Maurice's Strategikon
Maurice's Strategikon
2007-01-10 16:48:20
While going though Google Alerts, I came across a reference to Maurice's
Strategikon, which is an 'Art of War' for Byzantine forces in early
medieval times. The work is new to me, and I am posting it because I
wonder if it was a work that Western European nobles learned as part of
their military education in medieval times.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/strategikon/strategikon.htm
I make the following observations, hoping that others might know more
about this treatise.
* Like the Byzantines, Napoleon used varied sized fighting units.
* The effectiveness of suppressive fire depends less on accuracy
than on sheer volume and high trajectory. The English were made aware of
this truth when first faced by Welsh firepower while Edward I fought the
Welsh. The English used the archer effectively during the early stages
of The Hundred Years War. Even though the English archer was dismounted
while the Byzantine archer was mounted, the basic concept of quantity of
fire over quality of fire remains the same.
* The use of cursores and defensores was meant to solve the problem
of 'victors' falling into ambushes while pursuing an enemy in retreat.
At Hastings, Harold's army pursued the Normans who were in retreat, and
were cut down when William's cavalry wheeled and charged. The Saxons had
no backup to protect them. Sometimes it's hard to know when a retreat is
a feint. Best to have support
* The Byzantines' new battle order placed the men in two lines, so
that the second line could cover if the the first line was pushed back.
Although this tactic was new for the Byzantines, I'm not sure how new it
was in general military strategy. It was certainly used in medieval warfare.
* Also, I'm not sure sure how new was the idea of flanking guards.
* Perhaps we still have something to learn from the concept that one
has to know one's enemy well. Maybe the reason we get into trouble these
days is that we are arrogant in our underestimation of our enemy's
intelligence.
* While reading the section on dispensing information on a
'need-to-know' basis only, I was struck by how business strategy has
moved back to this approach. About thirty years ago, businesses began to
entrust employees with great amounts of information so that front line
people could be 'empowered' to make their own strategic decisions. If we
look at what just happened at Home Depot, we see an example of a company
who reversed this tendency by removing power from the front-liners and
concentrating control in a tight central cadre. It's probably good to
keep things close to the vest in military initiatives, but I'm not sure
that it works in a business setting. Of course, one of the suggested
readings for corporate CEOs is The Art of War.
* The Strategikon advises that the commander master a variety of
strategic models, and that he not use the same strategy all the time.
One of the weaknesses shown by the French in the first stages of the
Hundred Years War is that their moves were predictable. They started out
with Genoese crossbowmen, and then followed with a massive cavalry
charge. The English knew that all they had to do was to order the long
bowmen to fire high and quickly. Of course, as time wore on, it was the
English who became predictable as the French opted for a war of attrition.
* The Spanish Jinettes seem to have been horsemen who used the
tactics of the Byzantine horsemen, but I assume the Spanish got the idea
from the Moors. I'm not sure that the concept of light horsemen was
adopted in other parts of Europe during the middle ages.
Interesting stuff. I wonder if this work was known in Western Europe, or
whether its lessons were learned from intermediary sources or
independent experience. By the same token, I know that the concepts
expounded upon in the Strategikon were not all made up by its author.
Of course,we know that, in some cases, the lessons weren't learned at all.
Strategikon, which is an 'Art of War' for Byzantine forces in early
medieval times. The work is new to me, and I am posting it because I
wonder if it was a work that Western European nobles learned as part of
their military education in medieval times.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/strategikon/strategikon.htm
I make the following observations, hoping that others might know more
about this treatise.
* Like the Byzantines, Napoleon used varied sized fighting units.
* The effectiveness of suppressive fire depends less on accuracy
than on sheer volume and high trajectory. The English were made aware of
this truth when first faced by Welsh firepower while Edward I fought the
Welsh. The English used the archer effectively during the early stages
of The Hundred Years War. Even though the English archer was dismounted
while the Byzantine archer was mounted, the basic concept of quantity of
fire over quality of fire remains the same.
* The use of cursores and defensores was meant to solve the problem
of 'victors' falling into ambushes while pursuing an enemy in retreat.
