436, which ensured the safety of Rouen, was
> actually
> > commanded by John, Lord Talbot, but Duke Richard too seems to have
> > carried out some useful work, regaining most of the Pays de Caux after
> > the rebellion of 1435, attending to the grievances of the Normans, and
> > surveying the English garrisons. During both of York's lieutenancies
> it
> > seems to have been a policy of his to delegate the basic management of
> > the war to leading captains: his retainer Talbot, as marshal, in 1436;
> > his brother-in-law Richard Neville, earl of Salisbury, as
> > lieutenant-general in 1437; and Talbot again as 'lieutenant-general
> for
> > the conduct of the war' (Pollard, 39) during York's second tour of
> duty
> > from 1441. Although the duke and his council retained overall control
> of
> > military policy throughout, it may be that York saw himself more as a
> > viceroy, responsible for government as a whole, than as a warrior.
> This
> > is certainly implicit in the attention that he gave to matters of
> > domestic governance in Normandy and the pays de conquete: it was for
> his
> > good rule of the duchy and for his genuine attempts to deal with the
> > problems created by a declining military occupation that York would be
> > remembered in France. His role in the fighting of the war was
> > undistinguished, and a number of English chroniclers noted the fact.
> >
> > Faced with the imminent expiry of his indentures-though not of his
> > lieutenancy, the term of which was indefinite-York sought permission
> to
> > return home in the spring of 1437. His successor was to be the earl of
> > Warwick, and York was instructed to remain in Normandy until his
> > arrival, which was delayed until the following November. It is
> difficult
> > to know whether the decision to replace York reflects disappointment
> > with his performance or not: the duke may even have wished to stand
> > down, possibly because of difficulties in extracting money from the
> > Norman exchequer for the payment of his troops. In any event Warwick's
> > service was soon cut short by his death in April 1439, and Henry VI's
> > government found itself once again faced with the task of providing
> for
> > the rule of Lancastrian France. It was apparently as a compromise
> > candidate that York emerged as the new lieutenant on 2 July 1440:
> > Gloucester appears to have sought his own appointment, while Cardinal
> > Beaufort, the regime's paymaster, probably pressed the claims of his
> > nephew John Beaufort, earl of Somerset. York, however, was the most
> > suitable choice for a post which now, more than ever, demanded a
> > flexible, diplomatic, and authoritative holder: as the government
> > pursued both peace and war with greater vigour than before, the duke
> was
> > sufficiently neutral, consultative, and grand to act effectively on
> its
> > behalf; he was also well connected with all parties, including the
> > military establishment in France.
> >
> > On this occasion York demanded adequate funding and increased powers
> > before he would accept the job: he went to France as a second Bedford,
> > with all the powers that Duke John had enjoyed after 1432 and a
> promise
> > of £20,000 a year from the English exchequer to fund his troops.
> Apart
> > from these improved terms of service, however, the patterns of the
> first
> > lieutenancy were repeated. York left England late, not arriving in
> > Normandy until the end of June 1441. He then moved speedily down the
> > Seine to Pontoise where Talbot was struggling to lift Charles VII's
> > siege, but this was to be his only military action in the three years
> > before the truce of Tours. It was not a particularly impressive one:
> if
> > York had helped to secure Pontoise for a further few months, he may
> also
> > have frustrated a daring scheme of Talbot's that could have resulted
> in
> > the capture of the French king. Caution, it seems, got the better of
> > York, and not for the last time in his career.
> >
> > Over the next few years the duke busied himself with matters of
> > governance and diplomacy while the war effort in Normandy ground
> slowly
> > to a halt. In part this was because Charles VII had turned his
> attention
> > to the south-west, but it is clear that York's reluctance to engage
> the
> > French directly caused dissatisfaction in the English government and
> it
> > may help to explain why Cardinal Beaufort was able to engineer a major
> > military command for his nephew John. The earl of Somerset's
> expedition,
> > planned from late 1442 and launched in the summer of 1443, involved a
> > major diversion of men, funds, and authority away from York and the
> > Norman theatre. Duke Richard dispatched an embassy to remonstrate with
> > the English government in June 1443, but it had no effect, and the
> > campaign itself added injury to insult: Somerset's attack on Brittany
> > and the duke of Alencon's stronghold of La Guerche disrupted York's
> > attempts, conducted during 1442-3, to involve the English in an
> alliance
> > of French princes. In the light of all this it is hardly surprising
> > that, following the expedition's failure, the government seems to have
> > felt the need to appease York: tallies for the payments due at
> > Michaelmas 1443 arrived in February 1444 and, later in that year, the
> > duke was given a major apanage in southern Normandy, while earldoms
> > (and, in Edmund's case, lands) were granted to his eldest sons. After
> > this no more of York's wages were paid until 1446, but at least the
> > truce contracted in May 1444 reduced his expenses and removed the need
> > for further military activity. In September 1445 York returned to
> > England: his indentures were about to expire, parliament was in
> session,
> > and-rather ironically, given the government's own failures in this
> > regard-his management of Norman finances was under investigation.
> >
> > York and English politics before 1450
> >
> > It now seems clear that Cardinal Beaufort, William de la Pole, earl of
> > Suffolk, and the other leading councillors and courtiers who, in the
> > first instance, managed Henry VI's authority in the 1430s and 1440s
> > intended Richard of York to be a pillar of the Lancastrian regime.
> This
> > did not mean that the already wealthy duke was to be showered with
> > gifts, nor did it mean that he was to be given a formal role in the
> > government of England. York was not, for example, appointed to the
> > re-established council in November 1437, but nothing should be
> inferred
> > from this: at twenty-six the duke would have been considered rather
> > youthful for what was in any case a rather anomalous role; exclusion
> > from the council would scarcely have excluded him from influence; and
> it
> > is likely that already the expectation was that his service to the
> crown
> > would be overseas, at least while he was of military age. It is not
> > known what part, if any, York played in the politics of 1437-41,
> during
> > which time he was in England and Henry VI, somewhat uncertainly, came
> of
> > age. There is no reason to suppose that he supported the moves of
> > Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, against Cardinal Beaufort in 1439-40,
> > despite Gloucester's suggestion that York and other lords had been
> > wrongfully kept out of power; nor should it be assumed that he was
> > opposed to the release of the duke of Orleans. He seems to have kept a
> > low profile at this time, participating in a scheme to restore order
> in
> > Wales in 1437-8, sharing in the custody of the Beauchamp wardship in
> > 1439, and touring his estates. When, in early 1441, the 'longe
> > bareynesse' of his marriage was suddenly ended and a son born, York
> > named him Henry (Bokenham's Legenden, 273). This demonstration of
> > dynastic loyalty earned a gift of £100 worth of jewels from the
> grateful
> > king: the restoration of the heir of Cambridge and Mortimer must have
> > seemed to be complete.
> >
> > As lieutenant of France for the second time York became embroiled in
> the
> > government's various diplomatic initiatives, including the moves
> > associated with the truce of Tours. It has often been assumed that
> Duke
> > Richard was hostile to the peace negotiations of the 1440s, but there
> is
> > absolutely no evidence for this. While the confusions of policy in the
> > early years of the decade must have been exasperating for anyone
> charged
> > with responsibility for the defence of Lancastrian France, there is
> > nothing to suggest that York preferred war to diplomacy as a means of
> > preserving English interests. As the plan to seek a truce with Charles
> > VII and a marriage alliance with the house of Anjou emerged as the
> > central plank of royal policy in 1444, York seems to have given it his
> > full support. In the new spirit of Anglo-French amity, for example, he
> > sent forces to assist the dauphin's campaign in Alsace in the summer
> of
> > 1444. The following year, and possibly in response to promptings from
> > the government, he opened negotiations for a marriage between his
> eldest
> > son (now Edward of Rouen-the future Edward IV-born on 28 April 1442)
> and
> > one of the French king's daughters. The duke may even have been
> > sympathetic to the government's plans to surrender Maine, which
> > proceeded alongside the truce negotiations and formed an integral part
> > of the alliance policy. Because of the postures that York struck after
> > 1450 historians have tended to assume that he was opposed to this
> > notorious scheme, but that is by no means clear. It is very likely
> that
> > he knew what was planned by the end of 1445 (if not earlier, since he
> > met Suffolk's embassy as it travelled through Normandy in 1444) and he
> > was certainly involved in the arrangements for compensating Maine's
> > English landholders in 1447. Interestingly York was never explicitly
> to
> > condemn the handover of the territory, although its loss was certainly
> a
> > prominent feature of popular and parliamentary criticism of William de
> > la Pole, by then duke of Suffolk, Edmund Beaufort, duke of Somerset,
> and
> > the other so-called 'traitors' of 1450.
> >
> > It is from the period following his return to England in 1445 that
> > York's alienation from Henry VI's ministers is often supposed to have
> > dated. The duke found himself accused of mishandling the funds he had
> > been paid for the defence of Normandy, and his chief accuser, it
> > appeared, was a central figure in the government, Adam Moleyns, bishop
> > of Chichester. York had returned to England confident of reappointment
> > to the French lieutenancy, but he was obliged to wait for more than a
> > year and then to see the office go to Edmund Beaufort instead. It used
> > to be thought that because of his alleged hostility to the peace
> policy,
> > and his putatively close links to the duke of Gloucester (who died
> > mysteriously in 1447), Duke Richard was persona non grata with
> Suffolk's
> > regime: his appointment to the lieutenancy of Ireland on 30 July 1447
> > has sometimes been seen as a form of exile, the government's hope
> being
> > that, like the earls of March, his predecessors, he would go there and
> die.
> >
> > However, events thus far do not support this interpretation. York was
> > certainly dismayed by the rumours concerning his performance in
> > Normandy, but he was explicitly vindicated by king and lords both in
> and
> > outside the parliament of 1445-6; it is not even known that Moleyns
> had
> > made the accusations York claimed, only that the duke saw in a public
> > attack on the bishop the opportunity to clear his own name. Similarly,
> > while York was probably disappointed not to regain the lieutenancy of
> > France, too much should not be made of this: the lieutenancy of
> Ireland,
> > which he was granted in return, was a post that his most distinguished
> > ancestors (notably Clarence himself) had held; it bestowed upon him
> > almost sovereign powers in the island; and it gave him the opportunity
> > to combine military service with the exploitation of his interests as
> an
> > Irish landlord. Finally, since the terms of his commission permitted
> him
> > to appoint a deputy and return to England, it cannot be seen as a form
> > of banishment. In some ways, indeed, 1446 and 1447 saw York more
> closely
> > involved in the governing regime than he had ever been: in October
> 1446
> > he was granted the abbey and town of Waltham because he 'will come
> often
> > to London for the king's business and his own' (CPR, 1446-52, 43);
> over
> > the next year he attended a number of council meetings and was named
> as
> > a witness to more than three-quarters of the charters issued from 1446
> > to 1448; during 1447-9 he was added to the peace commissions of eleven
> > counties beyond those to which he had been named at his inheritance
> (and
> > in some cases beyond the scope of his landholdings); and finally,
> almost
> > for the first time, he began to enjoy the kind of rewards more
> commonly
> > bestowed on courtiers-most notably, perhaps, the wardship and marriage
> > of the Holland heir (Henry) and a series of lands and offices once
> held
> > by Gloucester. This last detail is a reminder that there was almost
> > nothing to link York with Duke Humphrey in the latter's lifetime: in
> no
> > sense can York be considered his supporter, and it is not improbable
> > that, like other members of the nobility, he witnessed Gloucester's
> > destruction at the Bury parliament and, tacitly at least, assented to
> it.