At Hastings, Harold's army pursued the Normans who were in retreat, and
were cut down when William's cavalry wheeled and charged. The Saxons had
no backup to protect them. Sometimes it's hard to know when a retreat is
a feint. Best to have support
* The Byzantines' new battle order placed the men in two lines, so
that the second line could cover if the the first line was pushed back.
Although this tactic was new for the Byzantines, I'm not sure how new it
was in general military strategy. It was certainly used in medieval warfare.
* Also, I'm not sure sure how new was the idea of flanking guards.
* Perhaps we still have something to learn from the concept that one
has to know one's enemy well. Maybe the reason we get into trouble these
days is that we are arrogant in our underestimation of our enemy's
intelligence.
* While reading the section on dispensing information on a
'need-to-know' basis only, I was struck by how business strategy has
moved back to this approach. About thirty years ago, businesses began to
entrust employees with great amounts of information so that front line
people could be 'empowered' to make their own strategic decisions. If we
look at what just happened at Home Depot, we see an example of a company
who reversed this tendency by removing power from the front-liners and
concentrating control in a tight central cadre. It's probably good to
keep things close to the vest in military initiatives, but I'm not sure
that it works in a business setting. Of course, one of the suggested
readings for corporate CEOs is The Art of War.
* The Strategikon advises that the commander master a variety of
strategic models, and that he not use the same strategy all the time.
One of the weaknesses shown by the French in the first stages of the
Hundred Years War is that their moves were predictable. They started out
with Genoese crossbowmen, and then followed with a massive cavalry
charge. The English knew that all they had to do was to order the long
bowmen to fire high and quickly. Of course, as time wore on, it was the
English who became predictable as the French opted for a war of attrition.
* The Spanish Jinettes seem to have been horsemen who used the
tactics of the Byzantine horsemen, but I assume the Spanish got the idea
from the Moors. I'm not sure that the concept of light horsemen was
adopted in other parts of Europe during the middle ages.
Interesting stuff. I wonder if this work was known in Western Europe, or
whether its lessons were learned from intermediary sources or
independent experience. By the same token, I know that the concepts
expounded upon in the Strategikon were not all made up by its author.
Of course,we know that, in some cases, the lessons weren't learned at all.
Re: [Richard III Society Forum] Maurice's Strategikon
2007-01-10 18:39:44
Hello Bill
I'm not sure how well known the Strategikon was in the Middle Ages, but I suspect that it was not. My understanding is that Byzantium was very much a 'foreign country' to Westerners and viewed with a good deal of suspicion because of religious differences. Further, the Strategikon was written in Greek, and there was very littlre translation of Greek texts into Latin until the Rennaissance. I did do some Byzantine history at university and I distinctly remember our lecturer telling us that the most recent reliable edition of the Strategikon (in Greek) was published in the 17th century.
Regards
Ann
Bill Barber <bbarber@...> wrote:
While going though Google Alerts, I came across a reference to Maurice's
Strategikon, which is an 'Art of War' for Byzantine forces in early
medieval times. The work is new to me, and I am posting it because I
wonder if it was a work that Western European nobles learned as part of
their military education in medieval times.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/strategikon/strategikon.htm
I make the following observations, hoping that others might know more
about this treatise.
* Like the Byzantines, Napoleon used varied sized fighting units.
* The effectiveness of suppressive fire depends less on accuracy
than on sheer volume and high trajectory. The English were made aware of
this truth when first faced by Welsh firepower while Edward I fought the
Welsh. The English used the archer effectively during the early stages
of The Hundred Years War. Even though the English archer was dismounted
while the Byzantine archer was mounted, the basic concept of quantity of
fire over quality of fire remains the same.
* The use of cursores and defensores was meant to solve the problem
of 'victors' falling into ambushes while pursuing an enemy in retreat.
At Hastings, Harold's army pursued the Normans who were in retreat, and
were cut down when William's cavalry wheeled and charged. The Saxons had
no backup to protect them. Sometimes it's hard to know when a retreat is
a feint. Best to have support
* The Byzantines' new battle order placed the men in two lines, so
that the second line could cover if the the first line was pushed back.