> >
> > When he finally left for Ireland, in June 1449, Duke Richard did so as
> a
> > loyal and well-regarded member of the Lancastrian establishment. If he
> > had been less involved in affairs during the preceding year or so,
> this
> > may well have been at his own choice. Many of the nobility seem to
> have
> > withdrawn from the court during 1448 as the government's troubles
> began
> > to mount. York cannot have wished to be associated with the
> humiliating
> > surrender of Le Mans in March 1448 and he may well have feared the
> > consequences of the extraordinary coup at Fougeres. A tour of duty in
> > Ireland must have appeared an attractive alternative. During his
> > fourteen months in the province York scored a series of easy (if
> > short-lived) victories, receiving the submission of most of the
> island's
> > leaders and campaigning effectively in Wicklow. At the Drogheda
> > parliament of April 1450 he followed the lead of the Commons at
> > Westminster by introducing an Act of Resumption. Like the lieutenant
> of
> > France he was short of money, and this limited his achievements, but
> the
> > contrast between this vigorous performance and the demoralizing stasis
> > of Somerset's rule in France must have impressed itself upon
> contemporaries.
> >
> > Estates and connections
> >
> > By the mid-1430s, when he had gained full control over his estates,
> York
> > was the richest and most extensive landowner among the king's
> subjects.
> > Estimates of his wealth have varied between £2874 and £5800
> net, but the
> > most recent and reliable estimate suggests that his estates in England
> > and Wales were worth about £4000 a year (net) when he came into
> them,
> > and that his exchequer annuities yielded an average of £600 a
> year.
> > York's lands were scattered through England and the march of Wales,
> with
> > notable concentrations in the West Riding of Yorkshire; in
> Lincolnshire
> > and Northamptonshire; in Dorset and Somerset; in Herefordshire,
> > Shropshire, and the middle march of Wales; and in the centre of East
> > Anglia along the border of Norfolk and Suffolk. Beyond this he held
> the
> > earldom of Ulster and the lordships of Connacht and Trim, although
> only
> > the last of these Irish estates is likely to have yielded York any
> real
> > influence or income.
> >
> > The possession of such vast holdings shaped York's activities as a
> lord:
> > like John of Gaunt before him he was a truly national figure, with
> > interests so widespread and diverse that it was difficult for him to
> > exert the kind of local authority typical of later medieval magnates.
> He
> > had no real 'country'-no county-sized area of concentrated influence
> > where local gentlemen might turn first of all to him for lordship-and
> > this helped to determine both the nature of his affinity and the role
> > that he and it were to play in the politics of the realm. York's
> > following, like Gaunt's or indeed the king's, was a disparate group of
> > often important men, many of whom had their own local allegiances and
> > whose links with York were forged mainly through military service and
> > the tenure of estate or household office. In part, of course, this
> > pattern was a consequence of the duke's long minority and his
> prolonged
> > service in France: many of the servants of the duchy of York had
> melted
> > away in the 1420s into Gloucester's service, for example; while Duke
> > Richard's appointment as Bedford's successor in Normandy presented him
> > with a ready-made following looking for a lord. A spry comment from an
> > anti-Yorkist chronicler has promoted the suggestion that York was
> unduly
> > influenced by the men who gathered round him in Normandy-in
> particular,
> > by Sir William Oldhall, who was one of York's most reliable agents
> > during the 1450s-but there is little to support this notion,
> > particularly when the duke's involvement in the peace policy of the
> > mid-1440s is taken into account. On the contrary, it seems likely that
> > York's high status, his extensive interests, and his relative
> > disengagement from the affairs of any particular locality beyond his
> > estates meant that he was exposed to a wide array of different voices.
> > If anyone besides the king and his ministers was likely to hear the
> > counsel of the realm, it was surely York, who numbered lords such as
> > Talbot, Ralph Cromwell, and Thomas Scales among his councillors, but
> > also enjoyed links with exchequer clerks, lawyers, the widows of
> Norman
> > soldiers, and local worthies from all parts of the country. The
> > maintenance of this kind of connection may have cost York dear-as much
> > as £1300 a year, according to one recent estimate-but it seems
> that his
> > money was well spent. Despite his inability to offer really consistent
> > local support, he was apparently able to co-ordinate the raising of
> > large retinues throughout the 1450s. If some of his servants kept away
> > from the duke's more controversial ventures, a sizeable and
> prestigious
> > core remained loyal to the end.
> >
> > The making of York's rebellion
> >
> > The last and best-known period in York's political life began in
> > September 1450, when he suddenly returned from Ireland and took up the
> > common cry for the traitors surrounding the king to be brought to
> > justice. This was a significant change of political direction for the
> > duke, and one that shaped the remainder of his career, but the reasons
> > for it are not immediately obvious. Modern historians have mostly
> > rejected the traditional interpretation, which laid stress on York's
> > dynastic interests and saw his participation in the popular ferments
> of
> > the 1450s as a device for seizing the crown. Instead, the search has
> > been for the causes of personal grievance on Duke Richard's part: was
> he
> > moved to anger, or even desperation, by the government's enormous
> debts
> > to him? Was he incensed by the new pre-eminence of Edmund Beaufort,
> duke
> > of Somerset, the man who had so recently lost France? Did he fear for
> > his own position, as an old rival took control of Henry VI's
> government?
> > Alternatively, was York simply an opportunist, moving (typically late)
> > to exploit the regime's difficulties, but without any fixed idea of
> > where his dissidence might take him?
> >
> > One difficulty in reaching any conclusions lies in trying to establish
> > which elements of York's programme, as this slowly unfolded, were
> > intentional, and intended from the start. It is certainly unlikely
> that
> > the duke was seeking to gain the throne in 1450: previous legitimists
> > had soon revealed their desire to improve the realm by changing the
> > king, but York was not to assert his Mortimer-Clarence claim until
> 1460,
> > after ten years of activism explicitly devoted to other ends. Even in
> > that year, moreover, his move was greeted with hostility, and it seems
> > reasonable to suggest that the duke would have known all along that
> this
> > was a likely reaction and would have trimmed his policy accordingly.
> It
> > is possible that, in 1450, York was concerned to secure recognition as
> > heir presumptive to Henry VI: the king was still without a child and
> > there was a (somewhat faint) possibility of dynastic competition from
> > the house of Beaufort. Like most noblemen York took an active interest
> > in the claims and titles he possessed-in 1445 he had sought
> information
> > on his interest in the throne of Castile and in 1451 an agent of his
> was
> > to argue in parliament that the duke should be named as heir
> > apparent-but, at best, this can provide only a partial explanation for
> > his actions in 1450.
> >
> > As far as personal grievances are concerned, meanwhile, it is
> difficult
> > to see what grounds York had for complaint. That the duke was part of
> > the establishment in the 1440s has already been illustrated.
> Financially
> > he had fared no worse than any of Henry VI's other major accountants:
> > indeed, somewhat remarkably, given the state of royal finances, he
> > received £1200 from the crown at the end of 1449, and even in May
> 1450
> > efforts were being made to find him money. He may have decided to
> return
> > to England to seek funds-a letter to Salisbury, written in June 1450,
> > suggests that he feared serious losses in Ireland unless he received
> > further payments-but this is rather a different matter from acting on
> a
> > sense of grievance, and if seeking money was York's initial aim, it
> was
> > soon overwhelmed by other purposes.
> >
> > What, finally, of York's famous antagonism towards Somerset: was this
> > the motivation for his assault on the king's ministers? The problem
> here
> > is one of disentangling the personal feud between the two men from the
> > relative positions in which a wider politics had placed them: did York
> > attack the government because it contained Somerset, or did he attack
> > Somerset because he was the leader of the government? It is certainly
> > possible to find grounds for animosity between the two men: Beaufort's
> > performance in the last years of the war was undistinguished to say
> the
> > least, and York may have thought that he himself could have achieved
> > more; it has recently been suggested, moreover, that the lieutenant's
> > casual surrender of Rouen would particularly have rankled with Duke
> > Richard, since he had continued to be its captain. At the same time,
> > however, it is clear that once York had made his inflammatory moves of
> > September 1450 (and possibly even before then), he and Somerset were
> > destined to be at odds: Duke Richard's political standing came quickly
> > to depend on the argument that the government was run by traitors, and
> a
> > large part of his justification for taking up arms in 1450, 1452, and
> > 1455 was that the enmity of leading ministers obliged him to take
> action
> > to defend himself; Duke Edmund, on the other hand, was not unjustified
> > in regarding much of York's behaviour as threatening, both to himself
> > and to the order of the realm; if he sought, in 1450, in 1452-3, and
> in
> > 1455, to deal with the problem by repression instead of indulgence, it
> > was an understandable approach. Politics, as much as personality and
> > private interest, determined the conflict between York and Somerset.
> >
> > Pursuing this further, it may be suggested that it was in the
> > extraordinary politics of 1450 that the most likely reasons for York's
> > sudden attack on the government are to be found. As Normandy fell to
> the
> > French and the king's bankruptcy was exposed in parliament, the
> > authority of Henry VI's ministers disintegrated. MPs and more lowly
> > members of society appeared to be united in the belief that the king
> had
> > been betrayed by a self-serving clique who had pillaged his
> possessions
> > in England and surrendered those in France. If Suffolk's trial and
> > murder had removed the leader of the gang, the rest remained in
> > positions of power, and until the king and the 'true lords' took
> action
> > against them, there could be no justice or order in the realm. This
> > judgement on the recent past dominated public life in England between
> > 1449 and 1451, and it continued to exert a certain influence over the
> > public imagination thereafter. York, like other members of the
> nobility,
> > must have known that in certain ways it was wide of the mark, but this
> > did not mean that it could be ignored. In particular, in fact, it
> could
> > not be ignored by York, who had already been identified by some of the
> > government's critics as the figure most likely to visit retribution
> upon
> > the 'traitors'. This appears to be the explanation for the rough
> > reception that York and his men received at their landing in north
> Wales
> > in September: local agents of the royal household, and possibly their
> > commanders at the centre, had become alarmed about the duke's
> > intentions. It was at this point, perhaps, and not in 1447, that 'by
> > treating [the duke] as an enemy the court had made him one'
> (McFarlane,
> > 405): if both the king's ministers and his subjects were going to cast
> > York as the agent of justice, he might as well fulfil their
> > expectations. Certainly, the moment must have seemed ripe for someone
> to
> > take drastic action: the king's officers could not govern without
> public
> > confidence, and it may have appeared that the removal of some of the
> > discredited men-not least, perhaps, the duke of Somerset-was the best
> > way to restore it.
> >
> > Beyond all this, it might be added that, even if the government had
> not
> > moved against him in 1450, everything in York's make-up would have
> given
> > him the sense that he was the man to restore the situation. He was the
> > greatest prince of the royal blood, head and shoulders above other
> > lords, the natural successor to Bedford and Gloucester in the
> protection
> > of Henry VI's interests. He had already acted as the king's viceroy in
> > France and Ireland; why not in England too? What, if anything, York
> knew
> > of the deeds of men like Gaunt and Woodstock (or those of Montfort and
> > Lancaster), whose status was much the same as his and whose actions
> were
> > to prefigure his own, is not known; but one model of proper noble
> > service had been made available to him when, probably in 1445, York
> was
> > presented with an elegantly decorated translation of Claudian's life
> of
> > the consul Stilicho. It was an account of how the people of Rome and
> > other nations implored this virtuous prince to accept the office of
> > consul and restore good government to a city torn apart by the evil
> > advisers of a child emperor. Its translator had invited York to 'marke
> > stilicoes life' ('Mittelenglische Claudian-Ubersetzung', 256): in
> 1450
> > the moment had arrived when he might put this teaching to good use.
> >
> > York and the politics of the 1450s
> >
> > It was with a volley of bills and open letters addressed to the king
> > that York returned to English political life in September 1450. The
> > first of these sought to establish the duke's loyalty; the second
> > advertised his intention to seek justice against his accusers; but it
> > was the third that was truly controversial-it drew the king's
> attention
> > to the universal complaint that justice was not being done to those
> who
> > broke the king's law with impunity (in particular, the so-called
> > 'traitors'), and offered York's services in bringing the guilty to
> book.