Although this tactic was new for the Byzantines, I'm not sure how new it
was in general military strategy. It was certainly used in medieval warfare.
* Also, I'm not sure sure how new was the idea of flanking guards.
* Perhaps we still have something to learn from the concept that one
has to know one's enemy well. Maybe the reason we get into trouble these
days is that we are arrogant in our underestimation of our enemy's
intelligence.
* While reading the section on dispensing information on a
'need-to-know' basis only, I was struck by how business strategy has
moved back to this approach. About thirty years ago, businesses began to
entrust employees with great amounts of information so that front line
people could be 'empowered' to make their own strategic decisions. If we
look at what just happened at Home Depot, we see an example of a company
who reversed this tendency by removing power from the front-liners and
concentrating control in a tight central cadre. It's probably good to
keep things close to the vest in military initiatives, but I'm not sure
that it works in a business setting. Of course, one of the suggested
readings for corporate CEOs is The Art of War.
* The Strategikon advises that the commander master a variety of
strategic models, and that he not use the same strategy all the time.
One of the weaknesses shown by the French in the first stages of the
Hundred Years War is that their moves were predictable. They started out
with Genoese crossbowmen, and then followed with a massive cavalry
charge. The English knew that all they had to do was to order the long
bowmen to fire high and quickly. Of course, as time wore on, it was the
English who became predictable as the French opted for a war of attrition.
* The Spanish Jinettes seem to have been horsemen who used the
tactics of the Byzantine horsemen, but I assume the Spanish got the idea
from the Moors. I'm not sure that the concept of light horsemen was
adopted in other parts of Europe during the middle ages.
Interesting stuff. I wonder if this work was known in Western Europe, or
whether its lessons were learned from intermediary sources or
independent experience. By the same token, I know that the concepts
expounded upon in the Strategikon were not all made up by its author.
Of course,we know that, in some cases, the lessons weren't learned at all.
I'm not sure how well known the Strategikon was in the Middle Ages, but I suspect that it was not. My understanding is that Byzantium was very much a 'foreign country' to Westerners and viewed with a good deal of suspicion because of religious differences. Further, the Strategikon was written in Greek, and there was very littlre translation of Greek texts into Latin until the Rennaissance. I did do some Byzantine history at university and I distinctly remember our lecturer telling us that the most recent reliable edition of the Strategikon (in Greek) was published in the 17th century.
Regards
Ann
Bill Barber <bbarber@...> wrote:
While going though Google Alerts, I came across a reference to Maurice's
Strategikon, which is an 'Art of War' for Byzantine forces in early
medieval times. The work is new to me, and I am posting it because I
wonder if it was a work that Western European nobles learned as part of
their military education in medieval times.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/strategikon/strategikon.htm
I make the following observations, hoping that others might know more
about this treatise.
* Like the Byzantines, Napoleon used varied sized fighting units.
* The effectiveness of suppressive fire depends less on accuracy
than on sheer volume and high trajectory. The English were made aware of
this truth when first faced by Welsh firepower while Edward I fought the
Welsh. The English used the archer effectively during the early stages
of The Hundred Years War. Even though the English archer was dismounted
while the Byzantine archer was mounted, the basic concept of quantity of
fire over quality of fire remains the same.
* The use of cursores and defensores was meant to solve the problem
of 'victors' falling into ambushes while pursuing an enemy in retreat.
At Hastings, Harold's army pursued the Normans who were in retreat, and
were cut down when William's cavalry wheeled and charged. The Saxons had
no backup to protect them. Sometimes it's hard to know when a retreat is
a feint. Best to have support
* The Byzantines' new battle order placed the men in two lines, so
that the second line could cover if the the first line was pushed back.
Although this tactic was new for the Byzantines, I'm not sure how new it
was in general military strategy. It was certainly used in medieval warfare.
* Also, I'm not sure sure how new was the idea of flanking guards.
* Perhaps we still have something to learn from the concept that one
has to know one's enemy well. Maybe the reason we get into trouble these
days is that we are arrogant in our underestimation of our enemy's
intelligence.
* While reading the section on dispensing information on a
'need-to-know' basis only, I was struck by how business strategy has
moved back to this approach. About thirty years ago, businesses began to
entrust employees with great amounts of information so that front line
people could be 'empowered' to make their own strategic decisions. If we
look at what just happened at Home Depot, we see an example of a company
who reversed this tendency by removing power from the front-liners and
concentrating control in a tight central cadre. It's probably good to
keep things close to the vest in military initiatives, but I'm not sure
that it works in a business setting. Of course, one of the suggested
readings for corporate CEOs is The Art of War.
* The Strategikon advises that the commander master a variety of
strategic models, and that he not use the same strategy all the time.
One of the weaknesses shown by the French in the first stages of the
Hundred Years War is that their moves were predictable. They started out
with Genoese crossbowmen, and then followed with a massive cavalry
charge. The English knew that all they had to do was to order the long
bowmen to fire high and quickly. Of course, as time wore on, it was the
English who became predictable as the French opted for a war of attrition.
* The Spanish Jinettes seem to have been horsemen who used the
tactics of the Byzantine horsemen, but I assume the Spanish got the idea
from the Moors. I'm not sure that the concept of light horsemen was
adopted in other parts of Europe during the middle ages.
Interesting stuff. I wonder if this work was known in Western Europe, or
whether its lessons were learned from intermediary sources or
independent experience. By the same token, I know that the concepts
expounded upon in the Strategikon were not all made up by its author.
Of course,we know that, in some cases, the lessons weren't learned at all.
Re: [Richard III Society Forum] Maurice's Strategikon
2007-01-10 19:21:14
Thanks Ann.
I was intrigued that it existed. I think we all know of the /*Art of
War*/, since it's all over the place in bookstores. It's almost required
reading for business managers. But /*Maurice's Strategikon */is
seemingly not well known at all.
I didn't see anything in the treatise that was incredibly original, but
maybe I just don't know enough about the subject.
Even though the /*Strategikon*/ may not have been well-known, I get the
sense that its major tenets were understood, probably through some sort
of diffusion or through independent experience.
A lot of this stuff is just 'using one's head'.
A LYON wrote:
>
> Hello Bill
>
> I'm not sure how well known the Strategikon was in the Middle Ages,
> but I suspect that it was not. My understanding is that Byzantium was
> very much a 'foreign country' to Westerners and viewed with a good
> deal of suspicion because of religious differences. Further, the
> Strategikon was written in Greek, and there was very littlre
> translation of Greek texts into Latin until the Rennaissance. I did do
> some Byzantine history at university and I distinctly remember our
> lecturer telling us that the most recent reliable edition of the
> Strategikon (in Greek) was published in the 17th century.
>
> Regards
>
> Ann
>
> Bill Barber <bbarber@... <mailto:bbarber%40eol.ca>> wrote:
> While going though Google Alerts, I came across a reference to Maurice's
> Strategikon, which is an 'Art of War' for Byzantine forces in early
> medieval times. The work is new to me, and I am posting it because I
> wonder if it was a work that Western European nobles learned as part of
> their military education in medieval times.
> http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/strategikon/strategikon.htm
> <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/strategikon/strategikon.htm>
>
> I make the following observations, hoping that others might know more
> about this treatise.
>
> * Like the Byzantines, Napoleon used varied sized fighting units.
>
> * The effectiveness of suppressive fire depends less on accuracy
> than on sheer volume and high trajectory. The English were made aware of
> this truth when first faced by Welsh firepower while Edward I fought the
> Welsh. The English used the archer effectively during the early stages
> of The Hundred Years War. Even though the English archer was dismounted
> while the Byzantine archer was mounted, the basic concept of quantity of
> fire over quality of fire remains the same.
>
> * The use of cursores and defensores was meant to solve the problem
> of 'victors' falling into ambushes while pursuing an enemy in retreat.
> At Hastings, Harold's army pursued the Normans who were in retreat, and
> were cut down when William's cavalry wheeled and charged. The Saxons had
> no backup to protect them. Sometimes it's hard to know when a retreat is
> a feint. Best to have support
>
> * The Byzantines' new battle order placed the men in two lines, so
> that the second line could cover if the the first line was pushed back.