> > This was an open defiance of the government's authority, since the
> > essence of the 'traitors' idea was that it was the men about the king
> > who were most of all responsible for the disasters that had befallen
> the
> > realm. As far as York was concerned, this meant that a true subject
> was
> > obliged to act against the inner circle of authority in order to
> fulfil
> > the terms of his allegiance to king and realm, and this explains the
> > duke's many affirmations of loyalty to King Henry: it was the
> essential
> > justification for actions that, on the face of it, appeared disloyal.
> > Under normal circumstances, of course, attempts to separate a king's
> > chosen counsellors and servants from the ruler himself were unlikely
> to
> > succeed: defiance of royal agents easily shaded into defiance of the
> > king, and that was treason. As York and all the rest of the nobility
> > knew, however, these circumstances were not normal: Henry VI had shown
> > no more discernment than a child in the government of his realm; his
> > ministers were virtually self-appointed, and the policies pursued
> during
> > the 1420s, 1430s, and 1440s were essentially theirs. If this makes
> > nonsense of one aspect of the 'traitors' thesis, it exposes the truth
> of
> > another aspect: the government was not in any real sense the vehicle
> of
> > the king's will, and thus defiance of it was not treason; the regime
> > could legitimately be reshaped, and, with large sections of the public
> > arguing that it should be, York's actions had a certain justice in
> them.
> > In reality he was appealing not to the king with these manifestos, but
> > to the Lords and to the wider public: his plea was that those who were
> > less compromised by the disasters of 1449-50 must abandon those who
> were
> > more immediately responsible; a new government, in which the duke was
> to
> > play a more prominent role, must be established.
> >
> > Not surprisingly York's demands fell on deaf ears. The king's circle
> saw
> > little reason for a general blood-letting, and the nobility, who had
> > begun to lend support to the beleaguered regime as the crisis mounted,
> > appear to have taken a similar view. In a public reply to York's
> bills,
> > his offers of assistance were politely rebuffed, and the duke left
> > London to prepare for the parliament summoned to meet in November
> 1450.
> > When it gathered on the 6th, MPs demonstrated their continuing
> > enthusiasm for reform by electing Oldhall, York's chamberlain, as
> > speaker and loudly calling for the traitors to be brought to justice.
> > When the duke himself arrived, with sword borne upright before him and
> a
> > large army at his back, the initiative was his: Somerset was promptly
> > imprisoned and the Lords waited to see what would happen next. What
> > followed was in part a demonstration of Duke Richard's hesitancy and
> > conservatism, and in part a reflection of the constraints of his
> > position. Elements of the Commons' programme were put into effect, but
> > the duke made no attempt to alter the institutional framework of
> Henry's
> > government, and the result was that, during the Christmas recess,
> > authority drifted back to the king and his household, Somerset was
> > released, and the Lords, many of whom had flirted with York while he
> was
> > in the ascendant, resumed their former obedience. During the sessions
> of
> > the parliament in 1451 York's power waned, and Thomas Younge's
> notorious
> > attempt to have him recognized as heir apparent must have seemed to
> many
> > an act of desperation. Why had York not done more to secure himself
> > during his brief ascendancy? It is not, of course, clear what he
> wanted:
> > if only the restoration of order, then this was being achieved without
> > his help; if a role for himself in the government, then his actions
> had
> > made this unthinkable unless the king himself were to be altogether
> > displaced-the men of Henry's household, who effectively disposed of
> > royal power, were hardly going to welcome a man who had posed as their
> > nemesis. What York had done, in effect, was to go too far without
> going
> > far enough. Perhaps he should have cut his losses and risked a direct
> > assault on the throne; but such a move was almost certain to fail. The
> > duke had cast himself as the true liegeman of Henry VI: any deviation
> > from this role was sure to be seen as the grossest kind of betrayal;
> > York had many potential supporters, but-apart, perhaps, from his own
> > servants-their support was for his public, not his private, interests.
> >
> > It has been worth looking at the events of 1450 in some detail,
> because
> > for the next two years Duke Richard's options were very largely shaped
> > by what had happened in that year. He could not be secure while
> Somerset
> > and the household retained both control of the king and the support of
> > the Lords, yet there was little he could do to improve his lot. Moves
> > against Oldhall were under way by the end of 1451, and when, in
> January
> > 1452, York reacted publicly against them and against their
> implications
> > for himself, he was thinly supported. Apart from the duke's own men
> only
> > the malcontent Thomas Courtenay, earl of Devon, and his crony Lord
> > Cobham were persuaded to join the rising that attempted to repeat the
> > coup of 1450: the rest of the nobility gathered around the king and
> > Somerset, and York was forced to capitulate at Dartford in early
> March.
> > His failure left him worse off than before. He was obliged to swear a
> > humiliating oath of submission, his supporters and tenants were
> harried
> > by judicial commissions, and his attempts to discredit Somerset were
> > treated as part and parcel of a private quarrel. As the common people
> > were reduced to order and the government enjoyed the unfamiliar taste
> of
> > victory in Gascony, it seemed that York's political career was at an
> > end: never again would he be able to take his proper place in the
> > Lancastrian establishment.
> >
> > At this point, however, fate combined with the contradictions of Henry
> > VI's regime to bestow new opportunities upon Duke Richard. In the
> summer
> > of 1453 Somerset's governing consensus suddenly collapsed, as the
> > victories in Gascony were reversed, the king lost his mind, and war
> > broke out in the north between the Nevilles and the Percys. In the
> > resulting crisis York was the only person of sufficient stature to
> > restore the situation, and it must be this factor, above all, that
> > explains the decision of a non-partisan group of councillors to summon
> > him to London in October 1453, and the agreement in parliament to
> > appoint him protector and defender of the realm on 27 March 1454. Here
> > was a means for York to wrest control of government from Somerset and
> > the king's household men without bringing his loyalty to Henry VI into
> > question; and here was a means for the rest of political society to
> > contain the powerful duke and to create an effective government
> without
> > the kind of sacrifices that had been demanded in 1450. York certainly
> > did his part: he went to London full of emollient promises to attend
> the
> > council and do all 'that sholde or might be to the welfare of the king
> > and of his subgettes' (CPR, 1452-61, 143); he made no attacks on
> > Somerset or other sometime 'traitors' (though his ally, Norfolk, did);
> > and, on taking up the post of protector, he committed himself to rule
> > consultatively and representatively with the Lords. During the
> > succeeding months York made serious and well-founded attempts to
> pacify
> > the disputes in the north and north midlands, and he enjoyed some
> > success. Making genuine efforts to consult widely, he demonstrated the
> > same statesmanlike qualities that had marked his management of France
> > and Ireland: 'for a whole year', wrote one chronicler, 'he governed
> the
> > whole realm of England most nobly and in the best way' ('Benet's
> > chronicle', 212). There were certainly limits to his achievement, and
> > his tenure of office was to be brought to an abrupt halt in February
> > 1455, but the duke's performance may have prompted many of his peers
> to
> > look more sympathetically at his claims in the years to come.
> >
> > Unfortunately, however, the moulds of politics were changing in these
> > years, and the broad unity that had so long been preserved among the
> > nobility was breaking down. The deterioration of order in the
> > localities, which had become so dramatic and extensive by 1453, was
> now
> > combined with the emergence of a more aggressive Lancastrian
> dynasticism
> > to promote significant divisions among the elite. These had begun to
> > emerge even before York's protectorate: one of the reasons why it had
> > taken so long to arrange the duke's appointment was that a substantial
> > group of lords had grouped themselves around the queen, Margaret of
> > Anjou, who-since the birth of her son Edward in October 1453-was
> > attempting to secure a regency for herself. In the winter of 1453-4,
> > indeed, civil war looked a distinct possibility. It was held off by
> > York's readiness to make explicit his submission to the dynastic
> claims
> > of the new prince, and by the agreement of all but the most extreme
> > figures to join a broadly based regime under the duke's headship. When
> > Henry VI recovered his sanity, however, at Christmas 1454, those in
> the
> > household and the north who had opposed the protectorate seized the
> > opportunity to assert their interests. York was removed from office on
> 9
> > February 1455, and by early March a more hard-faced government was
> > taking steps against the duke. The fact that the Neville earls of
> > Warwick and Salisbury also fell under attack at this time reveals the
> > factional and divisive aims of those in control: although the
> government
> > proceeded with the language of treason and obedience, its narrowing
> base
> > and its sponsorship of conflict began to undermine its claims to such
> > public goods; when York and the Nevilles confronted the king,
> Somerset,
> > and the Percys at St Albans on 22 May 1455, there was a broad
> > equivalence between the two sides, and the first blows of a civil war
> > were struck.
> >
> > The Yorkist victory, however, brought this war to a rapid halt. Just
> as
> > he had done in the early 1450s, the duke submitted to the king and
> > attempted to rebuild unity. This was to remain his posture and that of
> > his allies right up to the disasters of 1459. York was certainly
> > prepared to strain his allegiance to its very limits-securing
> > appointment to a second protectorate on 15 November 1455 and depriving
> > the king of personal authority a week later-but he would not cross the
> > bounds to an outright repudiation of Henry VI's sovereignty. As a
> > consequence his pre-eminence remained insecure. His protectorate was
> > soon terminated (on 25 February 1456) when parliamentary pressure for
> a
> > resumption weakened his support among the Lords, but the aim of
> > preserving unity, or oonhede, among the nobility lingered on for some
> > years and ensured that if York was not to be admitted to any special
> > power, he was not to be destroyed either. It seems likely that,
> provided
> > he behaved himself, most of the peerage had some respect for the duke.
> > Pressure from Queen Margaret and her growing band of partisans meant
> > that he was obliged to repeat his submission of 1452 on a number of
> > occasions between 1456 and 1459, but he was confirmed in possession of
> > the lieutenancy of Ireland, and even seems to have been able to direct
> > policy for a time in the wake of the 'loveday' settlement of 1458.
> Only
> > in 1459 did the bulk of the Lords finally accept the case for war
> > against the duke, and then the fault-lines of 1453-4 and 1455 were
> > recreated and York received the support of the Nevilles. Rather as at
> St
> > Albans, York, Warwick, and Salisbury revived the case that evil
> > counsellors around the king were destroying the common weal of the
> realm
> > and threatening their own security. On this occasion, however, their
> > propaganda cut no ice: finding most of the nobility in arms against
> them
> > at Ludford Bridge (near Ludlow, Shropshire) and deserted by a part of
> > the army, York and his allies fled the field during the night of 12-13
> > October 1459.
> >
> > Exile, return, and death
> >
> > The duke and his second son, Edmund, earl of Rutland, spent the next
> > eleven months in Ireland, attempting to gain the men and money for an
> > armed return to England, where the duke's estates were in royal hands
> as
> > a result of his attainder at the Coventry parliament (about the end of
> > November 1459). His younger children, including George, were all
> placed
> > in the custody of the duchess of Buckingham. An incidental result of
> > York's efforts was the famous Drogheda parliament of 8 February 1460,
> in
> > which the Anglo-Irish establishment obtained recognition as a distinct
> > political community, separate from England, ruled by its own laws and
> > financed by its own currency. In return for these concessions York
> > gained resources, protection for his person, and an extensive army of
> > archers, which he must have intended to take to England. Plans for a
> > co-ordinated invasion of the mainland were apparently made during a
> > conference with Warwick at Waterford in the spring of 1460, and the
> > duke's Neville allies, accompanied by his eldest son, Edward of March,
> > duly landed in Kent in June professing loyalty to Henry VI and
> > protesting about the misgovernment of the realm. With startling
> success,
> > they won support in London and the south-east and proceeded to defeat
> > the royal army at Northampton on 10 July, submitting to the king at
> the
> > battle's end. Over the next few weeks March and the Nevilles began to
> > secure the realm and to await York's return, which finally occurred
> near
> > Chester on or about 9 September 1460.