> Although this tactic was new for the Byzantines, I'm not sure how new it
> was in general military strategy. It was certainly used in medieval
> warfare.
>
> * Also, I'm not sure sure how new was the idea of flanking guards.
>
> * Perhaps we still have something to learn from the concept that one
> has to know one's enemy well. Maybe the reason we get into trouble these
> days is that we are arrogant in our underestimation of our enemy's
> intelligence.
>
> * While reading the section on dispensing information on a
> 'need-to-know' basis only, I was struck by how business strategy has
> moved back to this approach. About thirty years ago, businesses began to
> entrust employees with great amounts of information so that front line
> people could be 'empowered' to make their own strategic decisions. If we
> look at what just happened at Home Depot, we see an example of a company
> who reversed this tendency by removing power from the front-liners and
> concentrating control in a tight central cadre. It's probably good to
> keep things close to the vest in military initiatives, but I'm not sure
> that it works in a business setting. Of course, one of the suggested
> readings for corporate CEOs is The Art of War.
>
> * The Strategikon advises that the commander master a variety of
> strategic models, and that he not use the same strategy all the time.
> One of the weaknesses shown by the French in the first stages of the
> Hundred Years War is that their moves were predictable. They started out
> with Genoese crossbowmen, and then followed with a massive cavalry
> charge. The English knew that all they had to do was to order the long
> bowmen to fire high and quickly. Of course, as time wore on, it was the
> English who became predictable as the French opted for a war of attrition.
>
> * The Spanish Jinettes seem to have been horsemen who used the
> tactics of the Byzantine horsemen, but I assume the Spanish got the idea
> from the Moors. I'm not sure that the concept of light horsemen was
> adopted in other parts of Europe during the middle ages.
>
> Interesting stuff. I wonder if this work was known in Western Europe, or
> whether its lessons were learned from intermediary sources or
> independent experience. By the same token, I know that the concepts
> expounded upon in the Strategikon were not all made up by its author.
>
> Of course,we know that, in some cases, the lessons weren't learned at all.
>
>
>
>
I was intrigued that it existed. I think we all know of the /*Art of
War*/, since it's all over the place in bookstores. It's almost required
reading for business managers. But /*Maurice's Strategikon */is
seemingly not well known at all.
I didn't see anything in the treatise that was incredibly original, but
maybe I just don't know enough about the subject.
Even though the /*Strategikon*/ may not have been well-known, I get the
sense that its major tenets were understood, probably through some sort
of diffusion or through independent experience.
A lot of this stuff is just 'using one's head'.
A LYON wrote:
>
> Hello Bill
>
> I'm not sure how well known the Strategikon was in the Middle Ages,
> but I suspect that it was not. My understanding is that Byzantium was
> very much a 'foreign country' to Westerners and viewed with a good
> deal of suspicion because of religious differences. Further, the
> Strategikon was written in Greek, and there was very littlre
> translation of Greek texts into Latin until the Rennaissance. I did do
> some Byzantine history at university and I distinctly remember our
> lecturer telling us that the most recent reliable edition of the
> Strategikon (in Greek) was published in the 17th century.
>
> Regards
>
> Ann
>
> Bill Barber <bbarber@... <mailto:bbarber%40eol.ca>> wrote:
> While going though Google Alerts, I came across a reference to Maurice's
> Strategikon, which is an 'Art of War' for Byzantine forces in early
> medieval times. The work is new to me, and I am posting it because I
> wonder if it was a work that Western European nobles learned as part of
> their military education in medieval times.
> http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/strategikon/strategikon.htm
> <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/strategikon/strategikon.htm>
>
> I make the following observations, hoping that others might know more
> about this treatise.
>
> * Like the Byzantines, Napoleon used varied sized fighting units.
>
> * The effectiveness of suppressive fire depends less on accuracy
> than on sheer volume and high trajectory. The English were made aware of
> this truth when first faced by Welsh firepower while Edward I fought the
> Welsh. The English used the archer effectively during the early stages
> of The Hundred Years War. Even though the English archer was dismounted
> while the Byzantine archer was mounted, the basic concept of quantity of
> fire over quality of fire remains the same.
>
> * The use of cursores and defensores was meant to solve the problem
> of 'victors' falling into ambushes while pursuing an enemy in retreat.
> At Hastings, Harold's army pursued the Normans who were in retreat, and
> were cut down when William's cavalry wheeled and charged. The Saxons had
> no backup to protect them. Sometimes it's hard to know when a retreat is
> a feint. Best to have support
>
> * The Byzantines' new battle order placed the men in two lines, so
> that the second line could cover if the the first line was pushed back.
> Although this tactic was new for the Byzantines, I'm not sure how new it
> was in general military strategy. It was certainly used in medieval
> warfare.
>
> * Also, I'm not sure sure how new was the idea of flanking guards.
>
> * Perhaps we still have something to learn from the concept that one
> has to know one's enemy well. Maybe the reason we get into trouble these
> days is that we are arrogant in our underestimation of our enemy's
> intelligence.
>
> * While reading the section on dispensing information on a
> 'need-to-know' basis only, I was struck by how business strategy has
> moved back to this approach. About thirty years ago, businesses began to
> entrust employees with great amounts of information so that front line
> people could be 'empowered' to make their own strategic decisions. If we
> look at what just happened at Home Depot, we see an example of a company
> who reversed this tendency by removing power from the front-liners and
> concentrating control in a tight central cadre. It's probably good to
> keep things close to the vest in military initiatives, but I'm not sure
> that it works in a business setting. Of course, one of the suggested
> readings for corporate CEOs is The Art of War.
>
> * The Strategikon advises that the commander master a variety of
> strategic models, and that he not use the same strategy all the time.
> One of the weaknesses shown by the French in the first stages of the
> Hundred Years War is that their moves were predictable. They started out
> with Genoese crossbowmen, and then followed with a massive cavalry
> charge. The English knew that all they had to do was to order the long
> bowmen to fire high and quickly. Of course, as time wore on, it was the
> English who became predictable as the French opted for a war of attrition.
>
> * The Spanish Jinettes seem to have been horsemen who used the
> tactics of the Byzantine horsemen, but I assume the Spanish got the idea
> from the Moors. I'm not sure that the concept of light horsemen was
> adopted in other parts of Europe during the middle ages.
>
> Interesting stuff. I wonder if this work was known in Western Europe, or
> whether its lessons were learned from intermediary sources or
> independent experience. By the same token, I know that the concepts
> expounded upon in the Strategikon were not all made up by its author.
>
> Of course,we know that, in some cases, the lessons weren't learned at all.
>
>
>
>
Re: [Richard III Society Forum] Maurice's Strategikon
2007-01-12 10:25:16
Maurice came to a sad end, being deposed by Phocas and put to death after having his eight children butchered before his eyes. all the deatails are in John Julius Norwich: 'Byzantium; the Early Centuries' (well worth reading anyway).
Regards
Ann
Bill Barber <bbarber@...> wrote:
Thanks Ann.
I was intrigued that it existed. I think we all know of the /*Art of
War*/, since it's all over the place in bookstores. It's almost required
reading for business managers. But /*Maurice's Strategikon */is
seemingly not well known at all.
I didn't see anything in the treatise that was incredibly original, but
maybe I just don't know enough about the subject.
Even though the /*Strategikon*/ may not have been well-known, I get the
sense that its major tenets were understood, probably through some sort
of diffusion or through independent experience.
A lot of this stuff is just 'using one's head'.
A LYON wrote:
>
> Hello Bill
>
> I'm not sure how well known the Strategikon was in the Middle Ages,
> but I suspect that it was not. My understanding is that Byzantium was
> very much a 'foreign country' to Westerners and viewed with a good
> deal of suspicion because of religious differences. Further, the
> Strategikon was written in Greek, and there was very littlre
> translation of Greek texts into Latin until the Rennaissance. I did do
> some Byzantine history at university and I distinctly remember our
> lecturer telling us that the most recent reliable edition of the
> Strategikon (in Greek) was published in the 17th century.