> >
> > Much about the next few weeks is obscure: it is not known why it took
> > York so long to join his allies on the mainland; it is not known when
> he
> > began so famously to assert his claim to the throne (13 September is
> the
> > first date for which a plausible case can be made); it is not known
> > whether or not the initiative had been agreed, or even discussed, with
> > the Nevilles. It seems clear that there was no option for York but to
> > attempt to make himself king: all other avenues, as has been shown,
> led
> > nowhere; the duke could neither secure himself nor restore political
> > order without taking the drastic step from which he had so far shrunk;
> > and it may have seemed that by 1460 the polity of Henry VI was
> > sufficiently dislocated to permit a direct assault on the king.
> > Unfortunately for the duke, however, his own options were different
> from
> > those of his allies, even his sons. These men had gained support on
> the
> > old plea of reforming Henry VI's government. They had recently made
> > their loyalty to the king explicit. As the managers of a large and
> > diverse alliance, they could not easily abandon what they had
> promised,
> > and it seems clear that the message from the London elite, who played
> an
> > important role in the frantic politics of 1459-61, was that a
> deposition
> > could not be tolerated. York marched into London, seized the king, and
> > entered parliament on 10 October, announcing that he intended 'to
> > challenge his right' to the crown (Johnson, York, 214). The Lords'
> > response was unpromising: they went into conclave at Blackfriars and
> > sent the young earl of March to persuade his father to accept a
> > negotiated settlement. By 13 October York had been brought to abandon
> > his plans for an immediate coronation, and a few days later he
> submitted
> > his claim for discussion in parliament. An accord emerged on 31
> October,
> > and its central feature was to leave Henry VI on the throne, while
> > settling the succession on York and his sons. It is possible that even
> > after this York attempted to get his way by inducing Henry to
> abdicate.
> > He must have realized that, like the treaty of Troyes on which it was
> > apparently based, the accord promised immediate war with the
> > disinherited heir. In any event, the king was moved to safety and the
> > duke was obliged to accept the terms agreed in October, at least for
> the
> > time being. Acting more or less as protector he marched north in early
> > December to deal with the forces of the prince of Wales and Queen
> > Margaret, which had regrouped in Yorkshire after the defeat at
> > Northampton. Venturing forth from his castle at Sandal on 30 December
> > 1460, in what may have been an uncharacteristic attempt to surprise
> his
> > enemy, York was set upon by an unexpectedly large Lancastrian force.
> In
> > the ensuing battle of Wakefield, he and his second son, Edmund of
> > Rutland, were killed. As a macabre riposte to Duke Richard's recent
> > pretensions, his head was severed from his body and displayed on the
> > walls of York bearing a paper crown.
> >
> > So ended the life of this curious figure, who, having played safe in
> the
> > prime of his years, abruptly changed tack at the age of thirty-nine,
> > pursuing ever more ambitious and dangerous policies until, with
> victory
> > almost in his grasp, he fell on an ill-chosen battlefield. Duke
> Richard
> > was the true founder of the royal house of York, but despite a career
> > that a recent biographer has described as 'the most successful failure
> > of the middle ages' (Johnson, 'Political career', abstract), he has
> > inspired little interest and even less sympathy among historians.
> > Notwithstanding his many claims to be acting for the 'common weal' of
> > the realm, York has usually been presented as a somewhat colourless
> > bungler: all along, it seems, he wanted power, but he could not decide
> > how far to go until the last minute, whereupon-fatally-he went too
> far.
> > In 1964 B. Wilkinson set the tone for most modern accounts of the
> duke's
> > career with his judgement that 'it would be folly to make a statesman
> > out of this fifteenth-century worldling' (Wilkinson, 88). This view
> > seems unfairly harsh: like many of his peers, his instincts were to
> make
> > the best of things in Henry VI's England, a world in which there were
> no
> > easy answers. York's opportunities were closely circumscribed and his
> > intentions in opposing Henry VI's government are far from clear; in
> fact
> > there may be a case for seeing him more as the victim of circumstances
> > than as their creator. His cautiousness, if ultimately unproductive,
> was
> > justified by the sheer impropriety of opposition to the government. On
> > the other hand, the recklessness that he demonstrated in 1450, 1452,
> > 1455, 1459, and 1460 was also justified: sometimes by its results;
> > always by the need to do something to restore the authority that the
> > king, in his feebleness, had frittered away. In medieval England,
> > however, the restoration of authority could only be carried out from
> the
> > throne. York's final and most destructive venture was thus his
> > best-conceived one, but it is easy to see why it has won him few
> plaudits.
> >
> > John Watts
> >
> > Sources P. A. Johnson, Duke Richard of York, 1411-1460 (1988) + T. B.
> > Pugh, 'Richard Plantagenet (1411-60), duke of York, as the king's
> > lieutenant in France and Ireland', Aspects of medieval government and
> > society: essays presented to J. R. Lander, ed. J. G. Rowe (1986),
> 107-41
> > + J. Watts, Henry VI and the politics of kingship (1996) + R. A.
> > Griffiths, The reign of King Henry VI: the exercise of royal
> authority,
> > 1422-1461 (1981) + Chancery records + J. T. Rosenthal, 'The estates
> and
> > finances of Richard, duke of York, 1411-1460', Studies in Medieval and
> > Renaissance History, 2 (1965), 117-204 + G. L. Harriss, Cardinal
> > Beaufort: a study of Lancastrian ascendancy and decline (1988) + A. J.
> > Pollard, John Talbot and the war in France, 1427-1453, Royal
> Historical
> > Society Studies in History, 35 (1983) + C. T. Allmand, Lancastrian
> > Normandy, 1415-1450 (1983) + M. K. Jones, 'Somerset, York and the Wars
> > of the Roses', EngHR, 104 (1989), 285-307 + R. A. Griffiths, 'Duke
> > Richard of York's intentions in 1450 and the origins of the Wars of
> the
> > Roses', Journal of Medieval History, 1 (1975), 187-209 + M. L.
> Kekewich
> > and others, eds., The politics of fifteenth-century England: John
> Vale's
> > book (1995) + J. L. Watts, 'De consulatu Stiliconis: texts and
> politics
> > in the reign of Henry VI', Journal of Medieval History, 16 (1990),
> > 251-66 + J. M. W. Bean, 'The financial position of Richard, duke of
> > York', War and government in the middle ages, ed. J. Gillingham and J.
> > C. Holt (1984), 182-98 + T. B. Pugh, Henry V and the Southampton plot
> of
> > 1415, Southampton RS, 30 (1988) + A. J. Otway-Ruthven, A history of
> > medieval Ireland (1968) + 'John Benet's chronicle for the years 1400
> to
> > 1462', ed. G. L. Harriss and M. A. Harriss, Camden miscellany, XXIV,
> CS,
> > 4th ser., 9 (1972) + E. Flugel, 'Eine mittelenglische
> > Claudian-Ubersetzung (1445)', Anglia, 28 (1905), 255-99 + P. A.
> Johnson,
> > 'The political career of Richard, duke of York, to 1456', DPhil diss.,
> > U. Oxf., 1981 + B. Wilkinson, Constitutional history of England in the
> > fifteenth century (1399-1485) (1964) + Osbern Bokenam's Legenden, ed.
> C.
> > Horstmann (Heilbronn, 1883) + 'William Gregory's chronicle of London',
> > The historical collections of a citizen of London in the fifteenth
> > century, ed. J. Gairdner, CS, new ser., 17 (1876) + K. Dockray, 'The
> > battle of Wakefield and the Wars of the Roses', The Ricardian, 9
> > (1991-3), 238-58 + R. Knowles, 'The battle of Wakefield: the
> > topography', The Ricardian, 9 (1991-3), 259-65 + C. Ross, Edward IV
> > (1974) + Itineraries [of] William Worcestre, ed. J. H. Harvey, OMT
> > (1969) + K. B. McFarlane, 'The Lancastrian kings', Cambridge Medieval
> > History, 8, ed. C. W. Previte-Orton and Z. N. Brooke (1936), 363-417 +
> > CPR, 1446-61 + CEPR letters, 8.132
> > Archives BL, letters relating to a truce between England and Burgundy,
> > Add. Ch. 75479
> > Likenesses painted glass window, Cirencester; repro. in S. Lysons, A
> > collection of Gloucestershire antiquities (1804) · painted glass
> window,
> > Trinity Cam. [see illus.]
> > Wealth at death under £4600 p.a. net: Johnson, Duke Richard, 7,
> 21-4
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> ========================================================================
> > © Oxford University Press, 2004. See legal
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>
--- In , "joanszechtman" <u2nohoo@...> wrote:
>
> Here's the link to the article
> <http://www.oxforddnb.com/public/lotw/1.html> .
>
> Joan
> ---
> author of This Time and Loyalty Binds Me, novels about Richard III in
> the 21st-century
> This Time was General Fiction Finalist of 2010 Next Generation Indie
> Book Awards
> website: http://www.joanszechtman.com/
> blog: http://rtoaaa.blogspot.com/
> ebook This Time: http://www.smashwords.com/books/view/3935
> ebook Loyalty Binds Me: http://www.smashwords.com/books/view/61786
>
>
> --- In , Christine Headley
> <christinelheadley@> wrote:
> >
> >
> > I subscribe to the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography Life of the
> Day.
> >
> > They usually choose people because it's their birthday - clearly not
> the
> > case this time - and I'm glad Richard Duke of York is having a turn.
> >
> > Best wishes
> > Christine
> >
> >
> > -------- Original Message --------
> > Subject: A most successful failure?
> > Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2011 07:00:00 +0100
> > From: oxforddnb-lotd@
> > Reply-To: epm-oxforddnb@
> > To: ODNBLIFEOFTHEDAY-L@
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > To read this Life of the Day complete with a picture of the subject,
> > visit http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/lotw/2011-07-15
> >
> >
> >
> > Richard of York, third duke of York (1411-1460), magnate and claimant
> > to the English throne, was the only son of Richard of Conisbrough,
> > fourth earl of Cambridge (1385-1415), and Anne Mortimer (b. after
> 1388,
> > d. before 1414), daughter of Roger (VII) Mortimer, fourth earl of
> March.
> > He was descended from Edward III through both parents, his father
> being
> > the son of that king's fourth son, Edmund of Langley, first duke of
> > York, and his mother the great-granddaughter of Edward's second son,
> > Lionel of Antwerp, duke of Clarence. It was this distinguished
> ancestry
> > that provided the basis for his explosive participation in the
> troubled
> > politics of the 1450s. In October 1460, after a decade of agitation
> and
> > intervention, he attempted to seize the throne on the grounds that his
> > descent from Clarence made him rightful king in place of Henry VI,
> who,
> > like the other Lancastrian kings, was descended from Edward III's
> third
> > son, John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster. The attempt failed, and York
> died
> > a few months later at the battle of Wakefield, but the claim, of
> course,
> > lived on to provide the basis for Edward IV's succession in March
> 1461.
> >
> > Youth and inheritance
> >
> > Richard of York was born on 22 September 1411, to parents who had
> > married in secret and were soon to be dead. His mother was gone within
> a
> > year or two; his father, who married again in 1414, was executed the
> > following year when details of his plot to depose Henry V came to
> light.
> > Cambridge's plan to raise the north and (apparently) to put Edmund (V)
> > Mortimer, earl of March, on the throne must have thrown his son's
> > dynastic position into sharp relief: the young Richard's mother had
> been
> > the elder of March's sisters, which made the boy himself a possible
> heir
> > to the Mortimer-Clarence claim to the throne. On Cambridge's death he
> > became a royal ward, and it is not altogether surprising that in March
> > 1416 he was placed in the custody of the Lancastrians' leading gaoler,
> > Sir Robert Waterton. Three years into his reign, however, Henry V was
> > busy laying to rest the divisions of his father's time and Richard of
> > York was destined for rehabilitation. He was protected from the
> effects
> > of his father's attainder and, on the death of his uncle Edward, duke
> of
> > York, at Agincourt, the boy was recognized to be his heir. Not long
> > after Henry VI's accession York's wardship and marriage were sold to
> > Ralph Neville, earl of Westmorland. At 3000 marks the price was a high
> > one, but Neville's investment was amply repaid when, in January 1425,
> > Edmund, earl of March, died childless, and York, as his nephew, became
> > heir to the extensive Mortimer inheritance. At some stage in the
> 1420s,
> > possibly as early as 1424, the young duke was married off to Cecily
> > Neville (1415-1495), one of Westmorland's daughters with Joan
> Beaufort.
> > From the point of view of the Nevilles, who had married into most of
> the
> > leading magnate families of the day, it was a prestigious match that
> > helped to confirm the family's growing pre-eminence; from the point of
> > view of Henry VI's government, it was an ideal way to absorb a
> > potentially dangerous figure by attaching him to some of the dynasty's
> > staunchest supporters.
> >
> > Over the next few years York was drawn more closely into the circle
> > around the young king. In 1426 he was knighted, and two years later he
> > was appointed to take up residence in the royal household. In 1430
> York
> > took part in the king's coronation expedition to France. His retinue
> was
> > small, but he was handsomely rewarded for his involvement: over 1000
> > marks by the summer of 1431. Soon after his return, and still a minor
> > (though there appears to have been some uncertainty over this at the
> > time), he was granted livery of his estates on 12 May 1432. At the
> time
> > both inheritances were encumbered with debts, dowers, and obligations,
> > while the duchy of York was mainly in the hands of feoffees. By the
> > summer of 1434, however, a series of financial settlements and the
> > deaths of the two remaining dowagers had lifted the worst of these
> > burdens, and the duke was free to enjoy his extensive patrimony
> > undisturbed. The acquisition of his inheritance had cost him quite a
> > lot, but he had received fair-even generous-treatment from the
> > government. York's proximity to the king, both in blood and in person,
> > and his links with the families of Neville and Beaufort had stood him
> in
> > good stead.
> >
> > Service in France
> >
> > In 1433 York was admitted to the Order of the Garter-a mark of favour,
> a
> > certificate of loyalty, and perhaps a token of martial expectations.
> His
> > first taste of military command was to be as successor to John, duke
> of
> > Bedford, in the lieutenancy of France, a post for which he was, in
> many
> > ways, the obvious candidate: the royal commission, dated 8 May 1436,
> > recited the king's desire to see France ruled by 'some great prince of
> > our blood' (Johnson, York, 226), and there was no one else who fitted
> > the bill, apart from Humphrey, duke of Gloucester. York had agreed to
> > serve in France as early as February 1436, but his army did not reach
> > Harfleur until 7 June. Had it left England more promptly, it might
> have
> > been able to prevent the French reconquest of Paris and the
> > Ile-de-France, which took place during the spring, though it is
> > difficult to know where the blame for the expedition's dilatoriness
> > should lie: York was also to be late leaving for his second tour of
> duty
> > in 1441, and the government was sceptical of his excuses on both
> > occasions, but recruiting an army was no easy feat in the later stages
> > of the Hundred Years' War, and delays were probably unavoidable. In
> the
> > event the French advance was halted by York's forces. The brilliant
> > campaign of autumn 1436, which ensured the safety of Rouen, was
> actually
> > commanded by John, Lord Talbot, but Duke Richard too seems to have
> > carried out some useful work, regaining most of the Pays de Caux after
> > the rebellion of 1435, attending to the grievances of the Normans, and
> > surveying the English garrisons. During both of York's lieutenancies
> it
> > seems to have been a policy of his to delegate the basic management of
> > the war to leading captains: his retainer Talbot, as marshal, in 1436;
> > his brother-in-law Richard Neville, earl of Salisbury, as
> > lieutenant-general in 1437; and Talbot again as 'lieutenant-general
> for
> > the conduct of the war' (Pollard, 39) during York's second tour of
> duty
> > from 1441. Although the duke and his council retained overall control
> of
> > military policy throughout, it may be that York saw himself more as a
> > viceroy, responsible for government as a whole, than as a warrior.
> This
> > is certainly implicit in the attention that he gave to matters of
> > domestic governance in Normandy and the pays de conquete: it was for
> his
> > good rule of the duchy and for his genuine attempts to deal with the
> > problems created by a declining military occupation that York would be
> > remembered in France. His role in the fighting of the war was
> > undistinguished, and a number of English chroniclers noted the fact.
> >
> > Faced with the imminent expiry of his indentures-though not of his
> > lieutenancy, the term of which was indefinite-York sought permission
> to
> > return home in the spring of 1437. His successor was to be the earl of
> > Warwick, and York was instructed to remain in Normandy until his
> > arrival, which was delayed until the following November. It is
> difficult
> > to know whether the decision to replace York reflects disappointment
> > with his performance or not: the duke may even have wished to stand
> > down, possibly because of difficulties in extracting money from the
> > Norman exchequer for the payment of his troops. In any event Warwick's
> > service was soon cut short by his death in April 1439, and Henry VI's
> > government found itself once again faced with the task of providing
> for
> > the rule of Lancastrian France. It was apparently as a compromise
> > candidate that York emerged as the new lieutenant on 2 July 1440:
> > Gloucester appears to have sought his own appointment, while Cardinal
> > Beaufort, the regime's paymaster, probably pressed the claims of his
> > nephew John Beaufort, earl of Somerset. York, however, was the most
> > suitable choice for a post which now, more than ever, demanded a
> > flexible, diplomatic, and authoritative holder: as the government
> > pursued both peace and war with greater vigour than before, the duke
> was
> > sufficiently neutral, consultative, and grand to act effectively on
> its
> > behalf; he was also well connected with all parties, including the
> > military establishment in France.
> >
> > On this occasion York demanded adequate funding and increased powers
> > before he would accept the job: he went to France as a second Bedford,
> > with all the powers that Duke John had enjoyed after 1432 and a
> promise
> > of £20,000 a year from the English exchequer to fund his troops.
> Apart
> > from these improved terms of service, however, the patterns of the
> first
> > lieutenancy were repeated. York left England late, not arriving in
> > Normandy until the end of June 1441. He then moved speedily down the
> > Seine to Pontoise where Talbot was struggling to lift Charles VII's
> > siege, but this was to be his only military action in the three years
> > before the truce of Tours. It was not a particularly impressive one:
> if
> > York had helped to secure Pontoise for a further few months, he may
> also
> > have frustrated a daring scheme of Talbot's that could have resulted
> in
> > the capture of the French king. Caution, it seems, got the better of
> > York, and not for the last time in his career.
> >
> > Over the next few years the duke busied himself with matters of
> > governance and diplomacy while the war effort in Normandy ground
> slowly
> > to a halt. In part this was because Charles VII had turned his
> attention
> > to the south-west, but it is clear that York's reluctance to engage
> the
> > French directly caused dissatisfaction in the English government and
> it
> > may help to explain why Cardinal Beaufort was able to engineer a major
> > military command for his nephew John. The earl of Somerset's
> expedition,
> > planned from late 1442 and launched in the summer of 1443, involved a
> > major diversion of men, funds, and authority away from York and the
> > Norman theatre. Duke Richard dispatched an embassy to remonstrate with
> > the English government in June 1443, but it had no effect, and the
> > campaign itself added injury to insult: Somerset's attack on Brittany
> > and the duke of Alencon's stronghold of La Guerche disrupted York's
> > attempts, conducted during 1442-3, to involve the English in an
> alliance
> > of French princes. In the light of all this it is hardly surprising
> > that, following the expedition's failure, the government seems to have
> > felt the need to appease York: tallies for the payments due at
> > Michaelmas 1443 arrived in February 1444 and, later in that year, the
> > duke was given a major apanage in southern Normandy, while earldoms
> > (and, in Edmund's case, lands) were granted to his eldest sons. After
> > this no more of York's wages were paid until 1446, but at least the
> > truce contracted in May 1444 reduced his expenses and removed the need
> > for further military activity. In September 1445 York returned to
> > England: his indentures were about to expire, parliament was in
> session,
> > and-rather ironically, given the government's own failures in this
> > regard-his management of Norman finances was under investigation.
> >
> > York and English politics before 1450
> >
> > It now seems clear that Cardinal Beaufort, William de la Pole, earl of
> > Suffolk, and the other leading councillors and courtiers who, in the
> > first instance, managed Henry VI's authority in the 1430s and 1440s
> > intended Richard of York to be a pillar of the Lancastrian regime.
> This
> > did not mean that the already wealthy duke was to be showered with
> > gifts, nor did it mean that he was to be given a formal role in the
> > government of England. York was not, for example, appointed to the
> > re-established council in November 1437, but nothing should be
> inferred
> > from this: at twenty-six the duke would have been considered rather
> > youthful for what was in any case a rather anomalous role; exclusion
> > from the council would scarcely have excluded him from influence; and
> it
> > is likely that already the expectation was that his service to the
> crown
> > would be overseas, at least while he was of military age. It is not
> > known what part, if any, York played in the politics of 1437-41,
> during
> > which time he was in England and Henry VI, somewhat uncertainly, came
> of
> > age. There is no reason to suppose that he supported the moves of
> > Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, against Cardinal Beaufort in 1439-40,
> > despite Gloucester's suggestion that York and other lords had been
> > wrongfully kept out of power; nor should it be assumed that he was
> > opposed to the release of the duke of Orleans. He seems to have kept a
> > low profile at this time, participating in a scheme to restore order
> in
> > Wales in 1437-8, sharing in the custody of the Beauchamp wardship in
> > 1439, and touring his estates. When, in early 1441, the 'longe
> > bareynesse' of his marriage was suddenly ended and a son born, York
> > named him Henry (Bokenham's Legenden, 273). This demonstration of
> > dynastic loyalty earned a gift of £100 worth of jewels from the
> grateful
> > king: the restoration of the heir of Cambridge and Mortimer must have
> > seemed to be complete.
> >
> > As lieutenant of France for the second time York became embroiled in
> the
> > government's various diplomatic initiatives, including the moves
> > associated with the truce of Tours. It has often been assumed that
> Duke
> > Richard was hostile to the peace negotiations of the 1440s, but there
> is
> > absolutely no evidence for this. While the confusions of policy in the
> > early years of the decade must have been exasperating for anyone
> charged
> > with responsibility for the defence of Lancastrian France, there is
> > nothing to suggest that York preferred war to diplomacy as a means of
> > preserving English interests. As the plan to seek a truce with Charles
> > VII and a marriage alliance with the house of Anjou emerged as the
> > central plank of royal policy in 1444, York seems to have given it his
> > full support. In the new spirit of Anglo-French amity, for example, he
> > sent forces to assist the dauphin's campaign in Alsace in the summer
> of
> > 1444. The following year, and possibly in response to promptings from
> > the government, he opened negotiations for a marriage between his
> eldest
> > son (now Edward of Rouen-the future Edward IV-born on 28 April 1442)
> and
> > one of the French king's daughters. The duke may even have been
> > sympathetic to the government's plans to surrender Maine, which
> > proceeded alongside the truce negotiations and formed an integral part
> > of the alliance policy. Because of the postures that York struck after
> > 1450 historians have tended to assume that he was opposed to this
> > notorious scheme, but that is by no means clear. It is very likely
> that
> > he knew what was planned by the end of 1445 (if not earlier, since he
> > met Suffolk's embassy as it travelled through Normandy in 1444) and he
> > was certainly involved in the arrangements for compensating Maine's
> > English landholders in 1447. Interestingly York was never explicitly
> to
> > condemn the handover of the territory, although its loss was certainly
> a
> > prominent feature of popular and parliamentary criticism of William de
> > la Pole, by then duke of Suffolk, Edmund Beaufort, duke of Somerset,
> and
> > the other so-called 'traitors' of 1450.