>
> Regards
>
> Ann
>
> Bill Barber <bbarber@... <mailto:bbarber%40eol.ca>> wrote:
> While going though Google Alerts, I came across a reference to Maurice's
> Strategikon, which is an 'Art of War' for Byzantine forces in early
> medieval times. The work is new to me, and I am posting it because I
> wonder if it was a work that Western European nobles learned as part of
> their military education in medieval times.
> http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/strategikon/strategikon.htm
> <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/strategikon/strategikon.htm>
>
> I make the following observations, hoping that others might know more
> about this treatise.
>
> * Like the Byzantines, Napoleon used varied sized fighting units.
>
> * The effectiveness of suppressive fire depends less on accuracy
> than on sheer volume and high trajectory. The English were made aware of
> this truth when first faced by Welsh firepower while Edward I fought the
> Welsh. The English used the archer effectively during the early stages
> of The Hundred Years War. Even though the English archer was dismounted
> while the Byzantine archer was mounted, the basic concept of quantity of
> fire over quality of fire remains the same.
>
> * The use of cursores and defensores was meant to solve the problem
> of 'victors' falling into ambushes while pursuing an enemy in retreat.
> At Hastings, Harold's army pursued the Normans who were in retreat, and
> were cut down when William's cavalry wheeled and charged. The Saxons had
> no backup to protect them. Sometimes it's hard to know when a retreat is
> a feint. Best to have support
>
> * The Byzantines' new battle order placed the men in two lines, so
> that the second line could cover if the the first line was pushed back.
> Although this tactic was new for the Byzantines, I'm not sure how new it
> was in general military strategy. It was certainly used in medieval
> warfare.
>
> * Also, I'm not sure sure how new was the idea of flanking guards.
>
> * Perhaps we still have something to learn from the concept that one
> has to know one's enemy well. Maybe the reason we get into trouble these
> days is that we are arrogant in our underestimation of our enemy's
> intelligence.
>
> * While reading the section on dispensing information on a
> 'need-to-know' basis only, I was struck by how business strategy has
> moved back to this approach. About thirty years ago, businesses began to
> entrust employees with great amounts of information so that front line
> people could be 'empowered' to make their own strategic decisions. If we
> look at what just happened at Home Depot, we see an example of a company
> who reversed this tendency by removing power from the front-liners and
> concentrating control in a tight central cadre. It's probably good to
> keep things close to the vest in military initiatives, but I'm not sure
> that it works in a business setting. Of course, one of the suggested
> readings for corporate CEOs is The Art of War.
>
> * The Strategikon advises that the commander master a variety of
> strategic models, and that he not use the same strategy all the time.
> One of the weaknesses shown by the French in the first stages of the
> Hundred Years War is that their moves were predictable. They started out
> with Genoese crossbowmen, and then followed with a massive cavalry
> charge. The English knew that all they had to do was to order the long
> bowmen to fire high and quickly. Of course, as time wore on, it was the
> English who became predictable as the French opted for a war of attrition.
>
> * The Spanish Jinettes seem to have been horsemen who used the
> tactics of the Byzantine horsemen, but I assume the Spanish got the idea
> from the Moors. I'm not sure that the concept of light horsemen was
> adopted in other parts of Europe during the middle ages.
>
> Interesting stuff. I wonder if this work was known in Western Europe, or
> whether its lessons were learned from intermediary sources or
> independent experience. By the same token, I know that the concepts
> expounded upon in the Strategikon were not all made up by its author.
>
> Of course,we know that, in some cases, the lessons weren't learned at all.
>
>
>
>
Regards
Ann
Bill Barber <bbarber@...> wrote:
Thanks Ann.
I was intrigued that it existed. I think we all know of the /*Art of
War*/, since it's all over the place in bookstores. It's almost required
reading for business managers. But /*Maurice's Strategikon */is
seemingly not well known at all.
I didn't see anything in the treatise that was incredibly original, but
maybe I just don't know enough about the subject.
Even though the /*Strategikon*/ may not have been well-known, I get the
sense that its major tenets were understood, probably through some sort
of diffusion or through independent experience.
A lot of this stuff is just 'using one's head'.
A LYON wrote:
>
> Hello Bill
>
> I'm not sure how well known the Strategikon was in the Middle Ages,
> but I suspect that it was not. My understanding is that Byzantium was
> very much a 'foreign country' to Westerners and viewed with a good
> deal of suspicion because of religious differences. Further, the
> Strategikon was written in Greek, and there was very littlre
> translation of Greek texts into Latin until the Rennaissance. I did do
> some Byzantine history at university and I distinctly remember our
> lecturer telling us that the most recent reliable edition of the
> Strategikon (in Greek) was published in the 17th century.
>
> Regards
>
> Ann
>
> Bill Barber <bbarber@... <mailto:bbarber%40eol.ca>> wrote:
> While going though Google Alerts, I came across a reference to Maurice's
> Strategikon, which is an 'Art of War' for Byzantine forces in early
> medieval times. The work is new to me, and I am posting it because I
> wonder if it was a work that Western European nobles learned as part of
> their military education in medieval times.
> http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/strategikon/strategikon.htm
> <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/strategikon/strategikon.htm>
>
> I make the following observations, hoping that others might know more
> about this treatise.
>
> * Like the Byzantines, Napoleon used varied sized fighting units.
>
> * The effectiveness of suppressive fire depends less on accuracy
> than on sheer volume and high trajectory. The English were made aware of
> this truth when first faced by Welsh firepower while Edward I fought the
> Welsh. The English used the archer effectively during the early stages
> of The Hundred Years War. Even though the English archer was dismounted
> while the Byzantine archer was mounted, the basic concept of quantity of
> fire over quality of fire remains the same.
>
> * The use of cursores and defensores was meant to solve the problem
> of 'victors' falling into ambushes while pursuing an enemy in retreat.
> At Hastings, Harold's army pursued the Normans who were in retreat, and
> were cut down when William's cavalry wheeled and charged. The Saxons had
> no backup to protect them. Sometimes it's hard to know when a retreat is
> a feint. Best to have support
>
> * The Byzantines' new battle order placed the men in two lines, so
> that the second line could cover if the the first line was pushed back.
> Although this tactic was new for the Byzantines, I'm not sure how new it
> was in general military strategy. It was certainly used in medieval
> warfare.
>
> * Also, I'm not sure sure how new was the idea of flanking guards.
>
> * Perhaps we still have something to learn from the concept that one
> has to know one's enemy well. Maybe the reason we get into trouble these
> days is that we are arrogant in our underestimation of our enemy's
> intelligence.
>
> * While reading the section on dispensing information on a
> 'need-to-know' basis only, I was struck by how business strategy has
> moved back to this approach. About thirty years ago, businesses began to
> entrust employees with great amounts of information so that front line
> people could be 'empowered' to make their own strategic decisions. If we
> look at what just happened at Home Depot, we see an example of a company
> who reversed this tendency by removing power from the front-liners and
> concentrating control in a tight central cadre. It's probably good to
> keep things close to the vest in military initiatives, but I'm not sure
> that it works in a business setting. Of course, one of the suggested
> readings for corporate CEOs is The Art of War.
>
> * The Strategikon advises that the commander master a variety of
> strategic models, and that he not use the same strategy all the time.
> One of the weaknesses shown by the French in the first stages of the
> Hundred Years War is that their moves were predictable. They started out
> with Genoese crossbowmen, and then followed with a massive cavalry
> charge. The English knew that all they had to do was to order the long
> bowmen to fire high and quickly. Of course, as time wore on, it was the
> English who became predictable as the French opted for a war of attrition.
>
> * The Spanish Jinettes seem to have been horsemen who used the
> tactics of the Byzantine horsemen, but I assume the Spanish got the idea
> from the Moors. I'm not sure that the concept of light horsemen was
> adopted in other parts of Europe during the middle ages.
>
> Interesting stuff. I wonder if this work was known in Western Europe, or
> whether its lessons were learned from intermediary sources or
> independent experience. By the same token, I know that the concepts
> expounded upon in the Strategikon were not all made up by its author.
>
> Of course,we know that, in some cases, the lessons weren't learned at all.
>
>
>
>
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