> >
> > It is from the period following his return to England in 1445 that
> > York's alienation from Henry VI's ministers is often supposed to have
> > dated. The duke found himself accused of mishandling the funds he had
> > been paid for the defence of Normandy, and his chief accuser, it
> > appeared, was a central figure in the government, Adam Moleyns, bishop
> > of Chichester. York had returned to England confident of reappointment
> > to the French lieutenancy, but he was obliged to wait for more than a
> > year and then to see the office go to Edmund Beaufort instead. It used
> > to be thought that because of his alleged hostility to the peace
> policy,
> > and his putatively close links to the duke of Gloucester (who died
> > mysteriously in 1447), Duke Richard was persona non grata with
> Suffolk's
> > regime: his appointment to the lieutenancy of Ireland on 30 July 1447
> > has sometimes been seen as a form of exile, the government's hope
> being
> > that, like the earls of March, his predecessors, he would go there and
> die.
> >
> > However, events thus far do not support this interpretation. York was
> > certainly dismayed by the rumours concerning his performance in
> > Normandy, but he was explicitly vindicated by king and lords both in
> and
> > outside the parliament of 1445-6; it is not even known that Moleyns
> had
> > made the accusations York claimed, only that the duke saw in a public
> > attack on the bishop the opportunity to clear his own name. Similarly,
> > while York was probably disappointed not to regain the lieutenancy of
> > France, too much should not be made of this: the lieutenancy of
> Ireland,
> > which he was granted in return, was a post that his most distinguished
> > ancestors (notably Clarence himself) had held; it bestowed upon him
> > almost sovereign powers in the island; and it gave him the opportunity
> > to combine military service with the exploitation of his interests as
> an
> > Irish landlord. Finally, since the terms of his commission permitted
> him
> > to appoint a deputy and return to England, it cannot be seen as a form
> > of banishment. In some ways, indeed, 1446 and 1447 saw York more
> closely
> > involved in the governing regime than he had ever been: in October
> 1446
> > he was granted the abbey and town of Waltham because he 'will come
> often
> > to London for the king's business and his own' (CPR, 1446-52, 43);
> over
> > the next year he attended a number of council meetings and was named
> as
> > a witness to more than three-quarters of the charters issued from 1446
> > to 1448; during 1447-9 he was added to the peace commissions of eleven
> > counties beyond those to which he had been named at his inheritance
> (and
> > in some cases beyond the scope of his landholdings); and finally,
> almost
> > for the first time, he began to enjoy the kind of rewards more
> commonly
> > bestowed on courtiers-most notably, perhaps, the wardship and marriage
> > of the Holland heir (Henry) and a series of lands and offices once
> held
> > by Gloucester. This last detail is a reminder that there was almost
> > nothing to link York with Duke Humphrey in the latter's lifetime: in
> no
> > sense can York be considered his supporter, and it is not improbable
> > that, like other members of the nobility, he witnessed Gloucester's
> > destruction at the Bury parliament and, tacitly at least, assented to
> it.
> >
> > When he finally left for Ireland, in June 1449, Duke Richard did so as
> a
> > loyal and well-regarded member of the Lancastrian establishment. If he
> > had been less involved in affairs during the preceding year or so,
> this
> > may well have been at his own choice. Many of the nobility seem to
> have
> > withdrawn from the court during 1448 as the government's troubles
> began
> > to mount. York cannot have wished to be associated with the
> humiliating
> > surrender of Le Mans in March 1448 and he may well have feared the
> > consequences of the extraordinary coup at Fougeres. A tour of duty in
> > Ireland must have appeared an attractive alternative. During his
> > fourteen months in the province York scored a series of easy (if
> > short-lived) victories, receiving the submission of most of the
> island's
> > leaders and campaigning effectively in Wicklow. At the Drogheda
> > parliament of April 1450 he followed the lead of the Commons at
> > Westminster by introducing an Act of Resumption. Like the lieutenant
> of
> > France he was short of money, and this limited his achievements, but
> the
> > contrast between this vigorous performance and the demoralizing stasis
> > of Somerset's rule in France must have impressed itself upon
> contemporaries.
> >
> > Estates and connections
> >
> > By the mid-1430s, when he had gained full control over his estates,
> York
> > was the richest and most extensive landowner among the king's
> subjects.
> > Estimates of his wealth have varied between £2874 and £5800
> net, but the
> > most recent and reliable estimate suggests that his estates in England
> > and Wales were worth about £4000 a year (net) when he came into
> them,
> > and that his exchequer annuities yielded an average of £600 a
> year.
> > York's lands were scattered through England and the march of Wales,
> with
> > notable concentrations in the West Riding of Yorkshire; in
> Lincolnshire
> > and Northamptonshire; in Dorset and Somerset; in Herefordshire,
> > Shropshire, and the middle march of Wales; and in the centre of East
> > Anglia along the border of Norfolk and Suffolk. Beyond this he held
> the
> > earldom of Ulster and the lordships of Connacht and Trim, although
> only
> > the last of these Irish estates is likely to have yielded York any
> real
> > influence or income.
> >
> > The possession of such vast holdings shaped York's activities as a
> lord:
> > like John of Gaunt before him he was a truly national figure, with
> > interests so widespread and diverse that it was difficult for him to
> > exert the kind of local authority typical of later medieval magnates.
> He
> > had no real 'country'-no county-sized area of concentrated influence
> > where local gentlemen might turn first of all to him for lordship-and
> > this helped to determine both the nature of his affinity and the role
> > that he and it were to play in the politics of the realm. York's
> > following, like Gaunt's or indeed the king's, was a disparate group of
> > often important men, many of whom had their own local allegiances and
> > whose links with York were forged mainly through military service and
> > the tenure of estate or household office. In part, of course, this
> > pattern was a consequence of the duke's long minority and his
> prolonged
> > service in France: many of the servants of the duchy of York had
> melted
> > away in the 1420s into Gloucester's service, for example; while Duke
> > Richard's appointment as Bedford's successor in Normandy presented him
> > with a ready-made following looking for a lord. A spry comment from an
> > anti-Yorkist chronicler has promoted the suggestion that York was
> unduly
> > influenced by the men who gathered round him in Normandy-in
> particular,
> > by Sir William Oldhall, who was one of York's most reliable agents
> > during the 1450s-but there is little to support this notion,
> > particularly when the duke's involvement in the peace policy of the
> > mid-1440s is taken into account. On the contrary, it seems likely that
> > York's high status, his extensive interests, and his relative
> > disengagement from the affairs of any particular locality beyond his
> > estates meant that he was exposed to a wide array of different voices.
> > If anyone besides the king and his ministers was likely to hear the
> > counsel of the realm, it was surely York, who numbered lords such as
> > Talbot, Ralph Cromwell, and Thomas Scales among his councillors, but
> > also enjoyed links with exchequer clerks, lawyers, the widows of
> Norman
> > soldiers, and local worthies from all parts of the country. The
> > maintenance of this kind of connection may have cost York dear-as much
> > as £1300 a year, according to one recent estimate-but it seems
> that his
> > money was well spent. Despite his inability to offer really consistent
> > local support, he was apparently able to co-ordinate the raising of
> > large retinues throughout the 1450s. If some of his servants kept away
> > from the duke's more controversial ventures, a sizeable and
> prestigious
> > core remained loyal to the end.
> >
> > The making of York's rebellion
> >
> > The last and best-known period in York's political life began in
> > September 1450, when he suddenly returned from Ireland and took up the
> > common cry for the traitors surrounding the king to be brought to
> > justice. This was a significant change of political direction for the
> > duke, and one that shaped the remainder of his career, but the reasons
> > for it are not immediately obvious. Modern historians have mostly
> > rejected the traditional interpretation, which laid stress on York's
> > dynastic interests and saw his participation in the popular ferments
> of
> > the 1450s as a device for seizing the crown. Instead, the search has
> > been for the causes of personal grievance on Duke Richard's part: was
> he
> > moved to anger, or even desperation, by the government's enormous
> debts
> > to him? Was he incensed by the new pre-eminence of Edmund Beaufort,
> duke
> > of Somerset, the man who had so recently lost France? Did he fear for
> > his own position, as an old rival took control of Henry VI's
> government?
> > Alternatively, was York simply an opportunist, moving (typically late)
> > to exploit the regime's difficulties, but without any fixed idea of
> > where his dissidence might take him?
> >
> > One difficulty in reaching any conclusions lies in trying to establish
> > which elements of York's programme, as this slowly unfolded, were
> > intentional, and intended from the start. It is certainly unlikely
> that
> > the duke was seeking to gain the throne in 1450: previous legitimists
> > had soon revealed their desire to improve the realm by changing the
> > king, but York was not to assert his Mortimer-Clarence claim until
> 1460,
> > after ten years of activism explicitly devoted to other ends. Even in
> > that year, moreover, his move was greeted with hostility, and it seems
> > reasonable to suggest that the duke would have known all along that
> this
> > was a likely reaction and would have trimmed his policy accordingly.
> It
> > is possible that, in 1450, York was concerned to secure recognition as
> > heir presumptive to Henry VI: the king was still without a child and
> > there was a (somewhat faint) possibility of dynastic competition from
> > the house of Beaufort. Like most noblemen York took an active interest
> > in the claims and titles he possessed-in 1445 he had sought
> information
> > on his interest in the throne of Castile and in 1451 an agent of his
> was
> > to argue in parliament that the duke should be named as heir
> > apparent-but, at best, this can provide only a partial explanation for
> > his actions in 1450.
> >
> > As far as personal grievances are concerned, meanwhile, it is
> difficult
> > to see what grounds York had for complaint. That the duke was part of
> > the establishment in the 1440s has already been illustrated.
> Financially
> > he had fared no worse than any of Henry VI's other major accountants:
> > indeed, somewhat remarkably, given the state of royal finances, he
> > received £1200 from the crown at the end of 1449, and even in May
> 1450
> > efforts were being made to find him money. He may have decided to
> return
> > to England to seek funds-a letter to Salisbury, written in June 1450,
> > suggests that he feared serious losses in Ireland unless he received
> > further payments-but this is rather a different matter from acting on
> a
> > sense of grievance, and if seeking money was York's initial aim, it
> was
> > soon overwhelmed by other purposes.
> >
> > What, finally, of York's famous antagonism towards Somerset: was this
> > the motivation for his assault on the king's ministers? The problem
> here
> > is one of disentangling the personal feud between the two men from the
> > relative positions in which a wider politics had placed them: did York
> > attack the government because it contained Somerset, or did he attack
> > Somerset because he was the leader of the government? It is certainly
> > possible to find grounds for animosity between the two men: Beaufort's
> > performance in the last years of the war was undistinguished to say
> the
> > least, and York may have thought that he himself could have achieved
> > more; it has recently been suggested, moreover, that the lieutenant's
> > casual surrender of Rouen would particularly have rankled with Duke
> > Richard, since he had continued to be its captain. At the same time,
> > however, it is clear that once York had made his inflammatory moves of
> > September 1450 (and possibly even before then), he and Somerset were
> > destined to be at odds: Duke Richard's political standing came quickly
> > to depend on the argument that the government was run by traitors, and
> a
> > large part of his justification for taking up arms in 1450, 1452, and
> > 1455 was that the enmity of leading ministers obliged him to take
> action
> > to defend himself; Duke Edmund, on the other hand, was not unjustified
> > in regarding much of York's behaviour as threatening, both to himself
> > and to the order of the realm; if he sought, in 1450, in 1452-3, and
> in
> > 1455, to deal with the problem by repression instead of indulgence, it
> > was an understandable approach. Politics, as much as personality and
> > private interest, determined the conflict between York and Somerset.
> >
> > Pursuing this further, it may be suggested that it was in the
> > extraordinary politics of 1450 that the most likely reasons for York's
> > sudden attack on the government are to be found. As Normandy fell to
> the
> > French and the king's bankruptcy was exposed in parliament, the
> > authority of Henry VI's ministers disintegrated. MPs and more lowly
> > members of society appeared to be united in the belief that the king
> had
> > been betrayed by a self-serving clique who had pillaged his
> possessions
> > in England and surrendered those in France. If Suffolk's trial and
> > murder had removed the leader of the gang, the rest remained in
> > positions of power, and until the king and the 'true lords' took
> action
> > against them, there could be no justice or order in the realm. This
> > judgement on the recent past dominated public life in England between
> > 1449 and 1451, and it continued to exert a certain influence over the
> > public imagination thereafter. York, like other members of the
> nobility,
> > must have known that in certain ways it was wide of the mark, but this
> > did not mean that it could be ignored. In particular, in fact, it
> could
> > not be ignored by York, who had already been identified by some of the
> > government's critics as the figure most likely to visit retribution
> upon
> > the 'traitors'. This appears to be the explanation for the rough
> > reception that York and his men received at their landing in north
> Wales
> > in September: local agents of the royal household, and possibly their
> > commanders at the centre, had become alarmed about the duke's
> > intentions. It was at this point, perhaps, and not in 1447, that 'by
> > treating [the duke] as an enemy the court had made him one'
> (McFarlane,
> > 405): if both the king's ministers and his subjects were going to cast
> > York as the agent of justice, he might as well fulfil their
> > expectations. Certainly, the moment must have seemed ripe for someone
> to
> > take drastic action: the king's officers could not govern without
> public
> > confidence, and it may have appeared that the removal of some of the
> > discredited men-not least, perhaps, the duke of Somerset-was the best
> > way to restore it.
> >
> > Beyond all this, it might be added that, even if the government had
> not
> > moved against him in 1450, everything in York's make-up would have
> given
> > him the sense that he was the man to restore the situation. He was the
> > greatest prince of the royal blood, head and shoulders above other
> > lords, the natural successor to Bedford and Gloucester in the
> protection
> > of Henry VI's interests. He had already acted as the king's viceroy in
> > France and Ireland; why not in England too? What, if anything, York
> knew
> > of the deeds of men like Gaunt and Woodstock (or those of Montfort and
> > Lancaster), whose status was much the same as his and whose actions
> were
> > to prefigure his own, is not known; but one model of proper noble
> > service had been made available to him when, probably in 1445, York
> was
> > presented with an elegantly decorated translation of Claudian's life
> of
> > the consul Stilicho. It was an account of how the people of Rome and
> > other nations implored this virtuous prince to accept the office of
> > consul and restore good government to a city torn apart by the evil
> > advisers of a child emperor. Its translator had invited York to 'marke
> > stilicoes life' ('Mittelenglische Claudian-Ubersetzung', 256): in
> 1450
> > the moment had arrived when he might put this teaching to good use.
> >
> > York and the politics of the 1450s
> >
> > It was with a volley of bills and open letters addressed to the king
> > that York returned to English political life in September 1450. The
> > first of these sought to establish the duke's loyalty; the second
> > advertised his intention to seek justice against his accusers; but it
> > was the third that was truly controversial-it drew the king's
> attention
> > to the universal complaint that justice was not being done to those
> who
> > broke the king's law with impunity (in particular, the so-called
> > 'traitors'), and offered York's services in bringing the guilty to
> book.
> > This was an open defiance of the government's authority, since the
> > essence of the 'traitors' idea was that it was the men about the king
> > who were most of all responsible for the disasters that had befallen
> the
> > realm. As far as York was concerned, this meant that a true subject
> was
> > obliged to act against the inner circle of authority in order to
> fulfil
> > the terms of his allegiance to king and realm, and this explains the
> > duke's many affirmations of loyalty to King Henry: it was the
> essential
> > justification for actions that, on the face of it, appeared disloyal.
> > Under normal circumstances, of course, attempts to separate a king's
> > chosen counsellors and servants from the ruler himself were unlikely
> to
> > succeed: defiance of royal agents easily shaded into defiance of the
> > king, and that was treason. As York and all the rest of the nobility
> > knew, however, these circumstances were not normal: Henry VI had shown
> > no more discernment than a child in the government of his realm; his
> > ministers were virtually self-appointed, and the policies pursued
> during
> > the 1420s, 1430s, and 1440s were essentially theirs. If this makes
> > nonsense of one aspect of the 'traitors' thesis, it exposes the truth
> of
> > another aspect: the government was not in any real sense the vehicle
> of
> > the king's will, and thus defiance of it was not treason; the regime
> > could legitimately be reshaped, and, with large sections of the public
> > arguing that it should be, York's actions had a certain justice in
> them.
> > In reality he was appealing not to the king with these manifestos, but
> > to the Lords and to the wider public: his plea was that those who were
> > less compromised by the disasters of 1449-50 must abandon those who
> were
> > more immediately responsible; a new government, in which the duke was
> to
> > play a more prominent role, must be established.
> >
> > Not surprisingly York's demands fell on deaf ears. The king's circle
> saw
> > little reason for a general blood-letting, and the nobility, who had
> > begun to lend support to the beleaguered regime as the crisis mounted,
> > appear to have taken a similar view. In a public reply to York's
> bills,
> > his offers of assistance were politely rebuffed, and the duke left
> > London to prepare for the parliament summoned to meet in November
> 1450.
> > When it gathered on the 6th, MPs demonstrated their continuing
> > enthusiasm for reform by electing Oldhall, York's chamberlain, as
> > speaker and loudly calling for the traitors to be brought to justice.
> > When the duke himself arrived, with sword borne upright before him and
> a
> > large army at his back, the initiative was his: Somerset was promptly
> > imprisoned and the Lords waited to see what would happen next. What
> > followed was in part a demonstration of Duke Richard's hesitancy and
> > conservatism, and in part a reflection of the constraints of his
> > position. Elements of the Commons' programme were put into effect, but
> > the duke made no attempt to alter the institutional framework of
> Henry's
> > government, and the result was that, during the Christmas recess,
> > authority drifted back to the king and his household, Somerset was
> > released, and the Lords, many of whom had flirted with York while he
> was
> > in the ascendant, resumed their former obedience. During the sessions
> of
> > the parliament in 1451 York's power waned, and Thomas Younge's
> notorious
> > attempt to have him recognized as heir apparent must have seemed to
> many
> > an act of desperation. Why had York not done more to secure himself
> > during his brief ascendancy? It is not, of course, clear what he
> wanted:
> > if only the restoration of order, then this was being achieved without
> > his help; if a role for himself in the government, then his actions
> had
> > made this unthinkable unless the king himself were to be altogether
> > displaced-the men of Henry's household, who effectively disposed of
> > royal power, were hardly going to welcome a man who had posed as their
> > nemesis. What York had done, in effect, was to go too far without
> going
> > far enough. Perhaps he should have cut his losses and risked a direct
> > assault on the throne; but such a move was almost certain to fail. The
> > duke had cast himself as the true liegeman of Henry VI: any deviation
> > from this role was sure to be seen as the grossest kind of betrayal;
> > York had many potential supporters, but-apart, perhaps, from his own
> > servants-their support was for his public, not his private, interests.
> >
> > It has been worth looking at the events of 1450 in some detail,
> because
> > for the next two years Duke Richard's options were very largely shaped
> > by what had happened in that year. He could not be secure while
> Somerset
> > and the household retained both control of the king and the support of
> > the Lords, yet there was little he could do to improve his lot. Moves
> > against Oldhall were under way by the end of 1451, and when, in
> January
> > 1452, York reacted publicly against them and against their
> implications
> > for himself, he was thinly supported. Apart from the duke's own men
> only
> > the malcontent Thomas Courtenay, earl of Devon, and his crony Lord
> > Cobham were persuaded to join the rising that attempted to repeat the
> > coup of 1450: the rest of the nobility gathered around the king and
> > Somerset, and York was forced to capitulate at Dartford in early
> March.
> > His failure left him worse off than before. He was obliged to swear a
> > humiliating oath of submission, his supporters and tenants were
> harried
> > by judicial commissions, and his attempts to discredit Somerset were
> > treated as part and parcel of a private quarrel. As the common people
> > were reduced to order and the government enjoyed the unfamiliar taste
> of
> > victory in Gascony, it seemed that York's political career was at an
> > end: never again would he be able to take his proper place in the
> > Lancastrian establishment.
> >
> > At this point, however, fate combined with the contradictions of Henry
> > VI's regime to bestow new opportunities upon Duke Richard. In the
> summer
> > of 1453 Somerset's governing consensus suddenly collapsed, as the
> > victories in Gascony were reversed, the king lost his mind, and war
> > broke out in the north between the Nevilles and the Percys. In the
> > resulting crisis York was the only person of sufficient stature to
> > restore the situation, and it must be this factor, above all, that
> > explains the decision of a non-partisan group of councillors to summon
> > him to London in October 1453, and the agreement in parliament to
> > appoint him protector and defender of the realm on 27 March 1454. Here
> > was a means for York to wrest control of government from Somerset and
> > the king's household men without bringing his loyalty to Henry VI into
> > question; and here was a means for the rest of political society to
> > contain the powerful duke and to create an effective government
> without
> > the kind of sacrifices that had been demanded in 1450. York certainly
> > did his part: he went to London full of emollient promises to attend
> the
> > council and do all 'that sholde or might be to the welfare of the king
> > and of his subgettes' (CPR, 1452-61, 143); he made no attacks on
> > Somerset or other sometime 'traitors' (though his ally, Norfolk, did);
> > and, on taking up the post of protector, he committed himself to rule
> > consultatively and representatively with the Lords. During the
> > succeeding months York made serious and well-founded attempts to
> pacify
> > the disputes in the north and north midlands, and he enjoyed some
> > success. Making genuine efforts to consult widely, he demonstrated the
> > same statesmanlike qualities that had marked his management of France
> > and Ireland: 'for a whole year', wrote one chronicler, 'he governed
> the
> > whole realm of England most nobly and in the best way' ('Benet's
> > chronicle', 212). There were certainly limits to his achievement, and
> > his tenure of office was to be brought to an abrupt halt in February
> > 1455, but the duke's performance may have prompted many of his peers
> to
> > look more sympathetically at his claims in the years to come.
> >
> > Unfortunately, however, the moulds of politics were changing in these
> > years, and the broad unity that had so long been preserved among the
> > nobility was breaking down. The deterioration of order in the
> > localities, which had become so dramatic and extensive by 1453, was
> now
> > combined with the emergence of a more aggressive Lancastrian
> dynasticism
> > to promote significant divisions among the elite. These had begun to
> > emerge even before York's protectorate: one of the reasons why it had
> > taken so long to arrange the duke's appointment was that a substantial
> > group of lords had grouped themselves around the queen, Margaret of
> > Anjou, who-since the birth of her son Edward in October 1453-was
> > attempting to secure a regency for herself. In the winter of 1453-4,
> > indeed, civil war looked a distinct possibility. It was held off by
> > York's readiness to make explicit his submission to the dynastic
> claims
> > of the new prince, and by the agreement of all but the most extreme
> > figures to join a broadly based regime under the duke's headship. When
> > Henry VI recovered his sanity, however, at Christmas 1454, those in
> the
> > household and the north who had opposed the protectorate seized the
> > opportunity to assert their interests. York was removed from office on
> 9
> > February 1455, and by early March a more hard-faced government was
> > taking steps against the duke. The fact that the Neville earls of
> > Warwick and Salisbury also fell under attack at this time reveals the
> > factional and divisive aims of those in control: although the
> government
> > proceeded with the language of treason and obedience, its narrowing
> base
> > and its sponsorship of conflict began to undermine its claims to such
> > public goods; when York and the Nevilles confronted the king,
> Somerset,
> > and the Percys at St Albans on 22 May 1455, there was a broad
> > equivalence between the two sides, and the first blows of a civil war
> > were struck.
> >
> > The Yorkist victory, however, brought this war to a rapid halt. Just
> as
> > he had done in the early 1450s, the duke submitted to the king and
> > attempted to rebuild unity. This was to remain his posture and that of
> > his allies right up to the disasters of 1459. York was certainly
> > prepared to strain his allegiance to its very limits-securing
> > appointment to a second protectorate on 15 November 1455 and depriving
> > the king of personal authority a week later-but he would not cross the
> > bounds to an outright repudiation of Henry VI's sovereignty. As a
> > consequence his pre-eminence remained insecure. His protectorate was
> > soon terminated (on 25 February 1456) when parliamentary pressure for
> a
> > resumption weakened his support among the Lords, but the aim of
> > preserving unity, or oonhede, among the nobility lingered on for some
> > years and ensured that if York was not to be admitted to any special
> > power, he was not to be destroyed either. It seems likely that,
> provided
> > he behaved himself, most of the peerage had some respect for the duke.
> > Pressure from Queen Margaret and her growing band of partisans meant
> > that he was obliged to repeat his submission of 1452 on a number of
> > occasions between 1456 and 1459, but he was confirmed in possession of
> > the lieutenancy of Ireland, and even seems to have been able to direct
> > policy for a time in the wake of the 'loveday' settlement of 1458.
> Only
> > in 1459 did the bulk of the Lords finally accept the case for war
> > against the duke, and then the fault-lines of 1453-4 and 1455 were
> > recreated and York received the support of the Nevilles. Rather as at
> St
> > Albans, York, Warwick, and Salisbury revived the case that evil
> > counsellors around the king were destroying the common weal of the
> realm
> > and threatening their own security. On this occasion, however, their
> > propaganda cut no ice: finding most of the nobility in arms against
> them
> > at Ludford Bridge (near Ludlow, Shropshire) and deserted by a part of
> > the army, York and his allies fled the field during the night of 12-13
> > October 1459.
> >
> > Exile, return, and death
> >
> > The duke and his second son, Edmund, earl of Rutland, spent the next
> > eleven months in Ireland, attempting to gain the men and money for an
> > armed return to England, where the duke's estates were in royal hands
> as
> > a result of his attainder at the Coventry parliament (about the end of
> > November 1459). His younger children, including George, were all
> placed
> > in the custody of the duchess of Buckingham. An incidental result of
> > York's efforts was the famous Drogheda parliament of 8 February 1460,
> in
> > which the Anglo-Irish establishment obtained recognition as a distinct
> > political community, separate from England, ruled by its own laws and
> > financed by its own currency. In return for these concessions York
> > gained resources, protection for his person, and an extensive army of
> > archers, which he must have intended to take to England. Plans for a
> > co-ordinated invasion of the mainland were apparently made during a
> > conference with Warwick at Waterford in the spring of 1460, and the
> > duke's Neville allies, accompanied by his eldest son, Edward of March,
> > duly landed in Kent in June professing loyalty to Henry VI and
> > protesting about the misgovernment of the realm. With startling
> success,
> > they won support in London and the south-east and proceeded to defeat
> > the royal army at Northampton on 10 July, submitting to the king at
> the
> > battle's end. Over the next few weeks March and the Nevilles began to
> > secure the realm and to await York's return, which finally occurred
> near
> > Chester on or about 9 September 1460.
> >
> > Much about the next few weeks is obscure: it is not known why it took
> > York so long to join his allies on the mainland; it is not known when
> he
> > began so famously to assert his claim to the throne (13 September is
> the
> > first date for which a plausible case can be made); it is not known
> > whether or not the initiative had been agreed, or even discussed, with
> > the Nevilles. It seems clear that there was no option for York but to
> > attempt to make himself king: all other avenues, as has been shown,
> led
> > nowhere; the duke could neither secure himself nor restore political
> > order without taking the drastic step from which he had so far shrunk;
> > and it may have seemed that by 1460 the polity of Henry VI was
> > sufficiently dislocated to permit a direct assault on the king.
> > Unfortunately for the duke, however, his own options were different
> from
> > those of his allies, even his sons. These men had gained support on
> the
> > old plea of reforming Henry VI's government. They had recently made
> > their loyalty to the king explicit. As the managers of a large and
> > diverse alliance, they could not easily abandon what they had
> promised,
> > and it seems clear that the message from the London elite, who played
> an
> > important role in the frantic politics of 1459-61, was that a
> deposition
> > could not be tolerated. York marched into London, seized the king, and
> > entered parliament on 10 October, announcing that he intended 'to
> > challenge his right' to the crown (Johnson, York, 214). The Lords'
> > response was unpromising: they went into conclave at Blackfriars and
> > sent the young earl of March to persuade his father to accept a
> > negotiated settlement. By 13 October York had been brought to abandon
> > his plans for an immediate coronation, and a few days later he
> submitted
> > his claim for discussion in parliament. An accord emerged on 31
> October,
> > and its central feature was to leave Henry VI on the throne, while
> > settling the succession on York and his sons. It is possible that even
> > after this York attempted to get his way by inducing Henry to
> abdicate.
> > He must have realized that, like the treaty of Troyes on which it was
> > apparently based, the accord promised immediate war with the
> > disinherited heir. In any event, the king was moved to safety and the
> > duke was obliged to accept the terms agreed in October, at least for
> the
> > time being. Acting more or less as protector he marched north in early
> > December to deal with the forces of the prince of Wales and Queen
> > Margaret, which had regrouped in Yorkshire after the defeat at
> > Northampton. Venturing forth from his castle at Sandal on 30 December
> > 1460, in what may have been an uncharacteristic attempt to surprise
> his
> > enemy, York was set upon by an unexpectedly large Lancastrian force.
> In
> > the ensuing battle of Wakefield, he and his second son, Edmund of
> > Rutland, were killed. As a macabre riposte to Duke Richard's recent
> > pretensions, his head was severed from his body and displayed on the
> > walls of York bearing a paper crown.
> >
> > So ended the life of this curious figure, who, having played safe in
> the
> > prime of his years, abruptly changed tack at the age of thirty-nine,
> > pursuing ever more ambitious and dangerous policies until, with
> victory
> > almost in his grasp, he fell on an ill-chosen battlefield. Duke
> Richard
> > was the true founder of the royal house of York, but despite a career
> > that a recent biographer has described as 'the most successful failure
> > of the middle ages' (Johnson, 'Political career', abstract), he has
> > inspired little interest and even less sympathy among historians.
> > Notwithstanding his many claims to be acting for the 'common weal' of
> > the realm, York has usually been presented as a somewhat colourless
> > bungler: all along, it seems, he wanted power, but he could not decide
> > how far to go until the last minute, whereupon-fatally-he went too
> far.
> > In 1964 B. Wilkinson set the tone for most modern accounts of the
> duke's
> > career with his judgement that 'it would be folly to make a statesman
> > out of this fifteenth-century worldling' (Wilkinson, 88). This view
> > seems unfairly harsh: like many of his peers, his instincts were to
> make
> > the best of things in Henry VI's England, a world in which there were
> no
> > easy answers. York's opportunities were closely circumscribed and his
> > intentions in opposing Henry VI's government are far from clear; in
> fact
> > there may be a case for seeing him more as the victim of circumstances
> > than as their creator. His cautiousness, if ultimately unproductive,
> was
> > justified by the sheer impropriety of opposition to the government. On
> > the other hand, the recklessness that he demonstrated in 1450, 1452,
> > 1455, 1459, and 1460 was also justified: sometimes by its results;
> > always by the need to do something to restore the authority that the
> > king, in his feebleness, had frittered away. In medieval England,
> > however, the restoration of authority could only be carried out from
> the
> > throne. York's final and most destructive venture was thus his
> > best-conceived one, but it is easy to see why it has won him few
> plaudits.
> >
> > John Watts
> >
> > Sources P. A. Johnson, Duke Richard of York, 1411-1460 (1988) + T. B.
> > Pugh, 'Richard Plantagenet (1411-60), duke of York, as the king's
> > lieutenant in France and Ireland', Aspects of medieval government and
> > society: essays presented to J. R. Lander, ed. J. G. Rowe (1986),
> 107-41
> > + J. Watts, Henry VI and the politics of kingship (1996) + R. A.
> > Griffiths, The reign of King Henry VI: the exercise of royal
> authority,
> > 1422-1461 (1981) + Chancery records + J. T. Rosenthal, 'The estates
> and
> > finances of Richard, duke of York, 1411-1460', Studies in Medieval and
> > Renaissance History, 2 (1965), 117-204 + G. L. Harriss, Cardinal
> > Beaufort: a study of Lancastrian ascendancy and decline (1988) + A. J.
> > Pollard, John Talbot and the war in France, 1427-1453, Royal
> Historical
> > Society Studies in History, 35 (1983) + C. T. Allmand, Lancastrian
> > Normandy, 1415-1450 (1983) + M. K. Jones, 'Somerset, York and the Wars
> > of the Roses', EngHR, 104 (1989), 285-307 + R. A. Griffiths, 'Duke
> > Richard of York's intentions in 1450 and the origins of the Wars of
> the
> > Roses', Journal of Medieval History, 1 (1975), 187-209 + M. L.
> Kekewich
> > and others, eds., The politics of fifteenth-century England: John
> Vale's
> > book (1995) + J. L. Watts, 'De consulatu Stiliconis: texts and
> politics
> > in the reign of Henry VI', Journal of Medieval History, 16 (1990),
> > 251-66 + J. M. W. Bean, 'The financial position of Richard, duke of
> > York', War and government in the middle ages, ed. J. Gillingham and J.
> > C. Holt (1984), 182-98 + T. B. Pugh, Henry V and the Southampton plot
> of
> > 1415, Southampton RS, 30 (1988) + A. J. Otway-Ruthven, A history of
> > medieval Ireland (1968) + 'John Benet's chronicle for the years 1400
> to
> > 1462', ed. G. L. Harriss and M. A. Harriss, Camden miscellany, XXIV,
> CS,
> > 4th ser., 9 (1972) + E. Flugel, 'Eine mittelenglische
> > Claudian-Ubersetzung (1445)', Anglia, 28 (1905), 255-99 + P. A.
> Johnson,
> > 'The political career of Richard, duke of York, to 1456', DPhil diss.,
> > U. Oxf., 1981 + B. Wilkinson, Constitutional history of England in the
> > fifteenth century (1399-1485) (1964) + Osbern Bokenam's Legenden, ed.
> C.
> > Horstmann (Heilbronn, 1883) + 'William Gregory's chronicle of London',
> > The historical collections of a citizen of London in the fifteenth
> > century, ed. J. Gairdner, CS, new ser., 17 (1876) + K. Dockray, 'The
> > battle of Wakefield and the Wars of the Roses', The Ricardian, 9
> > (1991-3), 238-58 + R. Knowles, 'The battle of Wakefield: the
> > topography', The Ricardian, 9 (1991-3), 259-65 + C. Ross, Edward IV
> > (1974) + Itineraries [of] William Worcestre, ed. J. H. Harvey, OMT
> > (1969) + K. B. McFarlane, 'The Lancastrian kings', Cambridge Medieval
> > History, 8, ed. C. W. Previte-Orton and Z. N. Brooke (1936), 363-417 +
> > CPR, 1446-61 + CEPR letters, 8.132
> > Archives BL, letters relating to a truce between England and Burgundy,
> > Add. Ch. 75479
> > Likenesses painted glass window, Cirencester; repro. in S. Lysons, A
> > collection of Gloucestershire antiquities (1804) · painted glass
> window,
> > Trinity Cam. [see illus.]
> > Wealth at death under £4600 p.a. net: Johnson, Duke Richard, 7,
> 21-4
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
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